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Summary 
My dissertation tells a history of Fiberline Composites a small Danish producer of 
reinforced plastic. The purpose of telling this story, which stretches over 25 years from 
the company’s founding in 1979 to 2004, is to discuss the process of growth. In The
Theory of the Growth of the Firm economist Edith Penrose seeks to explain this process 
and she proposes that it is best studied through historical analysis of the individual firm. 
This is the case, she argues, because firm growth is a path-dependent process of 
accumulating and exploiting resources and because every firm exists in a specific context 
of time and place.    
The firm’s available resources are exploited, or put to service, as a response to the 
(productive) opportunities that the firm sees and as Penrose notes the theory of the growth 
of firms is basically an examination of the changing productive opportunity of firms. 
Penrose describes productive opportunity as a subjective phenomenon. She notes that 
when the firm acts on such opportunities it will base its decisions on the company’s own 
self-conception and image of context. As such these concepts are the key to explaining the 
growth process of the firm. The object of my dissertation is to discuss the connection 
between the process of firm growth and the self-conception and image of context of the 
firm.  
To Penrose the concepts of self-conception and image of context is inaccessible. They are, 
she claims, an extremely personal aspect of the growth of individual firms because they 
are dependent on the ingenuity and preferences of the firm’s entrepreneur(s). I argue, 
however, that by considering construction of meaning along the lines suggested by 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, the subjective elements that Penrose points to may be 
treated not as unknowable, personal fads of the entrepreneur, but as shared cultural 
expressions of the firm. As such the subjective elements of firm growth can become the 
object of analysis.   
In my analysis I give a number of examples of how the growth of Fiberline has been 
influenced by the self-conception and image of context of the company: I discuss the 
connection between these concepts and the exploitation of resources in the company, I 
consider the role of experience and knowledge in forming the self-conception and image 
of context of the firm, I explore the influence on the company’s perception of productive 
opportunities and I discuss how the self-conception and image of context of the company 
influenced Fiberline’s decisions concerning specialization, diversification and market 
focus.   
My analysis show two overall development paths of Fiberline. On the one hand the 
company had a determined focus on a single area of specialization and on the other a very 
broad market focus. Both were connected to the self-conception and image of context of 
the company. Put roughly it may be concluded that over the first 25 years of their 
existence Fiberline developed to become highly specialized generalists.  
My study offer a new and closer reading of Penrose’s theory of firm growth confronting 
the subjective elements she pointed to but didn’t pursue further. It is a way of working 
with firm growth that allows for a microscopic perspective on the decisions and actions of 
firms as well as demonstrates the insight that may be gained by studying the growth 
process historically. 
Resumé
Min afhandling fortæller historien om Fiberline Composites en mindre dansk producent af 
armeret plast. Formålet med at fortælle denne historie, som strækker sig over 25 år fra 
virksomhedens grundlæggelse i 1979 til 2004, er at diskutere virksomheds vækst som en 
udviklingsproces. Økonomen Edith Penrose forsøger i The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm at forklare denne proces, og hun foreslår, at den bedst studeres gennem historisk 
analyse af den enkelte virksomhed. Dette er tilfældet, argumenterer Penrose, dels fordi 
virksomhedsvækst er en stiafhængig proces, hvor ressourcer opbygges og udnyttes, dels 
fordi enhver virksomhed eksisterer i en specifik kontekst både i tid og sted.  
De ressourcer, der er til rådighed for virksomheden, udnyttes som en reaktion på de 
produktive muligheder, som virksomheden ser. Penrose bemærker, at teorien om 
virksomhedens vækst dybest set er en undersøgelser af virksomhedens skiftende 
produktive muligheder. Penrose beskriver produktive muligheder som et subjektivt 
fænomen. Hun beskriver, hvordan virksomheden, når den handler, baserer sine 
beslutninger på virksomhedens egen selvforståelse (self-conception) og dens forståelse af 
omverdenen (image of context). Derfor er disse begreber afgørende for at forstå 
virksomhedens vækstproces. Formålet med min afhandling er at diskutere forbindelsen 
mellem virksomhedens vækstproces, dens selvforståelse og forståelse af omverdenen.   
For Penrose er selvforståelse og forståelse af omverdenen begge fænomener, der ikke 
lader sig indfange i analyse. De er, hævder hun, et ekstremt privat aspekt af den enkelte 
virksomheds vækst, fordi de er afhængige af virksomhedens entreprenør(er) og hans 
personlighed og tanker. Men ved at analysere betydningsdannelse (mening creation), som 
foreslået af antropolog Clifford Geertz, kan de subjektive elementer, som Penrose peger 
på, indfanges. De kan behandles ikke som entreprenørens private og personlige luner, 
men som fælles kulturelle fænomener. På den måde kan også de subjektive elementer af 
virksomhedens vækst analyseres og undersøges.       
I min analyse giver jeg en række eksempler på, hvordan Fiberlines vækst har været 
påvirket af virksomhedens selvforståelse og forståelse af kontekst: Jeg diskuterer 
forbindelsen mellem disse begreber og virksomhedens udnyttelse af ressourcer. Jeg 
overvejer betydningen af erfaring og viden i konstruktionen af selvforståelse og forståelse 
af kontekst. Jeg undersøger, hvilken betydning virksomhedens selvforståelse og forståelse 
af kontekst har for dens opfattelse af produktive muligheder, og jeg diskuterer, hvordan 
selvforståelse og forståelse af kontekst influerer Fiberlines beslutninger angående 
specialisering, diversifikation og markedsfokus. 
Min analyse viser, at der var to overordnede spor i Fiberlines vækst. På den ene side var 
virksomheden fast fokuseret på en enkelt teknologisk base, hvilket medførte, at den blev 
højt specialiseret, på den anden side vedblev virksomheden at have et meget bredt 
markedsfokus. Sagt lidt firkantet så betød dette, at man i Fiberline udviklede sig til at 
blive højt specialiserede generalister.  
Mit studie tilbyder en ny og tættere læsning af Penrose’s teori om virksomhedens 
vækstproces. En læsning, som udfolder de subjektive elementer, som Penrose havde øje 
for, men som hun ikke undersøgte nærmere hverken empirisk eller teoretisk. Det, jeg 
foreslår, er en metode til at arbejde med virksomhedens vækstproces, som tillader et 
mikroskopisk perspektiv på virksomhedens beslutninger og handlinger, og som 
demonstrerer hvilken indsigt, der kan opnås, ved at arbejde historisk med 
virksomhedsvækst.  
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11. Introduction
On May 1, 1979, in spite of bleak prospects, a handful of people met for champagne in a 
run-down production hall that housed a small company called Fiberline Composites. The 
young founder Henrik Thorning and his wife Dorthe Thorning had decided to celebrate 
this day as the company’s birthday. On this day Fiberline, which had been founded in 
January the same year, managed for the first time to pull a usable product through their 
machine. They were trying to learn how to make profiles in reinforced plastic by a 
relatively new method called pultrusion.  
Reinforced plastic materials are strong, flexible, and lightweight, and in the 1970s they 
had been known and used in a number of different industries for a period. Pultrusion 
would ensure better control of the process in which plastic material is mixed with 
reinforcement fibers. The potential lay in making more homogeneous profiles of greater 
strength, which would make the possible use of the profiles much greater compared to 
those already on the market. Henrik Thorning founded his company on this hope. 
However, it turned out to be exhaustingly difficult for Fiberline. To get production up and 
running was one thing, but it was quite another to manufacture larger amounts of profiles 
of a quality able to compete with well-known substitutes like steel or aluminum.  
A year after the founding, around New Year 1980, Fiberline’s situation was critical. 
Though they could now produce profiles of a somewhat even quality, the development of 
the production continued to be very expensive. On top of this it turned out to be next to 
impossible to sell the profiles, even though Fiberline was cooperating with one of 
Denmark’s largest and most respected dealers of plastic materials. In the drawer of his 
desk, Henrik Thorning kept a note he had written on a particularly challenging day. It 
read: “Never give up.” He looked at it often in the beginning, when the struggle for 
survival was intense.1
225 years later, in 2004, the company had approx. 100 employees. The yearly turnover was 
growing fast; closing in on 200 million DKK and the years prior to 2004 had shown the 
largest profits in the history of the company. The main part of the profiles was exported, 
and Fiberline was present at most European markets. A small book was produced as part 
of the celebrations on the occasion of Fiberline’s anniversary that year. It was given to 
employees as well as friends and acquaintances of the firm. The book portrays a confident 
firm that perceives itself as an entrepreneurial start-up, founded on the vision of Henrik 
Thorning, and grown to become an international technological leader of the industry.2
Indeed this would seem a happy history of development and growth. The object of this 
dissertation is to explore this process of growth by telling a history of Fiberline and by 
asking how Fiberline developed through time from idea to international company. 
Penrose and the historical study of firm development  
In The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Edith Penrose seeks to explain the process of 
growth of manufacturing companies,3 and she proposes that such processes should be 
studied through historical analysis for two reasons. The first involves the way resources 
are exploited in the company. Penrose describes the firm as a pool of resources, the 
service of which may be exploited to meet productive opportunities thereby creating 
competitive advantage and firm growth.4 The key concept is service that describes how 
the resources of the firm are put to use. Penrose notes that 
The important distinction between resources and services … lies in the 
fact that resources consist of a bundle of potential services and can, for 
the most part, be defined independently of their use, while services 
cannot be so defined, the very word ‘service’ implying a function, an 
activity.5
For the growth of the firm the use of some services is more important than others; 
experience and knowledge are especially central. Penrose states that 
3In the explanation of the course of expansion of a particular firm and 
of the limits on its rate of expansion, it is illuminating to put the chief 
emphasis on the firm's "inherited" resources and productive services, 
including its accumulated experience and knowledge, for a firm's 
productive opportunity is shaped and limited by its ability to use what 
it already has.6
As the company pursues new productive opportunities, it draws service from its existing 
(inherited) resources, gaining new experience and knowledge, which can then be put to 
service in the exploitation of new opportunities. This cumulative process is fundamental 
for understanding the direction and method of the growth of the company. The process is 
controlled by putting the available managerial resources of the company to service: these 
then determine the pace and set the limit to growth. In this process, Penrose notes, the 
firm may use different tools of growth like diversification or specialization.7
Firm growth from this perspective is a path-dependent process drawing productive 
services from resources built up over time and limited by the managerial and 
entrepreneurial services available to the firm at any given time. In the foreword to the 
third edition of her book, Penrose concludes that “One of the primary assumptions of the 
theory of the growth of the firm is that history matters; growth is essentially an 
evolutionary process…”8 which is the main reason why company growth should be 
studied historically.   
In a later text Penrose further notes that a second argument for conducting historical 
analysis is the contextual specificity of the growth process of any given firm. Quoting 
Schumpeter, who made the same point and also applied historical methods, she notes that 
“…the subject matter is essentially a unique process in historical time.”9 The context 
specificity of any given firm (or industry, market or any unit of analysis one might 
imagine) in both time and place is a prime argument in the field of business history for the 
relevance of the field, but as noted above not the only one offered by Penrose.   
4In her case study of the Hercules Powder Company, Penrose exemplifies how firm 
development can be studied through historical analysis.10 Penrose tells the history of the 
development of the Hercules Powder Company focusing on the interaction between the 
productive opportunities of the firm and the exploitation of the services available from its 
resources. The starting point of the history is a steep dive in the market for explosives 
after the First World War, which pushed the company to explore new opportunities and 
yield new services from their entrepreneurial resources.11 For this they turned to their 
development department, whose strong knowledge of chemicals could be operationalized 
in pursuit of new markets particularly in the growing plastic industry. Through the almost 
50 years, Penrose analyzes the growth of the company, this would lead them to diversify 
into many different markets, while the knowledge base was continuously strengthened 
and could be put into new service.12
In the Hercules case study, Penrose makes her central point about firm growth by 
exemplifying the cumulative process of exploiting productive opportunities drawing on 
and developing resources, experience and knowledge. She notes that the history of 
Hercules demonstrates that the development of a company, though unique in its details, 
“is by no means unique in its general pattern and will be found repeated in greater or less 
degree in the story of any number of long-established successful firms.”13 Concluding the 
case study and expressing the main point she strived to introduce into economic theory, 
Penrose further notes that “The company's history illustrates the impossibility of 
separating ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ as independent factors explaining the growth and 
diversification of a firm.”14     
Subjectivity, entrepreneurial attitude, and image of context 
As described previously, the productive opportunity of the firm is a central concept for 
Penrose. Defining it, she notes that it “… comprises all of the productive possibilities that 
5its [the firm’s] ‘entrepreneurs’ see and can take advantage of. A theory of the growth of 
firms is essentially an examination of the changing productive opportunity of firms.”15
This notion has important implications for the way growth processes may be understood, 
because emphasis is not on what possibilities are “out there” but on what possibilities the 
company sees – or perceives. In the Hercules study Penrose argues that 
Not only is the actual expansion of a firm related to its resources, 
experience, and knowledge, but also, and most important, the kinds of 
opportunity it investigates when it considers expansion. Moreover, 
once a firm has made its choice and has embarked on an expansion 
program, its expectations may not be confirmed by events. The 
reactions of the firm to disappointment - the alteration it makes in its 
plans and activities and the way in which it adapts (or fails to adapt) - 
are again to be explained with reference to its resources.16
In this passage Penrose elaborates further on the creation of path dependency already 
described as given from the way resources are exploited in the company. She maps out the 
process in the Hercules case study and concludes that  
The … interpretation of the growth of Hercules is based on a study of 
past history and of recent attitudes. It is clear that entrepreneurial 
attitudes, the "firm's conception of itself," have had a pervasive 
influence not only on its direction of growth but also on the method of 
growth and on the rate of growth.17
What Penrose suggests is an interrelation between the firm’s conception of self and its 
exploitation of resources. Furthermore Penrose suggests a dynamic interrelation between 
these two and the context (environment) of the company. Underscoring the importance of 
the concept of entrepreneurial attitude, she notes that
As management tries to make the best use of the resources available, a 
truly ‘dynamic’ interacting process occurs which encourages 
continuous growth but limits the rate of growth. … the environment is 
treated … as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities 
6and restrictions with which he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an 
‘image’ which in fact determines a man’s behavior.18
The idea of the company’s conception of itself and the relation between this and the 
company’s image of context is intriguing. Via the concepts of productive opportunity and 
entrepreneurial attitude, Penrose places conception at the center of both path-dependency 
and firm growth. However she doesn’t elaborate further and leaves resources as well as 
experience and knowledge at the center of growth analysis, even though the firm’s 
exploitation of all three (not just resources as already mentioned) is dependent on self-
conception. Penrose had no fear of opening the black box of the company and showcasing 
it to economists, but she drew the line at phenomena like attitude and conception, which 
she considered too elusive for analysis.  
Penrose touches upon the reason for this when defining enterprise in The Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm. In doing so she comes close to her use of entrepreneurial attitude in 
the Hercules case by saying that “There are probably many ways of defining enterprise, 
but for our purposes it can usefully be treated as a psychological predisposition on the part 
of the individuals to take a chance in the hope of gain.”19 She further notes that “This 
extremely personal aspect of the growth of individual firms has undoubtedly been one of 
the obstacles in the way of the development of a general theory of the growth of firms.”20
In her introduction Penrose also notes that  
… a theory purporting to explain the process of growth of firms can be 
useful on two levels. It can be useful even if it only presents a logical 
model yielding conclusions which seem to correspond to actual events 
that can be ‘observed’ in the growth of actual firms. But it will be even 
better if it helps us to understand the actions behind these events. For 
this, if we assume that firms act for a purpose, we must find an 
acceptable assumption as to why they act.21
7In a later passage she is even more specific about the subjective nature of action as she 
notes that  
If we can discover what determines entrepreneurial ideas about what 
the firm can and cannot do, that is, what determines the nature and 
extent of the ‘subjective’ productive opportunity of the firm, we can at 
least know where to look if we want to explain or to predict the actions 
of particular firms.22 
Penrose, however, restricts her exploration of why companies act to the analysis of the 
exploitation of resources. In the end then the notion of seeking to understand growth on a 
fundamental level, understanding why companies act as they do by considering self-
conception and the image of context in the construction of (productive) opportunity, 
remains merely an idea for Penrose.  
Foss and his colleagues, who discuss Penrose’s idea of the firm’s image of context, argue 
that from this perspective “The notion of productive opportunity is clearly a subjectivist 
(or, as some may prefer, ‘constructivist’) category.” Referring to Weick, they continue: 
“In terms of modern organization theory Penrose is here clearly talking about the 
‘enactment’ of the environment that the management team performs.”23 Foss and his 
colleges only observe this, however, but like Penrose they do not unfold the idea or 
explore it theoretically or empirically.  
I agree with Foss and his colleges in comparing Penrose’s image of the environment to 
Weick’s idea of enactment. Also Penrose’s concept of entrepreneurial attitude or self-
conception may be captured by Weick’s general idea of sense making or by Geertz’s 
notion of meaning construction – a shared social process.24 Drawing on such concepts 
from interpretative cultural theory, one can learn more about how self-conception and the 
company’s image of its environment interrelate with the exploitation of resources in the 
company and influence firm growth. By considering construction of meaning along the 
8lines suggested by Geertz, the subjective elements that Penrose points to may be treated 
not as unknowable, personal fads of the entrepreneur, but as shared cultural expressions of 
the firm.  
Research purpose
Penrose describes how the company grows through a process of exploiting productive 
opportunities by putting accumulated and unused resources to service. She points to both 
the company’s image of its context as well as its self-conception as instrumental in 
guiding the decisions and actions of the company and, as such, an important aspect to 
consider when seeking to understand the growth of the firm. Penrose leaves this aspect 
unexplored, however, in both her theoretical framework and her empirical study. 
The object of my dissertation is to add to the Penrosian understanding of firm growth by 
discussing the role of self-conception in the growth of Fiberline. I will be considering how 
an image of the context of the company is formed and seek to show how this image and 
the company’s self-conception influence decisions and actions of the company and by 
extension its growth. This will bring the study of growth closer to explaining why 
companies act the way they do; conceiving particular productive opportunities, making 
particular decisions, and choosing particular ways to put particular resources into service. 
Studies of firm growth  
The literature dealing with firm growth is substantial and found within many different 
fields of research.25 The work of Penrose is influential in strategic management as part of 
the foundations of the resource based view of the firm. The idea that firm heterogeneity 
can be explained by reference to the knowledge and resources of the individual firm has 
inspired new ways of thinking about market position and how competitive advantage can 
be facilitated.26 In this, however, the long-term development of the firm is often not 
considered, and the original intention of Penrose’s theory – to understand firm growth – 
9as well as the historical method she favored, is mostly forgotten in the strategic 
management literature. 
Generally studies of firm growth have been preoccupied with explaining and/or predicting 
how much firms grow27 and have typically applied a timeframe of either 1, 3 or 5 years.28
Shepard and Wiklund conclude on the basis of an extensive review that the performance 
measurements most often applied are sales, number of employees, profit, assets, and 
equity.29 Shepard and Wiklund are critical however of the generated knowledge of 
growth, and McKelvie and Wiklund in their discussion of the literature conclude that 
“Despite hundreds of studies into explaining firm-level growth differences, the main 
finding in this stream of literature is that researchers have been unable to isolate variables 
that have a consistent effect on growth across studies”30 Quoting Coad’s conclusion on the 
basis of an extensive literature review, they further note that “The main message that 
seems to emerge is that growth is largely a random process.”31
Compared to the overwhelming number of studies focusing on explaining rate of growth 
or growth conditions, studies focusing on the process of growth are few. In their 
discussion of the theoretical development of growth studies this leads Davidsson, 
Achtenhagen and Naldi to conclude that “as regards modes and process the current state 
of knowledge is so under-developed that mere mapping out of the phenomenon would 
constitute worthwhile contributions.”32
One of the very first observations by Penrose in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm is 
that growth does not only mean “change in amount.” It sometimes also denotes the 
process by which this change comes into being.33 Penrose seeks to explain growth as a 
process, and studies with this focus most often draw on her theory or on newer resource-
based theory derived or inspired from it.34 These studies are of a diverse nature, but 
generally they apply the same short term frame as in other forms of growth studies.35 Also 
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the field of Business History has difficulty presenting studies of the process of firm 
growth over time,36 which might seem surprising, especially given the arguments Penrose 
gives for doing such studies. But the research agenda of the field appears to have been 
preoccupied with matters other than theorizing firm growth processes.  
Penrose’s framework and the resource-based view of the firm have been applied to a great 
extent in the study of multinational companies and internationalization.37 But even though 
these topics have also interested business historians, they have mostly chosen other 
paths.38 Pettus in his article on firm growth argues that “analysis of the sequential 
development of a firm’s resource base over time is lacking in the literature”39
Pettus initially ponders that “Although everyone seems to agree that resources are 
developed in a complex, path-dependent process … no resourcebased theorist has 
explained or predicted this growth path.”40 By drawing inspiration from Penrose, but 
building mainly on newer resource-based theory derived from the strategic management 
field, Pettus sets out to explain and provide tools for predicting growth paths over time. 
He does this by formulating 5 steps of firm growth testing these empirically by analyzing 
the development of the 59 publicly traded companies in the American trucking industry 
over a period from 1980 to 93.41 During this period the industry was deregulated, which 
presented growth opportunities and threats for the industry and an opportunity to observe 
growth-paths in that situation. Pettus concludes that of the 59 companies in the sample 6 
followed the ideal growth path he formulated via resource-based theory leading to the 
highest growth rates in the industry, while the other companies followed a number of less 
effective paths.42
Pettus then might explain how the largest companies in the American trucking industry 
developed after the deregulation, described in the article as a Schumpeterian shock.43
However in looking for ways of testing the optimal growth paths not much explanation is 
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given of the actual growth process of the companies. The reasons why and by what 
actions the companies developed are left unexplored.  
McGovern and McLean’s recent article on the history Clarke Chapman offer another 
example of a study of firm growth over a longer period of time.44 They build their analysis 
on an in-depth study of a single company; compared to Pettus they offer a more detailed 
insight into the actual exploitation of productive opportunity in the company in the same 
way Penrose did in the Hercules study. Clarke Chapman was a subcontractor for the 
British shipbuilding industry, and through a study of the company from 1864 to 1914 
McGovern and McLean give an example of the path-dependent process of exploiting 
productive opportunities by drawing on resources available in the company, leading to 
new knowledge and resources, creating new opportunities.45
McGovern and McLean also discuss the influence of the structure of ownership of the 
company. They show that the will of the founders and their families to keep ownership 
and influence would often set limits on the growth of the company by hindering further 
investment of capital.46 McGovern and McLean also consider different factors in the 
context of the company, which are not all part of Penrose’s framework, but still important, 
they argue, for understanding the growth of this particular firm. These are mostly related 
to the economic situation in Britain in the period, a depression in the ship building 
industry, and subsequent labor conflicts. They also point to rapid technological change in 
the shipbuilding industry, to which the company supplied its products, as well as to the 
important influence of a strong social network of the management.47
Apart from exemplifying how a firm grows over time, demonstrating Penrose’ theory in a 
new context, McGovern and McLean also elaborate on many aspects of growth, which 
Penrose only touched upon and didn’t investigate empirically. Both Pettus and McGovern 
& McLean offer interesting insights into the process of growth, as well as examples of the 
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form of knowledge that may be drawn from working historically and over time with firm 
development. However neither Pettus nor McGovern and McLean seek to explain growth 
on the fundamental level described by Penrose as understanding why firms act and none 
of them engage with the subjectivity found in her concepts of image and self-
conception.48
Connell offers a very interesting study focusing specifically on the company’s image of 
the environment. She tells a history of the start-up of a Hong Kong trading company 
around 1782 and shows that by focusing on reputation and legitimacy the company 
influenced the legal environment for business to match their own image of context 
thereby creating new productive opportunities. This shows how the company shaped its 
environment by basing its actions on its own image of the context.49 As such, Connell 
gives examples of ways of creating productive opportunity not considered by Penrose 
whose focus was mainly on more direct market opportunities as demonstrated in the 
Hercules case. Connell offers considerations as to why the company acts the way it does 
based on image of context. However she doesn’t consider the same matter with reference 
to the exploitation of resources in the company and therefore only gives an account of part 
of the interpretative process of firm growth.  
These few examples aside, historical analyses focusing on the developmental process of 
firms over time drawing on a Penrosian framework are, as already discussed, rare both in 
the study of firm growth and in the field of business history.50 Studies, applying theory 
and tools from what could generally be called an interpretative paradigm, however, are 
now emerging in business history introducing concepts like sensemaking or construction 
of meaning to business history analyses. These might then offer a way to proceed if 
interested in the subjective aspects of Penrose’s concept of growth.  
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As a last remark before turning to these, Ericson’s A Narrative Approach to Business 
Growth should be mentioned as an example that introduce interpretative theory into 
growth studies.51 In her study Ericson interviewed around 70 former and current managers 
in the Swedish company Hilding Anders and asked them to tell her about the growth of 
the company through the last 70 or so years.52 From these narrative bits and pieces she 
gathers what she calls three plots. These are the company’s growth narrative as she tells 
it.53 Ericson’s analysis is interesting as it shows the richness of narratives on growth at 
play in the organization and the clashes between these narratives. Ericson’s point, as I 
perceive it, is that such narratives of growth are used by individuals to construct their 
organizational reality. Yet, no attempt is made to couple the narratives to actions in the 
past and the analysis, despite the fact that 70 years of company past is discussed, is 
essentially void of development or historical reasoning. Its focus is on the organization as 
a construct of the individual in the present.  
Construction of meaning in business history 
An interpretative take on studying organizations is by no means new, and cultural theory 
is an old friend of organizational studies. Drawing inspiration for example from 
anthropology such ideas have been cultivated in organizational studies leading to new 
ways of working with organizational culture and a growing interest in organizational 
practice.54 In the field of strategy this development, which has been called the practice 
turn, has contributed significantly to the theoretical development of this field drawing in 
new focuses and methods.55 Also organizational studies have seen a development in 
works drawing on semiotics or linguistics, embracing the general point that human reality 
is socially constructed and focusing on interpreting the expressions this construction finds 
in written or spoken language, narratives etc.56 In the field of business history, however, 
culture has traditionally been studied by applying other lenses.  
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Business history has generally applied a concept of culture derived from economic 
reasoning. A main focus in these studies have been on explaining the effects of national 
culture, values, and other cultural phenomena on entrepreneurial activity, for example, 
and economic growth in general.57 As Rowlinson and Procter noted in 1999, these studies 
tend to view culture “as a variable that can predict the efficiency of the firm.”58 The point 
of their theoretical discussion of organizational culture and business history is to invite 
business historians to engage more with new cultural theory as discussed and applied in 
studies of organizational culture. Inspired by the use of cultural theory in organization 
studies they further note that: “The concept of culture implies an interpretive approach to 
business history that should move it away from deterministic explanations of corporate 
success and failure towards an emphasis on the meaning and interpretations of actors that 
help constitute organizations over time.”59 
Before this, Lipartito’s 1995 article on culture and the practice of business history offered 
a rare discussion and example of the use interpretative cultural theory in the field. As 
many business historians before him Lipartito ponders how performance differences even 
between companies operating in the same markets can be explained. He presents an 
empirical example and ascribes the performance difference between the American and 
Japanese car industry to historical and contextual specificity, but also to unique 
organizational culture constructs and the way these enable technological development of 
some companies in the industry.60
In defining the concept of culture Lipartito draws on an anthropological tradition of 
seeing culture as a “mental apparatus for grasping reality,”61 which as Rowlinson and 
Proctor note has also been applied in studies of organizational culture and organizational 
ethnographies.62 However, at the brink of the new millennium Rowlinson and Procter 
didn’t seem overly enthusiastic about the prospects of engaging organizational culture 
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studies in further conversation with business history. On the one hand, they argue, post-
modernism has a strong grip on organizational culture studies making these very reluctant 
to accept the idea of the narrative structure (the writing of History with a capital H) 
associated with analyses in business history. On the other hand business historians 
unfamiliar with the subjectivity of post-modernism and heavily influenced by economic 
theory are also prone to empiricism.63 Rowlinson and Procter conclude that “the challenge 
for business historians is to resist the temptation to disappear into the archive equipped 
with ‘a check list’ provided by economists ‘for assessing the economic value of different 
cultures.’”64 In 2008 more than 10 years after writing his enthusiastic plea to business 
history for an engagement with new cultural theory, Lipartito considered the state of the 
art in The Oxford Handbook of Business History chapter on culture in the field. It shows a 
tendency to studies of culture still very influenced by economic theory and not many firm 
level analyses.65 It would seem that business history had so far stuck to the well-known 
‘check list’.  
However considering the field today and especially focusing on Scandinavian or Northern 
European publications, a new take on culture in the field of business history appears to be 
emerging. It can open the field to a new reign of questions and answers focusing instead 
on meaning construction in and around the company than on parameters for assessing 
economic growth. In this the discussion and application of narrative theory and method 
have been decisive.  
In a recent article Hansen discusses the benefits of a narrative approach to business 
history. Defining narratives he notes that 
Narratives are basic instruments for ordering reality, assigning 
causality, and constructing meaning. Humans—whether modern 
historians or the people they study—make sense of the world by 
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telling stories, and these stories have the potential to frame the way 
members of an organization or citizens of a nation see the world.66
This may help explain how “Individuals make decisions and take action on the basis of 
the narrative meanings they ascribe to their surroundings,”67 and by extension then a 
narrative approach can be used to understand mechanisms of change and development for 
example in organizations. Referencing Weick who argues that organizations develop a 
“trained incapacity to see the world differently” Hansen in an earlier article notes that 
narratives “… set important limits to the list of strategic options available to the 
organization, thereby producing organizational inertia or path dependency.”68
Theory on narratives offers both a way to study development over time as well as tools for 
doing textual analysis. Therefor the approach has been favored in studies of history 
(particularly social and cultural history) where most testaments to actions are in written 
text.69 Hansen notes that “historians are uniquely positioned and suited to analyze how the 
creation of meaning varies across time and space.”70  Within recent years this fact has 
been explored in business history through studies focusing either on the use of history or 
sensemaking in organizations.  
History is a powerful tool, which organizations can use to create and alter brands and to 
enable organizational and strategic change. At the same time however history may also be 
a constraint on change as noted. Lundström gives an interesting example of deliberate use 
of history as a tool for both branding and identity building in her analysis of the Swedish 
phone company Ericsson. She focuses particularly on the company’s celebrations of 
jubilees and analyzes the change in these across time.71 In his study of the company 
August Thyssen, Fear exemplifies how history can be used as a tool of management 
control in the organization,72 while Freeland shows the use of history in struggles for 
influence across divisions in General Motors.73
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Hansen in his study of the Danish savings banks shows how historical narratives do not 
always help facilitate change, but can also work to constrain the company’s capacity to 
change.74 The same point is made at an industry level in a study of the Danish furniture 
industry. Hansen shows how the narratives of the individual organizations and the 
industry are locked into larger national or cultural narratives facilitating and constraining 
the actors in the same way as organizational narratives.75 Mordhorst in his studies of a 
number of companies all originating in the Danish co-operative movement have shown 
how these companies are firmly locked into narratives of national Danish culture and how 
the companies struggle to formulate new meaning as these national narratives are 
questioned and lose explanatory power.76 Another stream of recent historical studies is 
focused on the process of sensemaking as it finds expression in historical narratives in the 
organization. Both Abolafia and Hansen have used this approach to analyze sensemaking 
in the financial sector, seeking to explain aspects of financial crisis at the organizational 
and societal level respectively.77
By the end of the 1990s the field of business history had certainly been slow to engage 
with interpretative theory as noted by Procter and Rowlinson. And Lipartito can probably 
not be blamed for overlooking a handful of studies drawing on new cultural theory in his 
2008 state of the art. But today a new stream of research in business history is thriving. It 
shows the benefits of applying narrative approaches in historical analysis and the 
possibilities this gives for asking questions concerning meaning creation or sensemaking 
and change. However, so far business history has not explicitly linked these insights to the 
process of firm growth or to Penrose’s idea of the role of image of context and self-
conception in firm growth.     
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Research questions  
As already stated the object of my dissertation is to discuss the role of self-conception and 
image of the context in the growth of Fiberline. I have clarified that I perceive Penrose’s 
notion of self-conception to be compatible to concepts like sensemaking or meaning 
construction. Therefore, a narrative approach is well suited for my analysis as the basic 
assumption is that narratives are tools used for constructing meaning which is a point set 
forth in recent studies of business history. Another point to be drawn from these studies is 
that narrative approaches may help explain change in organizations because they lay bare 
the grounds on which organizations act and make decisions as well as explain inertia and 
blind spots in this. As such a narrative approach to my study may help me in explaining, 
as was a dream of Penrose, why companies act the way they do - in pursuing productive 
opportunities and exploiting resources, in diversifying or focusing or in any other aspect 
of growth relevant to the development of my case company over time. The questions I 
will seek to answer through my analysis are:  
What narratives do Fiberline use and what self-conception and image of context is 
constructed by their use? How do they influence the company’s decisions? How can the 
company’s use of narratives be said to have influenced its growth? This last question may 
be split into three more specific sub questions: How did Fiberline’s use of narratives 
influence what services were yielded from the company’s resources? How did it influence 
the productive opportunities that were pursued? And how did Fiberline’s use of narratives 
influence the company’s choices concerning market focus and diversification?
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2. Analytical strategy  
Penrose’s idea of the role of self-conception in the development of the firm is basically a 
matter of meaning creation. This is captured in new cultural theory, which as 
demonstrated is now just being introduced into business history. I will be applying a 
concept of culture formulated by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. He defines it as follows:  
The concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a semiotic one. 
Believing … that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance 
he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis 
of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretative one in search of meaning.1
The central point is the searching for meaning. Geertz captures how the individual actor 
makes sense of existence by a process based on a continuous interplay between the 
interpretation of a specific situation and the context surrounding it. This constant 
interpretation (the spinning of webs) is closely linked to dynamics of change and 
development as every action is based on the meaning constructed. In this lies a logic of 
action new to the field of business history, as Lipartito notes:  
The logic of action in history was clear – individuals always 
understood and pursued their self-interest, and the self-interested 
actions of individuals constituted society. Business historians followed 
a similar logic, even though their unit of analysis was the organization 
more than the individual… These positions were strikingly different 
than those being developed by historians under the influence of 
cultural theory. Culturalists saw all aspects of human thought and 
behavior as contingent and variable.2
Penrose notes the same subjectivity of action and speculates how to find acceptable 
assumptions concerning why companies act the way they do.3 Geertz’s assumption is that 
every act is based on and can be explained by the meaning created in the situation, which 
he exemplifies by referencing the history of the many meanings of a wink.4
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I will dwell shortly on two main points of the cultural theory of Geertz before turning to 
the analytical tools offered by it. The two points represent the main arguments why the 
ideas he offers are particularly well suited for my purpose of making an historical 
analysis focused on development over time. One is the social nature of meaning and the 
implications this has for analysis. The other is the matter of how change may be 
understood, which is important in order to study development.  
The social nature of meaning 
Organizational theorist Barbara Czarniawska notes that one use of the word social is 
simply to point to the opposite of being alone.5 Geertz continually stresses the shared 
nature of meaning as constructed by the actor in interplay with the context of the specific 
situation. This by extension gives social nature to actions (he uses the term social action),6
which is a position that has been called the depsychologyzation of culture.7 In this Geertz 
is opposing a more subjective view of culture drawing on psychology.8 For example 
American anthropologist Ward Goodenough claims that “culture [is] in the minds and 
hearts of men… [It is] whatever … one has to know or believe in order to operate in a 
manner acceptable to its members.”9 Here the object of anthropology is a search for a 
mental code or key to understanding culture (and maybe even pass for a native).10
Geertz’s claim, on the other hand, that culture exists in a social setting, has a very 
practical analytical consequence as it moves the study of meaning away from the mental 
sphere, which is at best very difficult to access, and into a shared sphere, where it can be 
studied. This is among the main reasons why Geertz’s concept of culture has been widely 
used. The point has been particularly appreciated in social and cultural history, where the 
gap in time between the researcher and the culture studied most often marks a further 
hindrance of knowing the heart or mind of the actor(s) and where actions can be difficult 
to map out.11
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Earlier, when discussing the considerations of Penrose regarding the company’s self-
conception and the reservations she had about including such aspects in analysis, I 
mentioned her view of conception as something particularly private and inaccessible. 
Geertz however makes it clear that meaning creation is not a psychological process but 
rather takes place in a social/shared setting, and he offers concrete tools for studying it.  
Change and Geertz’ concept of culture 
Because of an insistent focus on a single situation or a very small series of situations in 
his analyses, Geertz has been criticized for producing an understanding of meaning 
creation that is too static.12 Though the depsychologization of culture has been 
appreciated in the field of history, it does on the other hand seem most interesting to 
many historians to ask questions concerning some form of development through time and 
not just a single event or situation. In any case change is the specific focus for me.  
At first glance the thick descriptions and interpretations of a single situation so distinctive 
in Geertz’s writing depict the cultural constructs under scrutiny as stable and resistant to 
change. However, the situations he focuses on almost always captures a moment, where 
these constructs are being challenged often by external pressure.13 Change, it could be 
argued, is at the center of his analysis then.14 Also he stresses the importance of historical 
context, the human need to narrate the past into meaningful entities and the importance of 
a firm understanding of stable elements in a culture for understanding change.15
Microhistory (or at least parts of it) has applied Geertz’s cultural concept for analysis of 
processes of (often social or political) change.16 The focused analysis offered through 
Geertz’s cultural concept provides possibilities for understanding such processes, because 
it ties meaning and action together. But as Geertz notes this (a messy reliance on human 
cognition) will of course leave the anthropologist (or historian) with an image of change 
much less organized than often preferred. “It is not history one is faced with … but a 
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confusion of histories … There is order in it all of some sort, but it is the order of a squall 
or a street market,” he notes.17
Thick Description and narratives  
Geertz proposes thick description as a way of doing analysis of meaning construction. 
Often thick description is merely seen as another way of proposing a detailed, in-depth, 
and focused analysis; this however is not all there is to it. In his definition of culture 
Geertz speaks of cultural analysis as being an interpretive science in search of meaning. 
He elaborates on this by saying: “It is explication I am after, construing social expressions 
on their surface enigmatical.”18 This explication or unfolding of social expressions is done 
through thick description. Geertz has borrowed the notion from British philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle and exemplifies it by Ryle’s story about the multiple meanings of a wink 
already mentioned. His point is that each wink gains meaning from the interaction 
between the specific performance of it and the context of that performance.19
The interrelation between the specific situation, the context, and the meaning constructed 
is mirrored in a duality in Geertz’s analyses between long descriptive passages dealing 
with the situation and the context of it and passages in which the construction of meaning 
in the situation is interpreted. Geertz makes it clear, though, that the descriptive parts of 
the analysis despite their style are also part of the interpretation as it represents the 
researcher’s reading of the situation.20 Also the interpretation starts long before the pen 
touches the paper (or the fingers the keyboard) and the researcher is thus communicating a 
distilled interpretation.21
Working as an anthropologist Geertz relies on ethnographic data collected in field studies 
through participatory observation, where he focuses on actions and interpret meaning 
from these. However he notes that interpreting action can be compared to analyzing text,22
and he is attentive to what he describes as a human need to narrate the past into sensible 
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entities.23 The same is noted by Carr who claims that any experience is given a narrative 
form by the actor in order to make sense of it, so it may be operationalized in the present; 
that is used as grounds for action.24 This - the performativity of narratives – guides what 
can and can’t be done in a situation by rendering some actions more meaningful than 
others. In this way meaning creation, action, and narratives are connected, and it is 
through the same mechanism inertia and blind spots can be created as already discussed.  
By nature of the past it is not possible to study situations and actions as they play out—
like an anthropologist. The historian is confined to whatever traces are left over from the 
past. From the traces of the past meaning creations may be interpreted and actions 
understood by doing narrative analyses. The sources business historians may draw on in 
such an analysis can be constituted by a large number of different materials all expressing 
narrative forms. Narratives create order, assign causality, and construct meaning.25 They 
are stable over time and it is by their stability that blind spots and inertia may be created.26
To sum up: A thick-description of the meaning constructed in the company can be done 
by analyzing the company’s use of narratives. Thus, the company’s subjective grounds for 
making decisions and acting may be analyzed as part of a history of the growth of the 
company.  
The case of Fiberline   
By now it should be clear that I have chosen to do a case study of Fiberline and as such it 
seems a good idea to offer both some considerations about what – if any – general 
knowledge can be gained from this as well as some arguments why I have chosen 
Fiberline. As I am claiming that narratives are used to establish meaning, I should 
probably start by telling my story, about how I came to know Fiberline in the first place 
(fundamental to my choice of using the company as a case of course). My introduction to 
Fiberline was mostly due to coincidence and my own sense of beauty (or simple 
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curiosity). Some years back I was invited to visit the company by a colleague. I accepted 
the invitation, as I wanted a closer look at the company’s very stunning buildings. Until 
then I had only seen these from the outside passing by on my way to work. The inside 
proved equally impressive, and the people I met were welcoming. It isn’t often that 
historians or other researchers are allowed to romper about a company’s archive with as 
much freedom as I was given in Fiberline. To this it also needs to be added that I have 
been working with the history of Fiberline as an independent researcher and have never 
been asked or commissioned to write for the company.27
Through her case study of Hercules, Penrose wishes to discuss general patterns of firm 
growth, and the same can be said for my use of Fiberline. In the manner of Geertz, the 
intention of my analysis is to give actuality to the concept of firm growth. He explains the 
value of thick description as a contribution to scientific debate in general as follows:     
The important thing about the anthropologist’s findings is their 
complex specificness, their circumstantiality. It is with the kind of 
material produced by long-term, mainly … qualitative, … and almost 
obsessively fine-comb field study in confined contexts that the mega-
concepts with which contemporary social science is afflicted … can be 
given the sort of sensible actuality that makes it possible to think … 
realistically and concretely about them …28
The aim is to draw large conclusions from small, but very densely 
textured facts; to support broad assertions about the role of culture in 
the construction of collective life by engaging them exactly with 
complex specifics.29
Empirical material and the use of it 
The archival material of Fiberline is rich, which is an advantage that is not to be 
underestimated, least of all by the historian. Through the meticulous effort of Dorthe 
Thorning, the archive of the company is large and well organized. Amongst many other 
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documents she has kept almost every piece of written information ever to pass between 
members of the board and the management of the company including a large number of 
lengthy reports from the management concerning the everyday running of the company. 
Apart from being uncommon30 (perhaps especially considering the relatively small size of 
Fiberline) this rich archival material is a precondition for doing historical analysis in the 
depth and detail intended here. 
Like many other growing companies Fiberline has seen a number of moves between 
offices, into new office space and even a move of the entire company. In the bustle of 
growth, archives are often lost or reduced, but at Fiberline they have been kept and cared 
for. I have thus been spared the frustrating job of tracking down deserted warehouses or 
almost forgotten basements in the hunt for useful materials. All archival material as well 
as all interviews, my notes from these, and the transcripts of the two most extensive 
interviews are in Danish. I have translated every passage I quote into English. In the 
analysis I distinguish between three main types of sources, which I will use to different 
ends: the material from board and management, interviews and contextual material.     
The material from board and management 
Through the first years Fiberline was owned by a handful of people. Henrik Thorning, the 
founder and manager, owned a part, and he and the other owners formed the board. In 
1993 Henrik Thorning became the sole owner of the company. Since then the board 
members have consisted of different professionals, paid for their effort and functioning as 
an advisory board. The board meets every three months, and prior to each meeting Henrik 
Thorning, assisted by Dorthe Thorning, writes up a report about the daily dealings and 
future plans of the company. These reports are long (up to 10 typed pages) and often 
structured by topic such as sales, marketing, administration, production, or procurement. 
Sometimes new topics are included for example strategy. In the archive the report has 
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been filed alongside a copy of the invitation to the board meeting (which contains an 
agenda for the meeting) and the minutes of the meeting the report was written for.  
In general the records of board meetings are structured around the agenda of the meeting. 
Often the report from management is just the first order of business followed by others. 
Henrik Thorning would typically start a meeting by talking the board through the report. 
The board would comment and then attention would turn to the other points on the 
agenda. During the first years of the company’s history, these would often concern the 
financial situation of the company or dealings with important customers. Often they circle 
back to the topics in the report and discussion continues. Henrik Thorning frequently took 
notes of the meetings and wrote the minutes. Often (especially after 1990) Dorthe 
Thorning would attend the meetings and write the minutes. But there were also periods 
where other members of the board would write them, examples are Niels Jørgen Kovstrup 
(a co-owner who also worked on and off at Fiberline through some years) or Jørn Hansen 
(member of the board and lawyer for the co-owner Dukadan).        
The reports from management, the minutes from the meetings, along with a number of 
letters that have passed between members of the board and the company (often 
concerning some acute problem) constitute a sort of ongoing dialog. These texts express 
“the acute nature of lived experience” as noted by Musacchio Adorisio31 and in them the 
established narratives of the company are often drawn on or referenced to make sense of 
events. However just as often in this form of texts the narratives used by board and 
management to make sense of a specific situation is implicit; they are shared by all and 
taken for granted. In these cases I will seek to draw in other sources in which the 
narratives are more explicitly used. This could for example be the many strategy 
documents made by the company and other forms of text, like articles, in which mainly 
Henrik Thorning tells about the company.  
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The advantage of the written strategy plans are that they have been worked through and 
discussed as a piece of concrete text between board and management. The strategy plans 
were formulated through a number of board meetings, in which the members discussed 
the topic at length finally agreeing on a strategy that was then written up and signed by 
the board. The style of such plans (and other similar texts I will draw in to my analysis) 
stands out compared to the material from the board meetings by more clear expression of 
narratives. Meaning is condensed in these texts and they can deliver good insights into the 
self-conception and image of context of the company. As Fiberline grew and the 
organization was formalized, the written strategies also became more extensive. Around 
the middle of the 1990s the strategies would be worked out by the leadership group and 
then presented to the board that would approve and sign it.     
Interviews  
I have conducted a number of interviews that may be used for the analysis of Fiberline’s 
history. A part of these are long unstructured interviews with Dorthe and Henrik Thorning 
together. Here I would simply ask them to tell me the history about themselves and the 
company. After these I conducted a number of shorter interviews with Henrik Thorning. 
These were more structured, and I would normally send him an e-mail with questions in 
advance. The questions were on specific elements in the archival material. I would for 
example ask how a new member of the board had been chosen or ask him to explain a 
particular development in the production or a quality problem discussed. I have used these 
short interviews to support descriptive elements in my analysis, and I have used 
interviews with members of the management group in the same way, for example with 
vice president Stig Krogh Pedersen. The long interviews where Dorthe and Henrik 
Thorning tell their history about Fiberline (and also their upbringing) are different. They 
are Dorthe and Henrik Thorning’s present sense of the history of Fiberline. During my 
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analysis I will use parts of these interviews to illustrate how narratives of the past live on 
through to today.   
Contextual material 
I will be focusing on the context as it made sense to and was narrated by Fiberline in the 
documents from board and management, strategic plans, etc. Individuals and companies 
alike may draw on larger narratives in constructing meaning. These may for example be 
narratives of national community as shown by Mordhorst in his studies of the Danish 
dairy company Arla.32 In the case of Fiberline these are, for example, shared ideas about 
the entrepreneur or shared narratives of the plastic industry, for example about the 
competitive nature of the industry. To understand how the world made sense to and was 
narrated by the Danish plastic industry, I will draw on materials from the Danish Plastic 
Industry organization representing its members in the industry. Mostly I will draw on the 
monthly magazine of the organization, which contained lively discussions between 
members and the management of the organization on various topics relevant to the 
industry. Henrik Thorning was active in these discussions, and Fiberline was from the 
beginning a member of the plastic industry organization and later also of the section for 
composite industry established as part of the Danish plastic industry organization.            
As noted Penrose points to the context specificity of firm development by noting that the 
growth of every company is a unique process in historical time.33 Through the analysis I 
will discuss the context of Fiberline more generally in order to facilitate my understanding 
of Fiberline’s image of environment. In The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, focus falls 
primarily on the market context of the firm.34 But as demonstrated by McGovern and 
McLean in their study of firm growth, many institutions of the surrounding world can 
influence the company by inducing it to act in one way rather than another.35
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I have sought to overview the Danish plastic industry by gathering and drawing on 
material from a long line of publications from both the Danish and European industry 
organizations; e.g. journals and conference proceedings. I have also looked for statistical 
material on the development of the plastic industry. This has been tricky, however, as the 
composite plastic manufactures like Fiberline  are sometimes registered as part of the 
glass manufacturing industry. At other times they are categorized as part of the 
conventional plastic industry, the development of which is also closer to that of the 
composite plastic manufactures. This is my focus, therefore, in order to see the 
development of Fiberline as part of a relevant industry and its development.  
Focus and structure of the analysis 
In my analysis I will be covering a period of roughly 25 years of the company’s history, 
from its founding in 1979 to 2004. Geertz notes that thick description really only stops 
when the attention of the ethnographer, exhausted by the intense focus of the analysis, is 
drawn to new things.36 Other considerations, however, also guide the matter of focusing 
the analysis. In my case an important argument for ending my analysis around 2004 is the 
practical consideration of my case company, who were most comfortable in granting me 
unhindered access to their archive knowing that I would not take my analysis too close to 
present day. 
In the first chapter I will establish what I believe to be the basic narrative of Fiberline. It 
expresses the self-conception and image of context of the company at a fundamental level. 
Constructed around the company’s founding, this basic narrative was continuously 
reconstructed throughout its history. In the second chapter of the analysis I will consider 
the context in which the basic narrative of Fiberline was formulated; I will focus 
especially on the prior knowledge and experience of Henrik Thorning to show how these 
influenced the establishment of the basic narrative. In the third chapter I will discuss the 
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start-up period and show how the basic narrative directed the actions of the company in 
this early period leading to a buildup of a particular set of resources, strengthening the 
self-conception of the company and making it focus its actions on the exploitation of this 
particular set of resources.   
In the fourth chapter I will discuss how the basic narrative, which had been strengthened 
through the start-up, was challenged by the difficulties of selling the profiles through the 
first years. In order to cope with these problems and make them sensible to the company, 
a new narrative of sale was established. It functioned to elaborate the basic narrative and 
as the grounds for acting in selling the profiles. In the fifth chapter I will discuss the 
efforts of Fiberline in raising capital and show how the self-conception of the company 
was also important in these efforts.  
In the sixth chapter I will discuss the influence of Fiberline’s self-conception and image of 
context in the company’s perception of productive opportunities and in their decisions to 
act upon these opportunities. This is closely linked to Fiberline’s decisions concerning 
diversification in which the company also acts on the self-conception established in the 
basic-narrative. In the seventh and final chapter of the analysis, I will discuss how the 
narrative on sale that had originally been established to cope with difficulties in the early 
years of the company’s history influenced the long run development of the company as it 
made Fiberline conceive of its market context in a particular way, which influenced the 
company’s market focus.  
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3. Founding a company and formulating a basic narrative
At the end of the day on January 31, 1979, Henrik Thorning got into his car, an Alfa 
Romeo, and drove the short way home to his wife and two young sons. He had quit his 
position as a technical manager in the Danish division of Jotun, a large producer of plastic 
materials, and that day had been his last on the job. In October of the previous year, he 
and his wife Dorthe Thorning had made the decision: now was the time when they would 
start up their own company.1
He came home that Wednesday in January to a company that existed only in the form of a 
small office in the basement of his and Dorthe’s house in the city of Kolding, where a 
business and financing plan had been drawn up. But over the following months Fiberline 
began to take shape. Henrik Thorning’s idea was to start a production of profiles in 
reinforced plastic (See Appendix 2 for more details on reinforced plastic and profiles). 
These materials are strong, flexible, and lightweight, and in the 1970s they had been 
known and used in a number of different industries for a period.2 But Henrik Thorning 
wanted to make profiles using a new method called pultrusion. This would ensure greater 
control of the process in which plastic material is mixed with reinforcement fibers. 
Potentially this would give a more homogeneous product of greater strength which would 
make the possible use of the profiles much greater compared to the profiles already on the 
market.3 So far there had been only a little experimenting with pultrusion in Europe, and 
no one had much success with the method yet.4 Therefore, Henrik Thorning would have 
to build up a production without really knowing if it would be possible to refine the 
process of pultrusion to a level where it could be industrialized.
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In this first chapter of the analysis, I will establish what I see as the basic narrative of 
Fiberline, in which the self-conception and image of context of the start-up is expressed. 
Penrose, in a rare consideration of the start-up situation, notes that 
The selection of the relevant product-markets is necessarily 
determined by the ‘inherited’ resources of the firm – the productive 
services it already has. This is true even in the extreme case of the 
prospective new firm with no resources at all other than the 
entrepreneur himself and what capital he can raise; the particular 
productive activities to be undertaken by such a firm must be chosen 
from among the alternatives suitable to the abilities, finances, and 
preferences of the entrepreneur.5
Fiberline and Henrik Thorning draw on the basic narrative when they make decisions and 
act; the preference of Henrik Thorning in focusing on particular productive activities and 
markets finds explanation in this narrative. The construction of the basic narrative is 
strongly influenced by the prior experience and knowledge of Henrik Thorning, which 
can be said to be the inherited resources of Fiberline or the productive services available 
to the company in the start-up situation. These inherited resources will be the focus of the 
chapter following this one. Before I turn to the basic narrative in this first chapter, I will 
begin by describing the circumstances of the start-up of the company in 1979 and the 
method of pultrusion.   
The circumstances of the start-up 
Henrik Thorning’s first few months working from the basement at Terresseparken in 
Kolding held many different challenges. Decisions had to be made concerning financing, 
equipment, machinery, personnel etc. Henrik Thorning agreed to buy a pultrusion 
machine from a Norwegian company called Plastkonstruktioner. The price was 740.000 
Norwegian Kroner.6 After making this decision, he started to look for a suitable site for 
the production in the area around Kolding, where he had a strong network of family and 
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friends, some of which were to become an important part of the start-up. Also it was from 
this area he drew most of his professional experience, and he had good knowledge of the 
other companies in the composite industry, many of them clustering in the southeastern 
part of Jutland and particularly around Kolding. The existing composites companies were 
mostly using different methods of laying up fiber class to create for example boats. Since 
Henrik Thorning was planning to exploit the method of pultrusion to create a production 
of a different kind, these could not be perceived as immediate competitors. Instead, they 
presented a knowledge base from which experienced employees might later be drawn. 
Part of this professional local network was also Henrik Thorning’s old employer Jotun. 
They were to deliver the polyester for the production, and as Henrik Thorning already 
knew the market well, he felt sure to get a good price. Jotun’s sales manager Peder Irgens 
was (and is) a good personal friend of Henrik and Dorthe Thorning, and at Jotun, he dealt 
with the business of Fiberline.7
In a newly developed industrial area in Kolding, a local contractor was building a small 
production hall which suited the need of Fiberline. After the lease was signed, though, the 
contractor went bankrupt. The machine, however, was on its way from Norway, and 
Henrik Thorning was now in a hurry to find a new location. He found some empty 
buildings in the village of Nr. Bjert just outside Kolding. They were owned by a company 
called Peter Madsens Maskinfabrik and had been used for manufacturing equipment for 
the agricultural industry. The lease was only for part of the buildings, which also housed 
other small production companies, but included the right to use a parking lot in front of 
the buildings as well as some additional buildings for storage.8 Dorthe and Henrik 
Thorning decorated the small office in the corner of the production in orange and brown 
as the fashion of 1979 dictated. Here, Dorthe Thorning would set up her work place, 
which included an electric typewriter—very advanced technology at the time she thought 
and one of her most valued possession.9 Before Dorthe and Henrik Thorning had moved 
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in and started decorating office space, funds had been raised. Their strong family network 
played an important role in this effort.  
Dorthe and Henrik Thorning had discussed their plans for starting up a company with 
Dorthe’s older brother Anders Hallen Pedersen many times. He was following their 
efforts and was interested in investing in the company.10 Anders Hallen Pedersen owned a 
company called Dukadan, one of Denmark’s largest distributors of plastic products and 
intermediates, and by the late 1970s Dukadan had invested in several different production 
companies in the plastic industry.11
Henrik Thorning and Anders Hallen Pedersen agreed they would both invest 200.000 
DKK in the company. Anders Hallen Pedersen represented Dukadan in this venture, while 
Henrik Thorning invested as a private individual (He borrowed the money from his 
farther).12 Apart from the 400.000 DKK invested by the owners Fiberline started out with 
further capital of 800.000 DKK. These were provided as a loan from FIH and from 
Aktivbanken A/S, who also granted an overdraft to support the day to day running of the 
company.13 The bank had been created in 1970 after a merger of four local banks.14 W.O. 
Christiansen had been manager of one of the four banks, Kolding Folkebank, and after the 
merger he was part of the management of Aktivbanken. He became Fiberline’s contact in 
the bank, where both Henrik Thorning’s father and grandfather were already customers 
after having used Kolding Folkebank before the merger.15
Today Henrik Thorning tells that he met with W.O. Christiansen already in 1978 to 
present him with the business plan for Fiberline. The plan was drawn up before Henrik 
Thorning quitted his job, because he wanted to be sure he could get the necessary capital 
before this. They met for coffee and what Henrik Thorning describes as a casual meeting 
at 11 am, one day in October. Henrik Thorning gave him the business plan and W.O. 
Christiansen promised to look it through after lunch the same day. In the afternoon he 
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called Henrik Thorning and said that everything looked fine and that the bank would be 
happy to lend the requested sum to the new company. He stressed, Henrik Thorning 
explains, that the material seemed to be well prepared, and that as both Henrik and Dorthe 
Thorning were of respectable family he knew well it would be no problem.16
 On January 27 1979 the founding was registered by the Danish authorities.17 Both the 
shares and the votes were divided equally between the two owners. Danish law stated that 
a joint-stock company with a share-capital of 400.000 DKK or less could chose to have a 
board of just two members, whereas companies with a larger share-capital were obligated 
to establish a board of at least three members.18 Still Fiberline chose to form a board with 
four members.    
Henrik Thorning asked his friend Kai Busch to be part of the board of Fiberline. Kai 
Busch was managing director of Kolding Trikotagefabrik a local textile company.19
Dukadan were to be represented in the board by Anders Hallen Pedersen and his 
company’s lawyer, Jørn Hansen. The two of them were used to working with each other 
in Dukadan and with the many subsidiaries already owned by the company.20 Jørn Hansen 
could be very frank and sometimes appears to have taken it upon himself to communicate 
the attitude of Dukadan in situations where it would have been more difficult for Anders 
Hallen Pedersen (as a brother in law) to do so.21 This might also have been the point of 
forming a larger board, as a buffer for potential disagreements in the family, but nothing 
was stated directly about the matter. 
Altogether Henrik Thorning appears to have been rather well prepared, not least for 
raising capital, before he quit his job in Jotun. Penrose notes that “the type of 
entrepreneurial service needed to raise capital may not be closely related to the type of 
services needed to run a firm efficiently, for successful raising of capital depends on an 
entrepreneur’s ability to create confidence.”22 Henrik Thorning certainly seems to have 
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inspired confidence, probably well aided by the relevance of his experience. But his 
network, both private and professional, was also important for his ability to raise capital 
and as such an important resource of the prospective firm which was put to service in the 
start-up situation.  
In his article on the Lessons from Iago, Hjorth has discussed the persuasive abilities of the 
entrepreneur. He uses Shakespeare’s Othello and particularly the sly and cunning 
character of Iago as an allegory to discuss how the entrepreneur prior to the start-up uses 
narratives to make sense of his idea of the prospective company and just as importantly to 
convince others of the idea.23 Therefore, it may be assumed that the basic narrative of 
Fiberline to which I will soon turn (or at least a version of it set in future) expressing the 
core of the idea of the company was constructed well before the founding of the actual 
firm and instrumental in inspiring confidence in Henrik Thorning, making him persuasive.   
Penrose also notes, however, the persuasive abilities of the entrepreneur are not the same 
services needed to run a firm efficiently. In the view of Henrik Thorning the efficient 
running of Fiberline rather demanded that resources in production and product 
development were put to service and as noted his intention was to build his company on 
producing profiles by pultrusion. 
Pultrusion  
At the middle of the 1970s, laying up and molding fibers soaked in plastic materials by 
hand was the most used method for making reinforced plastic. Apart from serious health 
issues, this was a problematic method because it was hard to control, which again made it 
difficult to ensure a homogeneous quality of the products. This meant that only quite 
simple constructions could be made in the material. Other different methods of molding 
then being used in the industry had the same problems of ensuring even quality. Thus, 
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many were experimenting with different forms of continuous processes because they 
would in principle be easier to control and optimize.24
The method of pultrusion is based on a continuous process. It was first developed in the 
1960s by Brandt Goldsworthy, an American mechanical engineer working for many years 
in the aviation and automobile industry and the lead innovator in many different methods 
of producing reinforced plastic materials. By 1976 approximately 40 companies in the 
U.S.A. were producing profiles by pultrusion, by a number of different methods, in an 
industry with no overall standard and mostly producing simple profiles.25 The methods 
used had many limitations and the product was rather expensive compared with profiles in 
other materials, for example steel. The fibers were mostly pulled (hence the name of the 
method) through open polyester baths, making it difficult to control the placing of the 
fibers as well as problematic to ensure a healthily environment.26
In Europe the experiences with pultrusion of profiles was still limited; although there 
were attempts in both England and France, no one had yet been very successful in 
developing the method to a stage where it could be industrialized. The products 
manufactured were still very simple and often of poor quality. As in America, the fibers 
were pulled through systems of open baths.27
Jotun, where Henrik Thorning worked, was interested in developing new uses for the 
reinforced plastic materials and was also developing new methods of production. The 
company was focusing, however, on another method called filament winding, which is 
used to make pipes, poles etc.28 The company Plastkonstruktioner in Norway was working 
with pultrusion, and they had developed a way to inject the plastic material into a closed 
chamber through which the fibers were pulled. In October 1978 Henrik Thorning visited 
Plastkonstruktioner in Norway: he saw that what they were doing for developing the 
process of pultrusion had potential and could make it possible to produce the profiles with 
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greater accuracy. Also the profiles could be shaped in countless ways (at least in theory) 
and given numerous different properties so that they might be used in many industries.29
A production based on this form of pultrusion would then be different from that of most 
other composite companies in the region (and Europe in general). As mentioned these 
generally focused on a simpler process and a product with only one or very few uses.      
In pultrusion as it is done in Fiberline today, reinforcement fibers are pulled through a 
guiding tool where they are placed very precisely. This is important for securing the 
desired properties of the finished profile. The fibers are then led through processing 
equipment where they are impregnated with plastic, called the matrix material. The 
combined mixture of fibers and matrix is pulled further through heating equipment where 
the profile is cured to its final form. The fully cured profile is then pulled forward to a saw 
that cuts the profiles into defined lengths.30 The process enables continuous production of 
composite profiles with a constant cross section and material properties tailored to 
specific purposes (see appendix 3 for a drawing of the process and further details).  
This new form of pultrusion required less manual labor than the older methods which 
would potentially help close some of the price gap between profiles in reinforced plastic 
and other materials. Another advantage was the improvement of the working environment 
gained by injecting the plastic material into a closed chamber instead of using open baths.  
At Jotun, Henrik Thorning had been tasked with evaluating the different existing methods 
for producing reinforced plastic as part of his job. This had drawn his interest to 
pultrusion, and he had found it to be the most efficient method compared to the six other 
methods he evaluated (see appendix 4 for the main points of the evaluation). Also, he 
knew that Jotun was working with the development of new types of polyester that were 
easier to control in the curing process and would be well suited for pultruison.31
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As Henrik Thorning tells it today, pultrusion is a very difficult process to master because 
there are many variables to control: for example, the fit between the fibers and the 
geometry of the tool, the temperature and curing process as well as the reaction between 
the plastic material, the fibers and the different chemicals that are added to different 
purposes (to accelerate the curing of the profiles or to give them different colors for 
instance). The difficulties of pultrusion were also a general point raised when discussing 
new methods in the plastic industry in the early 1980s.32
Plastkonstruktioner never really mastered pultrusion. According to Henrik Thorning, the 
Nowegian company’s problem was a lack of focus on this single process—and eventually 
they gave up. This observation seems to be important for Henrik Thorning, who sees 
determined focus as a main explanation why Fiberline learned to master the process.33
This focus and the process of pultrusion in general is a key part of what I have chosen to 
call the basic narrative of Fiberline which I will first present then elaborate on in the 
following. 
The basic narrative of Fiberline  
The basic narrative is centered on three core ideas of Fiberline; the product, the process 
and the potential. It is continuously formulated and reformulated from the start-up and, 
though not unchallenged, it continues to give sense and purpose to Fiberline up to today. 
It may be formulated along lines such as these:  
Henrik Thorning founded Fiberline to produce profiles in reinforced plastic. It was simply 
too good an idea to pass over and he believed he could make pultrusion work. Profiles in 
reinforced plastic is an amazing product with many beneficial properties. If produced by 
pultrusion the profiles are usable for endless purposes and they have the potential to 
challenge profiles in steel and aluminum.  
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The main function of the basic narrative is to give purpose or meaning to Fiberline. It 
constructs the company’s conception of self which as noted by Penrose is the grounds for 
action. Also the basic narrative creates an image of the environment (or the market) in 
which elements are in clear opposition to Fiberline (the steel and aluminum profile 
industries). This contributes to strengthening the self-conception of Fiberline. To know 
who you are it is good to know what you are definitely not.  
In the following sections I will unfold the basic narrative through a line of examples and 
also discuss how this “micro” narrative of Fiberline draws on larger narratives for 
example of entrepreneurship to strengthen the self-conception of the company. I will first 
discuss how the motivations of Henrik Thorning are narrated and how he is established as 
the founder of the company. I will then consider the understanding of the product and the 
perception of the market in the basic narrative. I will also discuss the role attributed to the 
method of pultrusion in the narrative and finally connect these points to the construction 
of the company’s birthday.   
Establishing a proper motive and a founder 
In November 1981, about three years after the founding of Fiberline, a local newspaper 
featured an article on the young company. It was mostly built on an interview with Henrik 
Thorning in which he discusses founding the company and his motivation for doing it. In 
the article it is noted that Henrik Thorning took the leap from a permanent position in 
Jotun. As he explains:  
At that point I had worked in the Jotun Group for three and a half 
years. It was an excellent company and I was satisfied in working 
there. But at some point you get an idea that you would like to try out 
in practice… I think that for some people it is natural to be self-
employed and start something up.34
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The same point was made almost 25 years later in 2004 in the publication made for 
Fiberline’s anniversary. Here on the very first page it is noted that
It had always been Henrik Thorning’s intention to become self-
employed and his own master. It was just a matter of finding the right 
moment and the right product.35
This statement establishes Henrik Thorning as the founder of Fiberline as expressed in the 
basic narrative. Also Henrik Thorning is using both passages to motivate his choice to 
start up Fiberline. In both instances, he is drawing on general perceptions about the 
motivation and character of the entrepreneur as described already by Schumpeter who 
notes that 
First of all there is the dream and the will to found a private kingdom, 
usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty … Then there is the 
will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove oneself superior to 
others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of the 
success itself … Finally, there is the joy of creating, of getting things 
done, or simply of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity.36
The dream of creating a private kingdom is partly expressed as a motivational factor for 
Henrik Thorning in the quotes above, but more clearly expressed is the joy of creating and 
of getting things done. In this respect his motivations are apparently archetypical of the 
entrepreneur.
Smith and Anderson have studied entrepreneurial tales, the written or oral stories 
entrepreneurs tell about themselves or the stories their companies tell about them. These 
tales, Smith and Anderson suggest, are used as tools of sensemaking for the entrepreneur 
and his company.37 At a general level this is necessary, they argue, because “Whilst the 
capitalist engine of growth is anonymous and amoral, entrepreneurship is personal and 
thus capable of moral and immoral action.”38 Therefore, entrepreneurial narratives have 
several common themes that emphasize morality and hard work.39 The point is that 
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motivation driven by the impulse to make things work and the joy of creating are 
considered moral and heroic, as opposed to motivation driven purely by the prospect of 
profit.40 At a more personal level, Smith and Anderson further argue, the entrepreneurial 
tale functions as a sensemaking tool for the entrepreneur and the company by providing a 
rational for the arguably irrational risks of enterprising.41 This element of risk is often 
managed in the narratives by framing the elements of hard work and morality as casual 
factors of success.42 As mentioned earlier Henrik Thorning links determined focus to 
Fiberline’s ability to master the process of pultruison and by extension to the success of 
the company, thus establishing himself as a proper and hardworking entrepreneur.43    
By pinpointing the social exchange in which the entrepreneurial tale is constructed Smith 
and Anderson’s research exemplifies how the individual or the company draws on larger 
shared or cultural narratives in making sense of the role of the entrepreneur. 
Venkataraman et al. in addressing the same issue notes that  
… the very person and identity of “the entrepreneur” could be and 
often is an artifact of … narratives about entrepreneurship. Another 
way to think about this is to notice that in societies where the view of 
agency as located within individuals dominates narratives, more 
individuals begin to act entrepreneurial.44
In my first interview with Henrik Thorning, he told me that he just wants to be 
remembered as a good engineer and that he was primarily motivated by his joy of creating 
stuff.45 To him the engineer is an entrepreneurial character that makes things and triumphs 
in seeing these things work.  
Naming the product and the market 
To Henrik Thorning then entrepreneurship is about producing stuff as formulated in the 
basic narrative. This is evident for example in the publication made for Fiberline’s 
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anniversary in which the start-up is further elaborated by a story of how Henrik Thorning 
got the idea for Fiberline: 
By the end of the 1970s Henrik was, as a young engineer, employed as 
a manager of the technical department at Jotun Group Denmark who 
delivered raw materials to producers of glass fiber products. As part of 
his job he had analyzed different materials and had reached the 
conclusion that plastic composites had a unique combination of 
properties which was only exploited within a few industries. The task 
was therefore to find an industrial process which effectively and with 
the smallest amount of manual labor possible could convert the raw 
materials into products of even and high quality. One day in the fall of 
1978 he returned home after a visit to Norway with a small plastic 
profile in his hand. It was lightweight but still surprisingly strong… 
The profile had been made by a production process called pultrusion… 
He had found both his product and his process.46
There is no doubt that the product is central to Henrik Thorning’s conception of Fiberline. 
The point of the 1981 article mentioned earlier was to give examples of start-up 
companies in Denmark that could grow and prosper in a period where many other small 
companies were having difficulties because of a recession in the Danish economy at the 
time. In the article Henrik Thorning describes the strengths of Fiberline and tells that 
We are working with a healthy material that has many positive 
properties and I predict a great future… Steel is heavy, it corrodes and 
it’s slow to transport. Aluminum is heat-conducting and then it bends 
much too easily. Reinforced plastic on the other hand is lightweight, it 
doesn’t corrode or bend, it’s easy to transport and it has greater 
strength than steel. In short reinforced plastic has better properties than 
the conventional materials used for profiles.47
In an earlier article from February 1980, Henrik Thorning makes the same point. The 
heading of the article states that “Denmark’s first factory for plastic profiles has been 
created in Nr. Bjert. Fiberline A/S, that produces reinforced plastic, may become a serious 
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competitor for steel and aluminum products.”48 In the article Henrik Thorning further 
explains that  
The product has so much potential that it can only prosper… The 
possible use for profiles in reinforced fiberglass is almost innumerous, 
because you get a product that has the strength of steel but only 
weighs a quarter or a fifth and with the rising oil prices it continuously 
becomes more competitive.49
An important aspect of the idea of the product as expressed by Henrik Thorning is its 
versatility and by extension its good potential. To him the fact that it could be fitted to 
many different uses was a clear strength. In the 1981 article he compares the situation of 
Fiberline to other small companies and notes that “Fiberline is less vulnerable to industry 
specific recessions. If the construction industry is in trouble, there will be other customers 
that will place orders with us.”50 In the article from February 1980 it is noted that 
When asked who can use these new plastic profiles from Nr. Bjert, he 
[Henrik Thorning] answers that the group of customers at the current 
moment in time is first and foremost made up by a broad section of the 
industry, but that the profiles can be used with advantage for a long 
line of other and different purposes.51
The idea of the potential of the product—that the profiles can be used in almost any 
industry imaginable—is linked to Henrik Thorning’s image of the market. Again and 
again Henrik Thorning returns to comparisons between the reinforced plastic materials 
and steel and aluminum (as in the quotes above). The idea of the market as it is expressed 
in the basic narrative is very broad and focused on substituting products rather than direct 
competitors. Of these Fiberline only saw a few that didn’t seem threatening. In an article 
from August 1980 Henrik Thorning says about the competitors that “at home Fiberline is 
the only company that runs a production of profiles in reinforced plastic … and across the 
globe there are no more than a handful.”52
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Today Henrik Thorning explains that he thought about the general structure of industrial 
production before the start-up and that he saw a missing link with great potential. As he 
sees it, materials are made into products by three different basic processes. Be it steel or 
aluminum or any other manufactured material, they are all made either as sheets, as 
molded parts, or as profiles. The composite industry could not yet deliver profiles that 
were able to compete. However, in substituting industries (for example steel 
manufacturing) profiles were big business. Thus to Henrik Thorning there seemed to be a 
gap in the market, a gap that held the potential for becoming a large industry.53
Henrik Thorning adds that when he was thinking all of this through before the company’s 
founding he summed up the idea for Fiberline in the figure below, showing the potential 
of profiles in reinforced plastic that he saw as being based on many considerations that 
were mutually dependent.54
This is a visualization of the basic narrative as formulated by Henrik Thorning. From 
around 2004, he started using a PowerPoint presentation called Meet the owner for the 
introduction of new employees to Fiberline.55 In this presentation, the same sense is 
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expressed. Here five out of the first 10 slides discuss the properties of reinforced plastic 
compared to steel and other products and the structure of industrial production.     
In the article from February 1980 Henrik Thorning explains in a bit more details that “The 
product range of Fiberline is built around a program of standard profiles, for example 
angel and flat profiles and tubes as well as special profiles made to fit the specific demand 
of the customer.”56 This focus on a standard program is a consequence of the basic 
narrative and the construction of the idea that the profiles can be sold to many different 
industries directly.  
Specifying the production process and constructing the birth of a company 
The method of pultrusion is central to the self-conception of Fiberline as expressed in the 
basic narrative. First of all it is a precondition for manufacturing the product which, as 
already discussed, is central in the narrative. Also the process of pultrusion is connected to 
Henrik Thorning’s conception of entrepreneurship and the role of the engineer. The 
anniversary publication is used to describe establishing the process of production at the 
start-up. Jens Johansen, the first foreman, is interviewed and on the first production he 
comments:  
After having spent a month or so lining up the machine, we started the 
first experimental production. It was a so-called flat profile of 50 x 10 
millimeters that today could be set up and produced with one hand tied 
around the back... But it turned out to be incredibly difficult. It [the 
profile] broke constantly and we didn’t know why.57
He further observes that “We experimented as we went along and adjusted everything 
imaginable and finally we succeeded. That evening we had champagne!”58 The joy of 
mastering the process of pultrusion expressed in this passage is central to the basic 
narrative; the focus on process is also part of the company name as Henrik and Dorthe 
Thorning explain it to be a visualization of the process of production.59
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Moreover, Fiberline chose its birthday in accordance with the basic narrative and the 
focus on the production process.60 Many dates could have been chosen and celebrated as 
the company’s birthday: for example, the day the agreement with Dukadan was made, the 
day the bank granted the necessary capital, the day of the formal approval from the 
authorities, or the day of the first sales. But Fiberline chose the day where Jens Johansen 
says they had champagne—the day of the first successful run of the production. By 
celebrating that day a particular sense of meaning or self-conception is being enforced as 
also formulated in the basic narrative. 
The birthday, May 1, is still celebrated today, and the publication made for the 25th
anniversary has already been mentioned many times. Like so many publications of that 
kind, it tells a tale of what happened. It is, however, first and foremost a tale of products 
and product development. Of 60 pages fewer than 10 describe sales, strategy, 
communication etc. The rest tell of production, new products, new projects, and of 
research and development.61 The publication is an artifact used to express the basic 
narrative of Fiberline and to reaffirm the company’s conception of self.    
Conclusion - Product, process and potential 
In this first chapter I have discussed what I see as the basic narrative of Fiberline. It is 
centered on the product, the production process and the potential of the material. Also, it 
establishes Henrik Thorning as the founder of the company and promotes his motivations 
as driven by an explorative spirit rather than profit. In describing the basic narrative of 
Fiberline, I have drawn on a line of texts from the period around the start-up to the 
communication made for the 25th anniversary and through the following chapters I will 
give many other examples of the use of the same narrative throughout the years. I will 
argue that the continued use of this narrative shows a construction and reconstruction of a 
particular self-conception that has continued to exist through the years and over the 
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following chapters many examples of the continued use of the basic narrative will be 
discussed. This is evidence of the fact that the self-conception of Fiberline as it was 
established in the first years of the company’s existence appears to have been quite strong 
and enduring. This is however not to say that such strong and enduring narratives 
necessarily exist in any case. Other companies may very well have experienced a much 
less stable or inhomogeneous use of narratives across a span of years.        
In establishing the basic narrative, Fiberline and Henrik Thorning draw meaning from 
larger, shared narratives, for example of the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship as 
discussed. Smith and Anderson have explained this praxis to be a matter of establishing 
the company as proper and moral in the eyes of the surrounding world but also in the 
company’s conception of itself.      
In establishing meaning and constructing the basic narrative, Fiberline also drew on the 
prior knowledge of Henrik Thorning. As noted Penrose argues that in the prospective firm 
the relevant product-markets and the particular productive activities chosen are guided by 
the “inherited” resources available for service in the start-up. These inherited resources 
are put to service based on the self-conception of the company, which is constructed 
through the basic narrative. The knowledge and experience Henrik Thorning got prior to 
the founding are part of the inherited resources, or they are available services of Fiberline 
in the start-up and part of the context in which the basic narrative was constructed. In 
discussing the circumstances of the start-up in this chapter, the network of Henrik and 
Dorthe Thorning has been shown to be an important resource put to service, for example 
in financing the start-up. In the following chapter I will discuss the context in which the 
basic narrative was first formulated and consider the role of the prior experience and 
knowledge of the entrepreneur, Henrik Thorning. 
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4. The prior experience of Henrik Thorning and the 
context of the Start-up  
In the first chapter of the analysis I unfolded the basic narrative which functions to 
construct Fiberline’s self-conception. This construction is influenced by the prior 
experience and knowledge of Henrik Thorning, which can also be said to be the inherited 
resources of Fiberline available for service in the start-up situation. Therefore, the prior 
experience and knowledge of Henrik Thorning will be the focus of this chapter as an 
important part of the context of the basic narrative. 
First, I will describe the development of the plastic industry in Denmark in general and 
the composites industry. Then I will discuss Henrik Thorning’s professional background, 
first in technical sales in Dukadan and then as head of technical development in Jotun 
Denmark. I will also place the experience of Henrik Thorning in the context of the plastic 
industry in an attempt to show that he worked at the forefront of the innovative 
development of the industry, granting him knowledge of the products and production 
methods, experience with developing both, and good entrepreneurial resources.    
The plastic industry in Denmark in the 1970s and start 80s 
The Danish plastic industry started growing after the Second World War but accelerated 
in the 1960s, powered by the massive growth of the Danish economy at the time. The 
period saw an explosion in the total turnover of the industry, and an estimated 75 
companies in 1950 had grown to about 200 in the industry by 1970 and 528 by 1986.1
The oil crisis of 1973 put a brake on economic growth in Denmark, and at the same time 
discussions about the negative results of the consumer society, especially for the 
environment, were growing.2 For the plastic industry, which uses oil products in the 
production, the challenges of the crisis in 1973 were mostly in the form of a more difficult 
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supplier situation and rising prices on raw materials. Yet, there was also a growing 
skepticism toward the industry’s use of different chemicals, many of which were 
suspected to be problematic for both health and environment.3 However, in spite of the oil 
crisis and growing skepticism towards the products in the public, the consumption of 
plastic continued to grow in Denmark throughout the 1970s; the versatility of the 
materials was great and numerous advantages could be gained by using them.  
Through the 1970s a number of companies in the industry developed and specialized. 
They were optimizing and automatizing their production. A few companies grew larger, 
but the industry experienced a significant number of small or middle sized companies.4
Many were subcontractors delivering products to a single or a few different industries. 
This structure meant that many companies pushed for international sales, and exports 
increased through the 1970s and start 80s. Based on a 1984 survey of the Danish plastic 
industry, it was concluded that the international competitiveness of the industry was very 
good and that more than 40% of production was exported. This increase was attributed to 
a high level of knowledge and innovation in the industry and the structure of many small 
or medium sized companies thought to be better at adapting to technological development 
than large international competitors.5
Though the industry was developing well and growing faster than most other Danish 
industries at the time, there still were concerns at the end of the 1970s. As technologies 
for producing in plastic became more known and used, and as many producers were 
operating as subcontractors, there was a fear that customers would engage in up-stream 
integration, producing the plastic products themselves. However, this integration would 
require a large production and heavy investment on the part of the customer, and the 
discussion at this point in time was mostly speculative.6 Another worry was that the 
industry was entirely dependent on raw materials from a small number of large suppliers, 
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all of them international; the only Danish manufacturer, Mærsk Kemi, had stopped its 
production of plastic materials in 1978. Also fluctuations of prices for plastic material 
were great as they were directly dependent on oil prizes, a challenge for the nerves of 
most plastic producers in the 1970s.7 In 1979, however, the Danish plastic industry 
organization concluded that overall it was a prosperous industry, with great export 
potential. They hoped for more stable supplier conditions or that in the event of raising 
prizes they could pass these on to their customers as they had done before. 8
A new worry of the plastic industry by the late 1970s was the pressure that was building 
from increasing restrictions from Danish authorities. As already mentioned the effort of 
preserving the environment underwent an institutionalization through the decade. Both the 
authorities and the Danish unions were concerned about the health issues in the plastic 
industry connected to evaporation of chemicals like styrene, a solvent added to polyester 
and commonly used also in the production of composites. It was suspected to cause 
cancer; although this hadn’t been proven there were still many problems in using an 
organic solvent like styrene as it could, if inhaled, cause headache, skin eruptions, and 
short term amnesia.9 Therefore, there was a wish from the Danish authorities of reducing 
the allowed evaporation values.10
The development of the composite industry in Denmark  
Composites are materials that have been made by combining different materials into one. 
Reinforced plastic materials are strong and lightweight, the main properties to be 
exploited in the early composite industry in Denmark. The first Danish production of 
reinforced plastic—to be used in boats for the navy —was made by a Copenhagen-based 
company called Sandersens Bådebyggeri in 1956.11 In the 1960s a number of small 
companies started producing boats in fiberglass especially in the southeastern part of 
Jutland. The strength and light weight of the composites combined with its ability to bare 
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harsh conditions while being maintenance free made the materials ideal for boats. The 
Danish manufacturers mostly made small ships and boats for leisure use. They used a 
labour-intensive method in which fibers were soaked in open polyester baths and then laid 
up by hand and molded into form. The evaporation and handling of the styrene added to 
the polyester led to bad working conditions in many of these small companies often 
working in a primitive fashion.12
At the beginning of the 1970s the greatest part of the composite materials used in 
Denmark still went into producing boats, but a number of companies were experimenting 
with the new materials for other purposes. The development of the composite industry in 
Denmark was powered by entrepreneurial individualists rather than by large companies 
already in the plastic industry, and an estimated 400 small producers existed in Denmark 
in the middle of the 1970s. A number of these were founded in the southeastern part of 
Jutland, like many of the existing companies, particularly in and around the city of 
Kolding, making the city the center of what might be called a composite cluster.13
Most of these small new companies were founded by men who had been working and 
gathering experience in other composite companies in the area. Many of them, especially 
the first movers, had worked in the production of the companies building boats in 
composites. They started their own production using materials in known forms as well as 
known methods to make new products, for example oil tanks or trailers and caravans. The 
companies were drawing on practical production experience, exploring the possibilities of 
the materials and experiencing all kinds of problems as they went along. 14
Close to Kolding in the small town of Lunderskov, a local furniture manufacturer started 
experimenting with fiberglass already in the 1950s. Eventually the company changed 
name to LM Glasfiber and in 1978 produced its first wind turbine blades in fiberglass. 
Today, almost half of all the reinforced plastic used in Denmark goes into producing parts 
53
for the wind turbine industry, LM Glasfiber (now LM Wind Power) being the largest 
supplier for the industry and the largest Danish manufacturer of composite materials.15 In 
general the composite industry has experienced growth and consolidation similar to the 
plastic industry and today offers specialized products for a small number of industries on 
international markets.16
Environmental concerns and organizing the industry   
In the 1970s and 1980s the relation between the producers of composites and the rest of 
the plastic industry was in some respects problematic. The use of open polyester baths 
made the composites industry a major consumer of styrene because it is added to liquefy 
the polyester. The consumption was heavily criticized as it was thought to reflect poorly 
on the entire plastic industry already struggling to create a better image. This was an 
important reason why the composite industry, already in 1978, decided to create a 
separate organization which became a subsection of the Danish organization for the 
plastic industry.17 Jotun was among the first members of the section, and their managing 
director was a member of the first board of directors.18
The 1970s saw the growth of the environmental movement in Denmark and the 
institutionalization of the effort to preserve the environment through the first laws of 
environmental protection, the establishment of a ministry for the same and a lively and 
continued public debate on the matter which was often also connected to a debate on the 
work environment in the Danish industry.19
By the end of the 1970s the Danish work environment authorities were demanding a 
drastic cut in the allowed evaporation of styrene in the production as mentioned. The limit 
intended by the authorities was considered impossible to meet by the section. Many 
doubted whether it was at all possible and most were worried that the investments 
necessary to meet the demands would be too expensive to bear.20 Through lengthy 
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negotiations they eventually agreed on a smaller reduction, which however still meant that 
most of the companies (many still young and small) would need to invest in ventilation 
systems and other safety equipment. The limit would later be reduced further, ending in 
1987 at the level originally intended by the Danish Working Environment Authorities.21
For many producers in the composite industry Jotun, who was an important supplier, 
played a role in the effort to adapt production to meet the restrictions. Jotun offered to 
help the small companies measure the evaporation and to guide them in setting up the 
production so that problems were minimized. Frequently, some results could be made 
simply by rearranging the production line to fit better with the natural stream of air from 
doors and gateways, which would lessen the necessary investments in ventilation 
systems.22 Henrik Thorning was often responsible for planning these tests and guiding the 
customers.23
The section was active in arranging courses and other forms of education for the 
members. At first, these activities focused mostly on meeting environmental demands, but 
over time the section started offering education for their members on many other different 
topics, such as process technology. Through the section members could be educated by 
researchers working with reinforced plastic materials at a number of Danish institutions of 
higher education, including Research Center Risø, Aalborg University, the Danish 
Technical University, and the two Danish institutes for technology, or by engineers from 
the large suppliers of raw materials.24
As a frequent participator in the activities of the section, Henrik Thorning was part of a 
milieu in which environmental and work safety issues were taken very serious, and where 
there was a constant pressure from authorities.25 One result of the effort to meet the limits 
of evaporation in the production of composites was an intense focus on coming up with 
new ways of production that could be automated to a degree that it could be handled in 
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closed confinements.26 This view was adopted by Henrik Thorning and, as demonstrated, 
an important aspect of his conception of the company was a focus on the methods of 
pultrusion as expressed in the basic narrative.  
As seen the product was raised up to a level of perfection in Fiberline’s basic narrative. In 
doing so, Henrik Thorning was not only referring to the potential of reinforced plastic 
profiles as a form of revolutionary renewal of industrial production and construction as 
discussed but also drawing on larger shared narratives about the proper way of doing 
business in Danish society. In the 1981 article on the strengths of Fiberline compared to 
other Danish start-ups discussed earlier, Henrik Thorning as noted starts out by stressing 
that “We are working with a healthy material.”27 In the article from August 1980 Henrik 
Thorning tells that “At Fiberline the profiles are made by infusing the matrix directly into 
the tools. This gives an environmentally-friendly production process.”28 For the February 
1980 article the first foreman of the production at Fiberline, Jens Johansen, was also 
interviewed: “Jens Johansen says about the working conditions at Fiberline that it is 
something completely different than what he has so far known. The environment is fine. 
No dust or noise.”29 In stressing the environmental benefits of producing profiles by the 
new method of pultrusion, Henrik Thorning is establishing Fiberline as a proper modern 
Danish company.             
In the publication produced for the 25th anniversary, the image of environmental benefits 
of Fiberline’s production process is also stressed as one of Henrik Thorning’s motives for 
choosing pultrusion as the founding idea of his company. This motive is presented 
alongside the original idea about the potential of the product wrapped in the lingo of the 
new millennium:    
Pultrusion provided completely new prospects for producing high-tech 
products with a large content of knowledge that allowed for innovation 
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in almost every industry. At the same time it was a closed process that 
would secure a good working environment where there would be no 
problems in meeting the demands from the authorities.30     
Furthermore, the publication stresses that Fiberline has won awards for its work in 
reducing the environmental impact of its production. Also it is noted that Fiberline is one 
of the few companies in Denmark who by installing a private wind turbine is covering 
their own consumption of energy.31
Dukadan and Henrik Thorning’s two years working there 
Henrik Thorning was trained as a machine operator and had then become a mechanical 
engineer. When he was done with military training in 1973, he needed a job; he got a 
couple of offers, one of them from his brother in law Anders Hallen Pedersen. As Henrik 
Thorning was interested in plastic and saw his brother in law’s company as offering the 
best possibility of influence, he chose Dukadan, where he worked for two years.32
As already mentioned Dorthe Thorning’s older brother Anders Hallen Pedersen was an 
important figure in the start-up of Fiberline, as his company Dukadan owned half of 
Fiberline when it was founded.33 Like Henrik Thorning, Anders Hallen Pedersen was a 
mechanical engineer who served in the Danish air force after finishing his studies. In 1968 
he founded the company Dukaplast A/S (later Dukadan A/S) after working for a couple of 
years in a Danish company that sold bottled gas. A friend from the air force and a cousin 
of this friend supplied the necessary capital. They came from a wealthy family that owned 
one of Denmark’s largest steel trading companies. As part owner of Dukaplast, Anders 
Hallen Pedersen contributed mostly by running the company.34
Among a wide range of other activities, the two cousins were trading plastic parts on the 
Danish market during the 1960s. Although not very successful, they could sense the 
potential in these new materials. Anders Hallen Pedersen could too, and the new company 
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was set up to focus only on dealing plastic parts. Dukaplast became a distributer on the 
Danish market for some of the biggest European plastic companies, the foundation of the 
growth of the company when plastic sales boomed in the 1970s.35 The two cousins were 
not part of the daily running of the company, and it was mainly through Anders Hallen 
Pedersen’s effort that it became a success.36
Throughout the 1970s the company grew rapidly and began production of different 
intermediate goods in plastic materials. This would most often be done by starting up new 
companies owned partly or entirely by Dukadan. Some of these companies were sold off 
again while others were kept, but the main part of the business continued to involve 
dealing with different parts in plastic. Throughout these years the company earned very 
good profits, and Anders Hallen Pedersen took care to secure his influence in an 
agreement with the two cousins stipulating his share of votes at 50% even though he 
owned only one third of the company.37
In 1979, when Dukadan became involved in Fiberline, Anders Hallen Pedersen was 38 
years old. He ran a successful business that he had himself developed from scratch in just 
a little over 10 years. Through his co-ownership of Dukadan, he was also gaining 
influence in the much larger steel company owned by the family of the two cousins. He 
would later become a principal owner and managing director of it. The differences 
between Henrik and Dorthe Thorning and their little start-up and the accomplishments of 
the successful older brother were indeed substantial.         
At Dukadan Henrik Thorning was hired to work in sales, but his contact with customers 
was mostly related to technical questions. This position gave him an opportunity of doing 
a lot of experiments, taking part in developing new products. One of these experiments, 
he remembers, concerned newly developed products for the fishing industry that needed 
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testing in the harsh environment in which they were to function. To do these tests Henrik 
Thorning spent 14 days on a fishing boat on the North Sea.  
The period working at Dukadan was interesting; Henrik Thorning says that he learned a 
lot and also got the opportunity of observing an organization that had grown fast. To 
Henrik Thorning, Dukadan was however first and foremost a dealer of plastic parts, and in 
1974 he left the company to work in the Danish division of Jotun, a large Norwegian 
manufacturer of paint.38
Jotun  
Originally Jotun manufactured marine paint for the whaling fleet in Norway, but the 
company grew to supply many different forms of paint globally. In 1972 the company, 
then already international, merged with three Norwegian competitors, one of which 
primarily manufactured paint like Jotun. Two of the companies, however, also produced 
materials for the plastic industry in the form of unsaturated polyester and synthetic resins. 
Like paint the plastic materials could be used in coating surfaces, but with other properties 
(for example better wearing qualities). For the Jotun Group the merger limited 
competition on the Norwegian home market and helped open the company up to further 
internationalization.39 Part of the idea of the merger was also to develop the production of 
plastic materials as part of the business alongside the production of paint.40 When Jotun 
Denmark was established in 1966, they set up office in Copenhagen where most of the 
large shipping companies who would buy ship paint were located. However, as Jotun’s 
strategy changed to focus on polyester and resins, they decided to move to the 
southeastern part of Jutland where the Danish plastic and composite industries were 
developing most.41
Henrik Thorning was hired to be head of technical services in Jotun Denmark. By the time 
he began in 1974, the company had moved to its new headquarters in Kolding. In hiring 
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mechanical engineers like Henrik Thorning, Jotun sought to strengthen its capabilities in 
new areas, which might increase industrial production of products using their materials. 
Henrik Thorning was to work with composite materials that seemed to hold great 
potential and for which Jotun could supply the polyester.42 In Denmark the new industry 
of companies that used composite plastic materials in their production was flourishing. As 
mentioned the first movers were mostly using these materials to construct new, 
lightweight ships and boats, and in the beginning of the 1970s these made up the greatest 
part of Jotun’s Danish customers.43 Through their efforts, Jotun hoped to spur production 
of other products as the materials continued to develop and be industrialized. A test 
facility was established in Kolding, and here they mostly worked with development of the 
different methods for production of reinforced plastic materials. The young composite 
plastic industry at this time had many problems concerning the production, and as a large 
supplier Jotun worked actively to solve these.44
Henrik Thorning generally had free rein to experiment in his job. He sought to further his 
knowledge about glass fiber, which was essential to producing the most used form of 
reinforced plastic.45 For instance, he spent six weeks in France following the production at 
Saint Gobain, one of the world’s largest producers of glass fiber. Also, as he explains, he 
participated in many conferences in order to keep up with the development in the 
industry.46     
Through his job at Jotun Henrik Thorning gained knowledge of composite materials and 
how they could be used and manufactured. Furthermore he got to know the Danish 
composite industry that was growing fast and becoming a part of the more mature plastic 
industry. In working with technical service at a large supplier, Henrik Thorning was 
positioned at the center of the innovative development of the plastic industry, which 
afforded usable knowledge and experience.   
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Innovation in the Danish plastic industry  
Hansen and Serin have analyzed the development of innovations in the Danish plastic 
industry until the end of the 1980s. Based on extensive statistical material, they formulate 
three stages in the history of the industry where the innovative development is driven by 
different parts of the industry’s value chain. First they argue there was a pioneering phase 
from the end of the 19th century until around the Second World War, when the industry 
was moved forward mostly by the innovations of entrepreneurs who would typically also 
produce their own raw materials, build their own machinery, and so on.  
The second phase of development was driven by the producers of raw materials, mainly 
large international companies in the chemical industry like Jotun. This meant that new 
types of plastic found their way to the Danish market faster than before and that the 
Danish plastic producers benefitted from the international market they were part of 
through their suppliers. The competition among producers of raw material was fierce, and 
the product in itself didn’t allow much differentiation apart from in the very first phase 
after the introduction of new materials. Therefore, technical service became an important 
competitive factor that developed through the second phase of the industry’s history from 
being a matter of information about new types of plastic to becoming much more 
extensive.47 Hansen and Serin note that “The technical service has become comprehensive 
and today it includes formulating and doing tests, construction and design assistance, and 
more.”48 This they further conclude is the reason why only around a half percentage of the 
total turnover of the plastic industry was allocated to research and development activities 
yearly through the 1980s. Actual innovative development in the industry occurred in a 
small number of large suppliers of raw materials.49
Hansen and Serin, however, also note that by the end of the 1980s (when they did their 
analysis) this appeared to be changing and that the industry had moved into a third 
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development phase. As more and more complicated products could be manufactured in 
plastic, the customers of the plastic producers began to demand more: they would need 
help in picking the right materials and selecting the right tools for the production. This 
also meant that innovations would now be made in collaboration between supplier, 
producer, and often also customers. The producer had a central role in this development, 
and Hansen and Serin report cases where the producers would take active part in drawing 
the customer’s end product. As such, they conclude, some of the plastic producers have 
developed resources vital for the customer’s own development and a source of 
competitive advantage.50 They further note that continued innovation and specialization 
would be important for plastic producers, and they speculate that this development will 
constitute a reestablishment of the position of the creative entrepreneur in the plastic 
producing company and in the industry. This development is furthered by the growing 
international competition which at the brink of the European single market was a much 
debated theme and the cause of Hansen and Serin’s interest in the innovative development 
of the industry.51 Finally, they note that the importance of specializing is further advanced 
by the fact that the Danish plastic industry is made up mostly of small companies.52 This 
last point of Hansen and Serin on the internationalization of the industry and the 
continued specialization of the producers falls in line with the points drawn from the 
industry organization’s own perception of the development of the industry by the end of 
the 1970s that I discussed earlier.      
Jotun’s development in Denmark through the 1970s offers an example of Hansen and 
Serin’s second development phase of the plastic industry—especially considering the 
arguments for Jotun’s establishment of a Danish subsidiary, their reasons for hiring 
people with knowledge of production development like Henrik Thorning, and his function 
in his job there. His function in Jotun exemplifies the extensive role of technical service 
given by the suppliers of raw materials in the period. In formulating and doing tests, in 
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assisting the producers in developing both construction and design, Henrik Thorning was 
at the center of the innovative development of the industry in the 1970s. From this much 
knowledge and experience could be gained. In addition, he was used to visiting and 
helping the many small start-up companies amongst Jotuns’ customers and understood the 
challenges of these young companies. 
As it would grow from the beginning of the 1980s, Fiberline was an example of the third 
phase described by Hansen and Serin. Henrik Thorning’s company developed a praxis of 
cooperation with both suppliers and customers and often took a very active role in the 
product development of their customers. Fiberline also exemplifies the reestablishment of 
the innovative role of the entrepreneur in the plastic industry as expressed in the 
prominent role of Henrik Thorning in the company’s basic narrative.   
Conclusion - Knowledge of materials, experience in production 
This chapter has focused on the prior knowledge and experience of Henrik Thorning. I 
have argued earlier that in or before the start-up of a company the entrepreneur will, to 
paraphrase Smith and Anderson, use the entrepreneurial narrative, what I have called the 
basic narrative, as a sensemaking tool for providing a rational for the arguably irrational 
risks of enterprising.53 In this endeavor, the prior knowledge and experience of the 
entrepreneur is important.  
Henrik Thorning knew the plastic industry to be in a state of growth, and he had seen 
many examples of start-ups in the composites industry. He knew the strong environmental 
focus in the plastic industry and had practical experience with the challenges new rules 
and regulations brought to small companies. He knew that cleaner production methods 
could be the source of competitive advantage in an industry so regulated by public 
opinion and environmental legislation. As such the focus on pultrusion (with its 
environmental benefits compared to other methods of production) in the basic narrative is 
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not based on the engineer’s interest in or fancy of a smart method alone, but actually 
draws on a shared perception in the industry that securing the work environment was 
necessary for the continued success of the industry. This knowledge was useful in 
constructing the basic narrative, because it made the idea of Fiberline seem convincing 
and the risk of starting up the company seem sensible. 
The two years Henrik Thorning worked at Dukadan afforded him general experience in 
product development in the plastic industry. In Jotun this was further extended by 
knowledge of composites production. He assisted many start-up companies in developing 
their production of composites and acquired experience of many different methods. The 
period when Henrik Thorning worked at Jotun was characterized by the innovative 
development of the industry being centered on the suppliers of raw materials, which he 
experienced directly. Like his knowledge of the industry, this experience in production 
development was useful in constructing the basic narrative of Fiberline: it made it seem 
reasonable and convincing that Henrik Thorning could actually make the process of 
pultrusion work.  
As mentioned earlier Penrose notes that the particular productive activities to be 
undertaken by a new firm are chosen from the alternatives suitable to the abilities and 
preferences of the entrepreneur, which is to a high degree provided by his prior 
knowledge and experience.54 The use of the prior experience and knowledge of Henrik 
Thorning in making the basic narrative of Fiberline convincing enough to act upon as 
clarified above may be said to explain his preference in choosing pultrusion of reinforced 
plastic profiles as the productive activity of his company. His ability to start up a company 
based on this particular productive activity was also strongly influenced by his use of 
prior experience and knowledge, as will be evident from the following chapter focusing 
on the start-up. Here he would also put his inherited entrepreneurial resources to use—or 
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“in service” as Penrose would phrase it. The entrepreneurial resources of the company, 
Penrose notes, are those that are put to service as contributions to the operations of a firm, 
which relate to the introduction and acceptance of new ideas in the company.55 The 
experience of Henrik Thorning indicates that he took strong entrepreneurial resources 
with him into Fiberline which, given the problems of starting up the production, was 
fortunate. This will be clear from the following chapter in which I will discuss the start-up 
period and process.   
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5. Putting resources to service and strengthening the 
basic narrative in the start-up process 
In the last two chapters I have discussed how a basic narrative was constructed in 
Fiberline around the time of the founding. I have also shown how Henrik Thorning’s prior 
experience and knowledge were important parts of the context in which the narrative was 
formulated, as both contributed to make the narrative sensible and convincing. In this 
chapter I will discuss how Thorning’s prior knowledge and experience as inherited 
resources were put into service in the start-up of the company, and I will consider how the 
new experience gained through this contributed to reaffirm the basic narrative 
strengthening it further.   
As with so many other companies, Fiberline’s start-up was difficult in many ways. I will 
first discuss the process of getting the production running over the first circa two years; I 
will consider the first sales of the company and finally the challenges of financing the 
running of the company in the start-up period.   
Getting started 
It was not only for financial resources that Henrik Thorning looked to his network prior to 
the start-up as already discussed. From the office in his basement, Henrik Thorning hired 
a foreman and an engineer. He wanted them to be ready to start working even before the 
machine would be delivered, so that they would be well prepared to start production. The 
new foreman, Jens Johansen, who would be responsible for running the production, 
already knew the composite industry. He had been working as a foreman in a small 
company that manufactured fishing boats in fiberglass in the Kolding area. When Henrik 
Thorning was working at Jotun, they had gotten to know each other working on some 
projects together.1 Furthermore, the new foreman had earlier been working in the textile 
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industry, and he had some experience with continuous productions processes.2 Svend Erik 
Dahlgren, who was to operate the machine, was also recruited from Henrik Thorning’s 
network, but he didn’t have any experience in production of composites. He was related to 
Alfred Hansen who was running Peter Madsens Maskinfabrik, and he knew the buildings 
well and could help set up the machine in them.3
To prepare the three of them went to Norway for a fortnight to be trained in working the 
pultrusion machine at Plastkonstruktioner. Jens Johansen later remembered the faith they 
had in their own ability and the possibilities of the new production as they returned. “I … 
didn’t know anything about pultrusion. But after two weeks in Norway, we went home 
assured that we had everything under control,” he explains.4 On their return they started 
clearing the buildings and preparing for the installation of the machine. 
Plastkonstruktioner delivered a complete line including heating chamber, pulling devices, 
and saws as well as tools and raw materials for the first profiles. In principle Fiberline 
would soon be ready to begin production.5
But as already noted it wasn’t until May 1, 1979, after weeks of testing, that the first 
profile was pulled successfully through the machine. Even more time passed before 
profiles could be produced in larger amounts. In August, after more than half a year of 
experimental production, it was still very difficult to control the process, and the quality 
of the profiles was poor.6 Earlier I quoted Jens Johansen when he told about the start-up 
of the production for the 25th anniversary publication and the process was clearly 
remembered as difficult.   
According to the minutes Henrik Thorning opened the first meeting of the board, held 
about half a year after the founding, with a presentation “of the basic idea of Fiberline and 
the possibilities of the production.”7 It isn’t clear how this information was presented, but 
as production was the only topic specifically named in the minutes as part of this talk, it 
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probably received attention in proportion to the importance given to production in the 
self-conception of the company as expressed in the basic narrative. Following this 
presentation the board continued to discuss the production. Jørn Hansen asked how the 
quality of the profiles could be improved, as it was still very difficult to control it.8 Jørn 
Hansen and Kai Busch also questioned the large and expensive waste in production, and 
Henrik Thorning explained that this was due to the problems of getting the production 
running. Waste of fiber was caused each time they had to stop production and change the 
tool, as well as when the production failed.9
Around New Year 1980, a year after the founding, a large Danish company, E. 
Rasmussen Industri, placed the first substantial order at Fiberline. Amongst other things 
this company produced cabinets for electrical installations. The profiles in reinforced 
plastic had two very good qualities suited to this purpose: they were electrically isolating 
and could be produced with a complex geometry prepared for the installation making this 
procedure, as well as assembling the cabinet, much simpler. The order was very important 
to the board. Still E. Rasmussen Industri had to wait, as it was very difficult for Fiberline 
to produce the profile.  
The minutes of the board meeting in March 1980 noted that “In the production the period 
has been marked by tests partly made in cooperation with the supplier of raw materials 
and by the production of colour samples for ER-I [E Rasmaussen Industri].” In September 
1980 they were still not producing for E Rasmussen Industri, and it is noted that   
The period since the last meeting has been marked by the running-in 
of the ER-I profiles. The running-in has taken longer than expected 
and it has proven necessary to make changes to the tools … since the 
defect is in the construction of the tool, it is the supplier, 
Plastkonstruktioner A/S, that will have to decide where the changes 
are to be done … Jørn Hansen is stand-by with legal assistance.10
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Almost a year after E Rasmussen industri had placed their order at Fiberline, they were 
still waiting for deliveries. Jens Johansen explains that  
… It wasn’t easy. The new tools from Norway were late and when 
they finally arrived we couldn’t make it work. The sides of the profiles 
collapsed, the surface was peeling, the colors were wrong, and so on. 
Actually it took a couple of years to get an effective production 
running and in that period I can easily say that we felt the hardship of 
life.11
And E Rasmussen Industri was not the only ones experiencing problems with the 
production of Fiberline. In the minutes of the board meeting on January 9, 1981, Henrik 
Thorning describes this problem, along with the result of the half-year prior to this: 
The result is marked by the continued delay of the ER-I profiles and 
also the large waste from the running-in is influencing the contribution 
margin negatively. Dukadan has returned, at a cost of almost 20.000 
DKK, pipes for idlers to Fiberline because they were flawed. The 
reason for the problem hasn’t been found yet.12      
Fiberline certainly seemed to encounter many difficulties in the start-up, and they appear 
to have worked hard at getting the production running and producing profiles of even 
quality. But as already mentioned Jens Johansen also describes a feeling of conquest as 
they got better and better, in time mastering the process. Jens Johansen observes: 
After a while we became good at it. We produced still more 
complicated profiles and were always learning new things; tools, line 
ups, and combination of materials were continually improved, and 
we developed an entirely new production line, which we drew from 
scratch.13
He concludes that “It had been a tough and difficult birth – but now we could do it,” and 
he further notes that it was because of the optimism and enthusiasm of Henrik and Dorthe 
Thorning that they didn’t give up.14 Henrik Thorning continued to focus on the future and 
didn’t seem to doubt that Fiberline would learn to control the production and produce 
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better profiles. Already in January 1980, for example, he initiated discussions in the board 
about how the capacity of the production could be boosted when it would become 
necessary.15 However, the board agreed that the company couldn’t afford a second 
pultrusion machine in the foreseeable future; instead, they discussed if it would be 
possible to start up an evening or night shift in the production.16
An issue came up in the board almost immediately after the founding. It shows the speed 
of development of Fiberline’s resources in production and development in spite of - or 
maybe because of - the difficulties encountered. The question involved how Fiberline 
should deal with the machinery that was invented as the production was developed. Kai 
Busch suggested that they should seek to protect these, for example a newly developed 
machine for cutting fiberglass, as there had been several inquiries from interested buyers. 
But Henrik Thorning, reaffirming the basic narrative, said that “…the primary job of 
Fiberline is to produce profiles...” 17 Still the board agreed that possibilities should be 
explored, and in March 1980 they sold a machine for cutting fiberglass to the Swedish 
company, ASEA. It offered a good income to Fiberline at a time when the financial 
situation was critical,18 but it was not a method of income that the company pursued 
further.  
The board also discussed a silo system for storing grain and other commodities made with 
Fiberline’s profiles. The prototype was made in cooperation with a company called 
Sorenco. The board discussed if it would be possible to make a written agreement 
whereby Sorenco had to use profiles from Fiberline in any silos they might produce in the 
future. They agreed that Dukadan’s lawyer Jørn Hansen would make a draft for an 
agreement that Fiberline could then negotiate with Sorenco.19 Apart from showing that the 
technological level of Fiberline’s production and their ability to develop new products 
were growing, these cases are also early examples of Fiberline working together with a 
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customer not just to develop a profile for a specific purpose but to develop the end 
product for the customer. This method would become Fiberline’s preferred one and, as 
discussed earlier, a general method of innovation in the Danish plastic industry. Henrik 
Thorning’s attitude toward selling machinery, however, was clear, demonstrating his 
focus in producing and developing profiles.  
In all Fiberline handled the difficulties of the start-up by focusing on getting production 
running and developing profiles. An important element was to put the firm’s inherited 
resources into use. As discussed earlier such resources exist, even in the prospective firm. 
In the case of Fiberline, the resources to be put into service in the start-up included Henrik 
Thorning’s knowledge and experience with materials, but also—and not least of all—the 
entrepreneurial resources he acquired in his prior job at Jotun working with the 
development of new products at the forefront of the innovative development of the 
industry. The new machinery that was developed and then sold is evidence of this, as is 
the profile developed for E Rasmussen Industri. It had been a difficult process to develop 
it, but they managed to do so; the result was an innovative product that would in time 
become much used in the electrical industry (though not always produced by Fiberline). 
The company’s 25 years jubilee publication says about the profiles for E Rasmussen 
Industri that 
These were large and complicated profiles that no one had made 
before. Technologically they were difficult to produce, and Fiberline 
was in a hurry to develop the process. In return the company learned 
pultrusion in its extreme.20
Through such processes Fiberline developed new or at least stronger resources that might 
offer new services of production and product development. At the same time the 
experience of getting the production running served to reaffirm the sense expressed in the 
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basic narrative that Fiberline could make the process of pultrusion work as expressed in 
the quote above.     
In discussing the different qualities of entrepreneurial services, Penrose distinguishes 
between those drawn from resources that are built up through the operations of the firm 
and those that are, instead, given by the temperament of the entrepreneur himself. As 
mentioned she also notes that such phenomena as temperament cannot be described in 
economic analysis but can only be observed in their effect.21 In an earlier chapter I 
discussed one of the four temperamental resources of the entrepreneur that Penrose 
mentions, namely what she calls the fund-raising ingenuity. I have shown that the ability 
of Henrik Thorning to raise capital, though clearly aided by his own ingenuity, was also 
facilitated by the context of the start-up: Henrik Thorning’s prior experience and his 
strong network. Another temperamental resource of the entrepreneur discussed by 
Penrose is entrepreneurial ambition. Here she distinguishes between the ‘product-minded 
entrepreneur’ and the ‘empire builder.’22 She notes that the product-minded entrepreneur 
is primarily interested in the growth of his firm as an organization for the purpose of 
production and distribution of goods and services. Describing such entrepreneurs, she 
notes that  
Their interests are directed towards the improvement of the quality of 
their products, the reduction of costs [and] the development of better 
technology … They take pride in their organization, and from their 
point of view the ‘best’ way to make profits is through the 
improvement and extension of the activities of this organization.23      
Henrik Thorning is an entrepreneur of this kind. However, like the fund-raising ingenuity 
exercised by Henrik Thorning, the service of entrepreneurial ambition he delivers to 
Fiberline is best understood in context, by considering the self-conception of the 
company. I have already discussed Henrik Thorning’s prior experience and knowledge at 
length and shown what service was drawn from both in the start-up, as well as how they 
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were part of the context in which the basic narrative was formulated. Also I have earlier 
shown the basic narrative of the company to be focused on production and product 
development. It would become even more so as the company made new experiences 
through the start-up. In other words Henrik Thorning’s product-minded behavior is not 
only a matter of temperament or personal and private fads, but also of self-conception 
constructed in interplay with the context of the start-up and expressed in a shared basic 
narrative.   
The first sales 
In the summer of 1980, Henrik Thorning made a trip to England to visit three companies 
producing profiles by pultrusion.24 He wrote a long report to the board concerning the trip. 
About one of the companies, BTR-Permali in Gloucester, Henrik Thorning reports that 
“they said that they hadn’t sold anything the first two years they had been on the market 
with profiles; after that they had only moved forward.”25 In the report Henrik Thorning 
mentions the positive expectations of the future of each of the three companies 
specifically and then repeats it in his conclusion. This need to establish and repeat the 
point may be taken as a first clue that the image of context as it was formulated in the 
basic narrative was under pressure to deliver sense to the world Fiberline experienced 
around them. As discussed previously, the first formulation of Fiberline’s image of 
context was based on the idea of the potential of a product that could be sold to almost 
every industry and therefore had great market potential. Over the first couple of years, 
though, it became clear that it would perhaps not be very easy to sell the profiles—which 
appeared to have been quite surprising for Fiberline and was the reason Henrik Thorning 
sought comfort in the stories from English companies.  
Bearing in mind that a strong focus on production and product development made sense 
and was central to the company from its very founding, one realizes, not surprisingly, that 
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the challenges of selling the products came quite unexpectedly for Fiberline. Furthermore, 
according to the agreement between the owners, Dukadan was responsible for supplying 
sales expertise to Fiberline. Dukadan had a substantial network of customers as well as an 
experienced sales department already functioning. 26 All of these resources could be 
utilized in selling Fiberline’s products. The agreement between the two companies 
specified that every year they would settle upon a guaranteed minimum purchase from 
Dukadan.27 Fiberline in return would have to pay compensation to Dukadan if they sold 
products without their involvement. Dukadan’s focus was the Danish market, where their 
core business was, but they also had sales offices in Norway and the Northern part of 
West Germany.28
At the very first meeting of the board, held in August 1979, sales were already being 
discussed, as Fiberline would be out of orders to produce within a month. Henrik 
Thorning noted, however, that in the long run things looked better as Fiberline was 
negotiating with a couple of very big potential customers one of them the Danish State 
Railways, DSB. But Jørn Hansen was worried that it could be dangerous for the company 
to invest in large deliveries of a special profile for a single customer. He stressed the “risk 
of investment in such big cases and furthermore the importance that small companies like 
ours finds small but broad niches.” 29 Jørn Hansen’s point was that Fiberline should focus 
on a number of standard products that could be used in different industries and thus sold 
on many different markets. This was the model used in Dukadan’s subsidiary companies. 
The company had become successful by selling standard products—it was the source of 
their experience and resources.30 The view was also in line with the basic narrative of 
Fiberline. As discussed earlier Henrik Thorning saw the potential of Fiberline in selling 
standard profiles exactly as described by Jørn Hansen. This approach was constructed or 
formulated as the best way to exploit the versatility of the profiles; it would also make 
Fiberline less vulnerable, as they could sell their profiles to many different industries.  
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Jørn Hansen’s opinion seemed to be shared by the other members of the board, and Kai 
Busch suggested a “market and product analysis, including an evaluation of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the company.”31 This, he thought, would make it possible to reach the 
right markets quickly with the right products. “Fiberline and Dukadan,” Henrik Thorning 
said, “had already gathered some information at a Scandinavian industry fair.” The fair 
was held yearly in the Danish city of Herning, and they agreed that Henrik Thorning and 
Anders Hallen Pedersen should present an analysis of the situation at the next board 
meeting.32
At the next meeting Henrik Thorning presented the results of the market analysis. In 
addition to observations from the Scandinavian fair, it drew mostly on information about 
the American market from the fiberglass manufacturer Owens Corning. American 
reinforced plastic was primarily sold on five different markets, as Henrik Thorning 
explaind: Electricity, sporting goods (ski pols for example), chemistry, construction, and 
transport. In the minutes of the meeting the board concluded that  
…this is in good accordance with the special properties of the product, 
namely high electric insulation capacity combined with large heat 
resistance, low weight and great elasticity, corrosion resistance and 
high mechanical strength.33
This reaffirms the versatility of the material, and it seems to have been the only comment 
the board had on the structure of the American market. Apparently they didn't consider 
any possible implications for the potential Danish market or the company’s strategy. It 
appears to have been self-evident to Fiberline that a product of such potential could and 
should be sold for many different industries. Today Henrik Thorning talks about the 
naivety of the engineer in the start-up phase. He was so convinced of the superiority of the 
product, he says, that he almost expected it to sell itself.34 This attitude corresponds well 
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with the above quote in which the American market survey is simply used to repeat the 
properties of the product and to reaffirm its potential.   
However, the profiles didn’t sell themselves. By the end of September 1979, production 
would be out of work within 10 days, once Fiberline had finished an order for gratings to 
be used in stables. This led to considerations in the board about how more sales in this 
particular market could be secured. In the minutes it is noted that  
…when discussing the optimal sales effort concerning grating profiles 
for use in agriculture, the necessity of influencing all parties involved 
was mentioned – researchers, farming consultants, farmers, farm 
equipment manufactures etc. – at the same time.35
Henrik Thorning then suggested that Fiberline should host a seminar about the 
possibilities of using reinforced plastic in the agricultural industry, a seminar to which 
representatives of the groups mentioned should be invited.36 It isn’t clear whether such a 
seminar was ever arranged. Probably there weren’t resources to fulfill the task in the 
company at the time. But the quote expresses a beginning realization that selling profiles 
on the Danish market might be somewhat different from selling the well-known products 
already in the portfolio of Dukadan.  
In November 1979, sales moved to the top of the agenda at the board’s meeting. Anders 
Hallen Pedersen opened the meeting by announcing that realized sales were significantly 
below budget: “The reason for this is found in a larger inertia in the market than expected 
and in the fact that the sales and marketing effort hasn’t been optimal.”37 As a 
consequence, he explained, Dukadan had hired three fulltime employees that were to be 
responsible for selling the products of Fiberline. Dukadan had also started distributing 
brochures and material samples to potential customers, but Anders Hallen Pedersen still 
found it difficult to estimate sales at that time. It was too early to say if the effort would 
pay off.38 The responsibility rested on Dukadan, and as they had strong resources and 
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good experience in selling plastic products, their opinion carried weight in the matter. 
Dukadan acted as they usually did:  when they stepped up their effort to sell standard 
profiles, they were putting their inherited resources in service.  
The problem of selling the profiles didn’t appear to be taken as an immediate challenge to 
the self-conception of Fiberline. The only indication so far that the basic narrative might 
be under pressure was a couple of vague clues, for example in Henrik Thorning’s 
debriefing of the trip to England. The problem of sales in the start-up, however, points to 
a central challenge for Fiberline, namely how to deal with the general unfamiliarity of the 
product. When proposing to work the entire value chain of the agricultural industry, 
Henrik Thorning formulated his early considerations about this matter, but so far it was 
left unexplored.  
The everydayness of acute problems  
The result of the first six months was presented in November 1979. It was characterized 
as poor but not deterrent. This made good sense to everybody, and Anders Hallen 
Pedersen had just demonstrated Dukadan’s will to invest considerable resources in selling 
the profiles by hiring more sales personnel. But Fiberline now estimated that they would 
be losing 200.000 DKK to keep running through January, and by April the same year the 
amount would grow considerably as repayment and interest on the pultrusion machine had 
to be paid. Henrik Thorning said that he saw Dukadan as the solution to this problem and 
wanted them to buy more profiles from Fiberline. His argument was that, since Dukadan 
could afford to put these in stock, it would be the cheapest and least risky way for them to 
help Fiberline and would keep Fiberline’s production running. Anders Hallen Pedersen 
was reluctant, however, to guarantee that Dukadan would buy more profiles; instead, he 
offered to lend Fiberline the required sum.39
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Jørn Hansen and Kai Busch once again questioned the expenses for raw materials, mostly 
fiberglass and plastic, which were much higher than budgeted. Henrik Thorning explained 
(for a moment forgetting the waste in the production which continued to be substantial) 
that this was because Fiberline had problems getting supplies in smaller quantum than 
usual on the market. Therefore, they had to buy whole containers of materials, which 
surpassed their need and burdened their liquidity. The board agreed that Henrik Thorning 
should try to sell part of the materials to other companies, for example Plastkonstruktioner 
in Norway, which demonstrates the acuteness felt by the board in the situation.40
In January 1980 the board met extraordinarily to discuss the result of the first year and a 
revised budget for the first quarter of 1980. The result of the first year was now noted to 
be “unsatisfactory on account of missing sales,” but it got worse as the record states: 
“Even the budget from the last meeting of the board (November 6, 1979) that until April 
1, 1980 had an estimated monthly sale of only 120.000 DKK – or about half of the 
original budget – hasn’t been meet.”41 Fiberline would now, by its own estimate, be facing 
a shortfall of 500.000 DKK by July 1980.42 This loss had to be financed somehow and the 
board debated at length how it could be done. Anders Hallen Pedersen promised that 
Fiberline could borrow 50.000 DKK from Dukdan in both February and March. 43 The 
board also agreed that Fiberline should ask for a postponement of repayments from some 
of their creditors for one or two quarters. The company now had loans in three different 
banks, Norsk Exportfinans, FIH, and Aktivbanken who were all asked. The last of the 
three accepted and was also asked for a new loan to cover the last 220.000 DKK of the 
expected shortfall (which they granted).44
But things didn’t get better. When the board met in March 1980, Anders Hallen Pedersen 
opened the meeting by presenting a new budget for 1980/81 based on their experience 
with sales in the first three months of the year. The new budget didn’t only require a 
78 
larger running credit but also left Fiberline with a deficit for the year.45 Henrik Thorning 
couldn’t accept this new budget and stressed that  
The January budget must be met! If a budget doesn’t seem to hold, 
you can’t just make a new one; every possibility and resource must be 
deployed to meet the budget.46
But Dukadan’s lawyer, Jørn Hansen, replied that “The horizon must be better in sales … 
The question is also if the new budget will hold… It will be necessary to supply the 
company more capital by issuing new shares.”47 Anders Hallen Pedersen responded: 
“More capital can be supplied either from the shareholders or from Dukadan. The last 
option will imply a change in the controlling interest.”48 Henrik Thorning closed the 
discussion by saying that every possibility had to be considered and that it might also be 
an option to raise money through a development fund. His conclusion of the meeting was 
that “The sales must be increased significantly, and before the next meeting of the board 
there must be a solution for Fiberline’s need for capital.”49 Henrik Thorning, reluctant to 
accept that more capital was needed, focused instead on boosting sales in the situation. 
Dukadan’s comment that they would take over the controlling interest of the company if 
they were to supply more capital threatened the Henrik Thorning as the founder and 
owner of Fiberline, which as discussed was an important part of Fiberline’s basic 
narrative. His reaction in the above quote and the other discussions on the topic is 
proportionate to the risk that he might lose control of the company.   
When the board met again in June 1980, sales prospects had gotten a little better with two 
new potential customers, one of them the Danish Armed Forces, interested in placing 
large orders with Fiberline. The record states that “Kai Busch and Jørn Hansen found that 
the potential contract with the Armed Forces was particularly interesting and thought that 
an investment of 25.000 DKK in tools shouldn’t be a hindrance.”50 Dukadan also seemed 
to have intensified their sales effort as promised and the record states that “Anders Hallen 
79
Pedersen mentioned … that material on LSK-profiles has been sent to the electro 
technical industry and that material for the chemical industry and consulting engineers is 
on the way.”51 The overall spirit seems to have gotten better; although there were still 
debates about how to handle sales, there were no discussions about the financial problems 
of the company and no more immediate threats to the ownership of Henrik Thorning. 
Through discussions about Fiberline’s financial situation over the period from the winter 
of 1979 to the summer of 1980, Henrik Thorning demonstrated his eagerness to maintain 
his influence in the company on the one hand while trying to meet the acute needs of the 
company on the other. He was eager for Dukadan to push harder to sell the profiles, still 
trusting their ability to do so, but he was also willing to borrow money through banks and 
funds. In general, Henrik Thorning didn’t appear to be very conservative in this regard. 
As just mentioned his role as founder and owner was better maintained by providing 
capital through banks that didn’t demand influence in board or management. Yet, Henrik 
Thorning continued to have a firm belief in the future success of the company, which as 
noted earlier may be connected to the potential of the product and the brilliance of the 
idea as also expressed in the basic narrative. So far the basic narrative hadn’t been 
contested to a degree where it didn’t provide sense to the world of and around Henrik 
Thorning. Therefore, there was no reason not to invest further in the development of the 
company - first and foremost in production and product development.      
Conclusion – Services in use in the start-up 
In this chapter I have discussed how the resources of both Fiberline and Dukadan were 
put to service in Fiberline’s start-up, about the first two years of the company’s history. It 
was a period and a process of many challenges, problems, and frustrations, but in dealing 
with these Fiberline strengthened the conception that they could make pultrusion work 
and that both the product and production process were something special. Jens Johansen’s 
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history about the feeling of conquest and the celebration of the first company birthday 
echoes this sentiment. I will argue that this confirmation of the self-conception of 
Fiberline gained through the difficulties of the start-up and the triumph of making 
pultrusion work is part of the explanation why the basic narrative was as stable and 
resistant to change as it turned out to be (and as will be clear from coming chapters).   
Henrik Thorning continued to voice his faith in the future and was willing to indebt the 
company (further) on that account. But he also wanted to maintain the idea that he was the 
right and proper founder and owner of Fiberline. Dukadan had problems selling the 
products from the beginning, but so far this didn’t cause Fiberline to doubt either 
Dukadan or the potential of the product. In other words the focus of Fiberline remained on 
the product and the production process, which made sense to them. As will be discussed 
further in the following chapter, this focus was so firm that after three years, at the brink 
of disaster, when Fiberline finally realized that they couldn’t rely on Dukadan to sell the 
profiles and therefore formulated a sales strategy, they proclaimed to do so “To obtain 
orders, which will secure the most optimal exploitation of Fiberline’s production capacity 
at all times.”52 For Fiberline, increasing sales was seen as a means to optimizing 
production capacity.             
In the start-up the inherited resources of Henrik Thorning were put into service as the 
company acted. Henrik Thorning’s knowledge and experience were important, as 
discussed, but his entrepreneurial resources built up through his former work at especially 
Jotun were also put into service. The task of developing the production to a level where it 
could run steadily and efficiently was difficult and demanded much in the way of thinking 
in new combinations and ideas. But through the process of trial and error in starting up the 
production described in this chapter (and earlier by Jens Johansen), Fiberline eventually 
got skilled at producing profiles: the company acquired new available services that could 
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be put to use in developing the production further. In this way Fiberline started 
accumulating new available services through the process described by Penrose.  
Penrose claimed herself that she knew little about new firms.53 However, in applying a 
Penrosian framework focusing on self-conception and image of context to the start-up of 
Fiberline, much can be discerned about this new firm. The connection between the 
concepts of self-conception and image of context, expressed in the basic narrative, and the 
use of inherited resources of the prospective firm have been brought into focus—as has 
the role of Henrik Thorning’s knowledge and experience in accumulating available 
services for his new firm and in formulating and strengthening its basic narrative. 
Though Penrose wasn’t interested in the new firm specifically, but rather mentioned it in 
passing to stress that it would grow according to the same mechanisms as a large and well 
established firm, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm is among the most cited in the 
field of entrepreneurship studies.54 However, it is most often mentioned as part of the 
roots of the resource based view of the firm where focus, as discussed earlier, is mostly on 
describing the sources of competitive advantage in the firm and less on the process of 
growth itself.      
An exception to this is Garnsey, who discusses the growth of the new firm based on 
Penrose’s theory and derives a three-step development process for it. Garnsey describes a 
preparation or search phase “… when entrepreneurs are seeking out opportunities and 
resources for a viable line of business. We can deduce,” she further notes, “that this may 
occur in some prior activity by the entrepreneurs, before the new firm is started.”55 After 
this first initiative there is a phase of mobilizing resources. Garnsey notes that  
Between the initial prospecting that inspires choice of an activity and 
the ability to perform productive services as an independent operation, 
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a period of learning must take place. Resources must be secured and 
the firm organized internally for productive activity.56
This is followed by a period of early resource generation focused on gaining and 
sustaining returns. Garnsey observes: “From the time when productive activity that yields 
returns is under way to the time when levels of profitability assure self-sufficiency, major 
problems centre around securing the viability of the enterprise.”57 These three stages, 
described as sequential, are deduced from Penrose based on her description of how 
resources are exploited in the company. Garnsey notes, as I have also done, that the 
initiative to act on productive opportunities according to Penrose is connected to the 
entrepreneurial predisposition or attitude of the company. However, Garnsey rejects this 
perspective as an avenue for exploring new venture initiative and growth and points out 
instead that Penrose’s analysis is focused on the recognition (not the construction) of 
opportunities, the creation of resources, and ways of matching these for future growth.58 It 
is via this perspective that she further develops her idea of a Penrosian three-step process 
of new venture growth, which she then seeks to test on statistical material of new venture 
growth patterns.59
In describing the search phase Garnsey points to opportunities as objects existing in the 
world around the entrepreneur. However, my analysis of the start-up of Fiberline shows 
the opportunity taken by Henrik Thorning in founding the company to be very closely 
connected not only to his prior knowledge and experience and to his existing network. 
This suggests that the opportunity of founding Fiberline was not available to everyone 
who might be searching for new opportunities, but should rather be seen as a construct of 
Henrik Thorning. As already discussed, Hjort describes how the entrepreneur may talk 
opportunities into being, an idea that has also been introduced into the field of 
entrepreneurship by Dimow and others who stress that, for example, sense making or 
narrative perspectives may be used to capture this construction of opportunities.60
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The two further stages Garnesey describes in her sequence of new firm growth constitute 
a period of learning followed by a period of early resource generation. However, as clear 
from the discussion in this chapter, it is very difficult to separate learning based on prior 
knowledge and experience from resource generation in the case of Fiberline. They are 
rather dependent on each other, which is also in line with Penrose’s description of how 
productive services are accumulated in the firm exactly by a process of learning.61
I cannot agree with Garnsey in describing the growth of a new firm as a three-step 
sequence. I rather think it should be seen as a context-specific process in which the 
entrepreneur draws on both prior knowledge and experience as well as inherited resources 
in constructing a self-perception and image of context, which then enables action. 
However, Garnsey’s description of the problems of securing the viability of the business 
in the start-up—developing the firm’s resources and the available services that may be 
drawn from these to a point where they may sustain a profitable running of the 
company—is very close to the development of Fiberline as I have described it in this 
chapter. It would not be a short phase, though, and as will be clear from the following 
chapter, Fiberline still faced many challenges before it could develop into a profitable and 
self-sufficiency company.         
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6. How should the profiles of Fiberline be sold? 
As discussed in the first chapter of the analysis, the image of the context as expressed in 
the basic narrative was inspired by the idea of the potential of the product and substituting 
industries were seen as the competition. This and the versatility of the profiles meant that 
Fiberline expected to sell standard profiles to a number of industries. Therefore, the 
partnership with Dukadan suited Fiberline well, as Dukadan offered resources and 
experience in selling standard plastic products to many different industries. In the start-up, 
however, selling the profiles turned out to be more difficult than imagined (as discussed in 
the previous chapter). But though this caused much debate in the board, it had not 
pressured the basic narrative to a point where it didn’t deliver sensible options for action. 
Therefore, Fiberline continued to push for developing the product and the process, and 
Dukadan intensified its effort of selling standard profiles as discussed.            
But Fiberline ended its 2nd financial year in April 1981 with a loss just as big as the first 
year; the turnover had taken a substantial dive and a heavy debt had accumulated (See 
appendix 1). Thus, by the spring of 1981, the situation began to seem desperate. Sales 
were still low and about half of the existing sale went to one single costumer, E. 
Rasmussen Industri, making Fiberline even more vulnerable through its dependence on 
this one customer. Clearly action was needed if Fiberline were to survive.   
Today Henrik Thorning says that it became clear to him that as far as sales and market 
strategy goes, a small company can’t strategize at all, but can only react.1 The object of 
this chapter is to discuss how Fiberline started focusing on sales to counter the difficult 
situation they were in by constructing a new narrative about how profiles should be sold. I 
will show how this new narrative was connected to the basic narrative, which meant that 
the effect wasn’t a disruption of the original conception of self or context but rather an 
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adaption of it to present circumstances. The basic narrative’s image of context was broad 
and unspecific in emphasizing substituting industries and in the potential of the product. 
The events of the period described in this chapter, from around the middle of 1981 to the 
middle of the 1980s, put particular pressure on this part of the basic narrative, forcing the 
construction of a more concrete image of the context that better accounted for the 
company’s reaction in the difficult situation in which it found itself.  
Before turning to the new narrative, I will first discuss the situation of Fiberline from 
around 1981 till 1984 in more detail to draw a picture of the grounds on which Fiberline 
felt compelled to act. Also I will briefly discuss the development of the Danish plastic 
industry in this period. After this I will consider how selling the profiles gradually became 
Fiberline’s focus from around 1981, before discussing how a new narrative of the proper 
way to sell profiles was constructed and how it was connected to the basic narrative.          
Pressure building  
During its first two years of running, Fiberline suffered heavy losses. Generally the period 
from the founding until the middle of the 1980s was marked by a long line of crises, and 
the company was in acute need of raising capital. As discussed Henrik Thorning seemed 
to keep optimistic about the future of the company and therefore he was not reserved in 
his attitude toward lending capital if necessary and possible.  
However, as evident from the discussions on financing in the board, which I referenced in 
the former chapter, it was becoming clear that not everybody on the board was as 
optimistic – or as bent on keeping control of Fiberline in the hands of Henrik Thorning. 
Anders Hallen Pedersen had hinted that if Dukadan were to invest more they would also 
want a larger part of the shares. The lawyer Jørn Hansen stated plainly: “We are getting 
closer to the day where results must start showing. If one doesn’t believe in better results 
in 1981 it must be stopped now.”2 As seen Henrik Thorning managed to solve the 
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immediate problems in the spring of 1980 through new loans from both the bank and 
Dukadan; about a year later, in April 1981, Fiberline again persuaded Dukadan to supply 
more capital as a loan.3 But things didn’t get better, sales were still low, the production 
still expensive, and Jørn Hansen became still more critical. The minutes from the meeting 
of the board in August 1981 state that  
Jørn Hansen found the situation critical and was of the opinion that we 
in December – if the company doesn’t balance at that time – have to 
decide if Fiberline must be supplied more money, must be sold or 
liquidated.4
It was becoming clear that Dukadan and Fiberline didn’t view Fiberline’s prospects in 
quite the same way. This discussion culminated in February 1982 when Anders Hallen 
Pedersen announced that Dukadan intended either to sell all its shares in Fiberline or to 
take over the company entirely—and that for now they would redraw from the board. 
They didn’t want to risk losing more capital. Later, they noted that the situation with 
Fiberline was so much more disappointing: Dukadan had never before invested so much 
in a new product and, to their knowledge, it remained to be seen if there was any actual 
market for it.5 They did, however, agree to continue as Fiberline’s distributor, and a new 
agreement about this was signed around the same time as Dukadan sold their shares.6
As discussed earlier Henrik Thorning’s position in the company was closely linked to the 
self-conception of Fiberline as formulated in the basic narrative. Therefore, he saw this 
situation as a question of both securing the survival of Fiberline and keeping it in his 
control. As before he would draw on his network to come up with a solution. In August 
1982, six months after Dukadan withdrew from the board, it was announced that Dukadan 
had sold all their shares. Four new owners, all personal friends of Dorthe and Henrik 
Thorning, became members of the board.7 Without implying of course that Henrik 
Thorning resorted to the tricks and games of Iago, as discussed earlier, this seems to 
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demonstrate some degree of fund-raising ingenuity, taking Fiberline’s situation into 
consideration.    
Henrik Thorning first bought all the shares in Fiberline from Dukadan for 1 DKK and 
then started to look for investors.8 The four investors agreed to lend the company 
1.360.200 DKK in all and then bought a part of the shares each from Henrik Thorning for 
1 DKK. Shares were distributed amongst them according to their share in the loan. After 
this deal Henrik Thorning and Niels Jørgen Kovstrup each owned 24 % of the shares. So 
did Torben Nymand who, apart from being a friend of Henrik and Dorthe Thorning, was 
the managing director at a local industrial company. Peder Irgens, whom Henrik Thorning 
knew from his time at Jotun, owned 14 % and so did Kai Busch, who had been member of 
the board from the founding of the company.9 Niels Jørgen Kovstrup had been working as 
a consultant for Fiberline from April 1981 and knew the company well.10 For Henrik 
Thorning this new situation offered a different kind of influence on the board, as he was 
now dependent on four fellow owners. But apart from Niels Jørgen Kovstrup, these were 
not as actively involved in the running of Fiberline as Dukadan had been. They were, 
however, all active in the board’s discussions and were in dialog on many different 
aspects of running the company.11
This new supply of capital was much needed. For the remainder of 1982, things seemed to 
be going a little better and Fiberline was, for a period, adhering to its budget. But by the 
beginning of 1983 things were back to normal with a not quite efficient production 
running small series, poor sales, and very tight liquidity.12 This situation immediately 
pressed Fiberline to find new funds, and ways of financing the continued running of the 
company were discussed again. So far the board agreed on asking for an expansion of the 
credit in Aktivbanken, while more possibilities were discussed.13 At an extraordinary 
general assembly in June 1983, it was announced that Fiberline had undergone a 
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reconstruction to try a save the company by getting rid of some of the expensive debt.14
When the board met again in July 1983, the financial situation was still uncertain and the 
liquidity very tight.15
It was particularly disturbing that E Rasmussen Industri over the summer of 1983 was 
buying less and less and didn’t seem too eager to renew their contract with Fiberline, 
though it would soon be running out. In the end E Rasmussen Industri didn’t renew the 
contract, and by the winter of 1983 they had moved all their business to a competitor.16
Losing such a big client led to a 23% drop in the turnover for the financial year of 
1983/84 that ended with a new deficit (see appendix 1). The situation was frustrating. It 
would soon be five years since Fiberline was founded, and still it seemed very difficult to 
establish a profitable and self-sufficient company. Applying Garnsey’s concepts, Fiberline 
seemed to have great difficulty in moving past the initial learning phase of development. 
Dukadan’s exit had demonstrated that at least they didn’t believe it likely to ever happen. 
But what sense could be drawn from this continued state of crisis? And what should be 
done?          
Here in the summer of 1983 Henrik Thorning was pretty clear on this. The solution to the 
problems was in boosting sales efforts! To help out in this particular situation, he 
suggested that the board should for a period take part in the running of the company, 
thereby enabling him to work more intensely with sales traveling intensely to visit 
customers. Now Henrik Thorning seemed as focused on sales as he had earlier been on 
production. This change was, however, long in the making.  
As discussed, the optimistic view of the potential of the product and its versatility 
established in the basic narrative gave sense to the partnership with Dukadan. It rendered 
their resources in selling standard products primarily on the Danish market relevant to 
Fiberline. Therefore, focusing on sales didn’t immediately make sense to Fiberline; as the 
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following will show, this turn of focus, so clear in the 2nd half of 1983, had only been 
reluctant and gradual. However, before turning to the first sales efforts of the company, I 
will shortly describe the development of the Danish plastic industry in the period.      
Strong export growth of the Danish plastic industry  
Considering the general market conditions for the Danish plastic industry in the period 
suggests that it wasn’t just the structure and routines of Dukadan that hindered their 
success in selling profiles on the Danish market and that other elements were involved. 
The Danish economy was in crisis with low growth rates, a high unemployment rate, high 
inflation, and a deficit on trade as well as public finances.17 This affected the Danish 
industry in general. The plastic industry was further challenged by new restrictive 
environmental legislation passed in 1979 and 1980: for example, a law obligating 
companies to register every product made with any form of chemical, an expensive and 
time consuming process for companies in the industry.18 These factors meant that the 
Danish plastic industry was experiencing either declining or very slow growth in turnover 
in the beginning of the 1980s. Many companies were producing plastic packaging for 
food and consumer goods and were thus hit hard by the fall in the private consumption in 
Denmark. Another large group of plastic producers delivered to the construction industry 
were equally hard pressed by the economic crisis; this was for example where much of 
Dukadan’s business was located. The plastic industry managed to secure a small growth 
through these difficult years because the industry generally experienced growth in export 
activities.19 For this reason it was presented as an exemplary industry, for example by the 
Danish Minister of Industry, Ib Stetter, who in 1983 was very satisfied with the positive 
influence of the plastic industry on the Danish trade balance.20
Growth in export happened even though the largest export markets of the Danish plastic 
industry, Sweden and West Germany, were experiencing some of the same economic 
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challenges as Denmark. The plastic industry organization ascribed the growth in export to 
the technological ability and flexibility of the industry focusing on the many companies 
that, like Fiberline, made complicated products in modern plastic materials. It was 
underscored that this growth happened not only in spite of difficult times, but also in spite 
of the challenges brought on by the new environmental legislation. This legislation 
weakened the competitive advantage of the Danish companies on international markets by 
adding demands that international competitors didn’t have to meet.21 In all there seems to 
have been a strong export focus in the industry. As it turned out Fiberline also came to 
pursue an international sales strategy with great eagerness, though it was initially seen to 
be forced on them by circumstances.    
A gradual focus on sales 
As discussed in the previous chapter Dukadan had problems selling the profiles already 
from the founding of Fiberline. They had, however, demonstrated their commitment to the 
partnership in November 1979 by promising to hire sales personnel to work exclusively 
with Fiberline’s products. Yet, sales never took off in the hands of Dukadan, and not a 
single meeting of the board was held without it being noted that Dukadan was not buying 
as much from Fiberline as budgeted.  
Henrik Thorning would repeatedly seek to influence Dukadan and help them to sell more 
profiles. He offered to train Dukadan’s sales personnel, to accompany them when visiting 
potential customers, and to help them calculate and specify the profile structure needed by 
customers. Fiberline also repeatedly encouraged Dukadan to update sales materials; they 
produced their own materials and asked the sales consultants of Dukadan to deliver these 
to potential customers.22
The agreement between Dukadan and Fiberline that was drafted as part of the founding in 
1979 has already been mentioned: it specified that every year the two companies should 
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settle upon a guaranteed minimum purchase from Dukadan. Fiberline in return would 
have to pay compensation to Dukadan if they sold products without their involvement.23
The idea was that Dukadan would buy standard profiles for stock, as they did with their 
other products. An important part of Dukadan’s competitive advantage as a distributor 
was a well-assorted stock that kept delivery time to a minimum.24
However, it turned out that some of the customers interested in the profiles couldn’t find a 
standard profile that fitted their specific need and would ask to have a special profile 
made instead. E Rasmussen Industri was an example of a customer that wanted a special 
profile. The task of selling these was different from selling standard profiles, as the 
potential customer often required more consulting in getting the right profile for their 
need. Therefore, Dukadan, whose sales personnel didn’t have the required knowledge for 
this, would often have to involve Fiberline in the process of selling special profiles.   
As a consequence Dukadan decided in August 1980 to give the responsibility for selling 
special profiles to Fibeline, meaning that they would pass on inquiries for special profiles 
directly to Fiberline. Henrik Thorning objected to this decision with reference to the very 
limited resources of Fiberline. In the minutes it is noted that 
Henrik Thorning finds that the decision is good in principal, but due to 
the capacity [of Fiberline] it would have been desirable if the change 
was made at a time when the ER-I deliveries were “on track” and 
Fiberline had gotten the head more above water financially.25
The new structure meant that the sale of standard profiles still had to go through Dukadan, 
also if the sale were made as part of Fiberline’s sale of special profiles.26 Unwelcome as 
this new responsibility was, Fiberline took it on; afterwards, their focus would gradually 
be drawn to sales. In April 1981 it is noted in the record of a board meeting that “Fiberline 
has had a number of visits from national and foreign companies with interest in the 
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pultrusion process.”27 This and the experiences of Fiberline’s first direct sale to 
international costumers over the first months after the new agreement with Dukadan led to 
Export being put on the agenda as a new point, because Henrik Thorning wanted to 
discuss it. Here the following was noted:  
For now the existing structure is maintained so Dukadan is responsible 
for export of standard profiles and Fiberline for export of special 
profiles. Jørn Hansen found it fair that Fiberline received a provision 
from Dukadan when they [Fiberline] sold standard profiles to 
customers that buy special profiles.28
This indicates that Fiberline had suggested taking over the responsibility of all export 
sales, which demonstrates Fiberline’s realization of the need for selling the profiles 
themselves. However, Dukadan, who was established in both the German and the 
Norwegian markets, refused this arrangement, which meant that so far Fiberline was 
confined to focus on selling special profiles if they wanted to influence the sale directly.29
But Fiberline’s proposal indicates a remarkable change in the attitude of the company: 
coming from a position where they complained of a lack of resources for taking on a sales 
effort of their own to a point where they argued for more responsibility in selling the 
profiles on international markets.  
And Fiberline appeared very serious in their new focus. In April 1981 Niels Jørgen 
Kovstrup was hired for a year as a consultant (before he became a co-owner). Amongst 
other matters of structure he would focus on systems for controlling production and 
quality.30 The idea was to lessen some of the work load on Henrik Thorning, thus freeing 
up resources for the sales effort. Fiberline also began communication with the local 
municipality of Kolding about consulting support for exporting special profiles. A 
business consultant from the municipality was researching the possibilities, and 
conclusions would be made in the early autumn of the same year.31
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The report from the export consultant was discussed at the meeting of the board in August 
1981; clearly not everybody was as excited about export sales as Henrik Thorning. It was 
a tense meeting because of Fiberline’s desperate situation at that time, which frustrated 
everybody and made the conflict between Dukadan and Fiberline obvious. Henrik 
Thorning pushed again for a harder effort in sales, and Dukadan insisted again that much 
was already done and that the problems might not rest with them alone. A clear sign of 
this conflict was that Henrik Thorning, who is the author of the minutes of this meeting, 
for the first time distinguished between them in Dukadan and us in Fiberline. The 
proposal from the business consultant from Kolding municipality appears to have been 
included in the material for the meeting, but unfortunately it has not been saved in the 
archive. The report led to heated discussions opened by Kai Busch. The minutes state that 
“Kai Busch found the proposal interesting, but questioned the current resources of 
Fiberline and also found that the Danish market should first be exploited fully.”32 The 
record continues:  
Henrik Thorning agreed that the Danish market should of course be 
exploited fully before export activities are launched and that it will be. 
Henrik Thorning also referred to the proposal, which explains why 
export is necessary.33
This was followed up by Anders Hallen Pedersen who is quoted to have asked “whether 
the quality control of Fiberline was sufficient to prevent large, expensive claims abroad?” 
The minutes continue: “Following this, Henrik Thorning informed [the board] that 
Fiberline is establishing a systematic quality control, thus making the possibilities for 
such complaints minimal.”34 Seeing as Niels Jørgen Kovstrup had only recently been 
hired for making such a system and that he would have to manage the task on a very 
limited budget, this would seem a somewhat distant hope. Clearly, the rest of the board 
was skeptical about this new focus on export. However, the interest shown by potential 
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international customers and the disappointment so far in the Danish market meant that, to 
Fiberline, export seemed the best option for selling profiles in the situation.  
As discussed previously, the company’s situation was critical, because Fiberline had been 
slow in taking up an active sales effort. This, I will argue, was because Fiberline’s basic 
narrative was essentially one about production which, as explained earlier, was the central 
element of the company’s self-conception. Fiberline’s image of context was based on the 
same focus on production and an abstract idea of the potential of the profiles. If the 
profiles were just good enough, they would sell themselves. However, this image of the 
context was now under growing pressure, first from the disappointing sales, and then from 
the still more desperate financial situation, and finally from the conflict with and 
subsequent exit of Dukadan. This tension between the self-conception of the company and 
the growing contextual pressure paved the way for Fiberline’s new and increasing focus 
on sales. This focus was strengthened further when E Rasmussen Industri pulled their 
business away from Fiberline. Acting in this situation the company would, however, 
continue to draw on the conception of the product formulated in the basic narrative as a 
versatile substitute to traditional materials that should, therefore, be sold as standard 
profiles to various different industries.   
Standard profiles and distributors 
In the months following August 1981, Fiberline extended their international engagement, 
and from February 1982 they appeared to have agreed with Dukadan that Fiberline could 
now also sell standard profiles outside Denmark. The record of the board meeting in 
January 1982 states that “In the coming period Fiberline will focus on the existing sales 
program for example by building [a web of] dealers of the standard profile program on the 
close European markets.”35 This was the first time Fiberline formulated structured 
thoughts of a specific sales strategy. Two connected elements were particularly important 
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in this strategy, namely the focus on selling standard profiles and the idea of building up 
an international network of distributors that could sell the standard profiles. So far, 
however, the international connections were so scattered that this was an idea or vision 
more than a plan.  
At the next meeting of the board in February 1982, Anders Hallen Pedersen announced 
that Dukadan intended to sell all its shares in Fiberline. After this Dukadan was still to sell 
Fiberline’s products in Denmark, but apart from that Fiberline was now independent of 
the company. A new distribution contract between the two was made following the sale of 
Dukadan’s shares. It stated that the agreement of dividing the responsibility between 
selling special and standard profiles was upheld. Dukadan was only to sell standard 
profiles at the Danish market, however, leaving Fiberline free to work international 
markets as it pleased, without having to hand customers over to Dukadan.36
When the original board of Fiberline met for the first time 3½ years earlier, Henrik 
Thorning had presented the company. At that time, he opened the meeting by presenting 
the idea of the company and its product. When the new board met for the first time, 
Henrik Thorning again made a general presentation of the company and his immediate 
plans for it. Now, he opened with sales and explained what he saw as the sales strategy of 
Fiberline. As in the first discussions on sales strategy quoted above, his remarks indicate a 
push toward international sales and a heavy focus on standard profiles: 
At the current moment the sales strategy of Fiberline is focused on 
strengthening the sale of standard profiles by establishing agencies in 
the nearest European countries. Producing standard profiles is 
something Fiberline can do directly without large expenses for 
development and start-up, and standard profiles are used in every 
industry and is therefore not a product that is sensitive to market 
trends.37
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As discussed the idea of selling standard profiles was connected to the vision of the 
product and its potential as formulated in the basic narrative. In establishing the basic 
narrative in the first chapter of the analysis, I drew on a number of articles in which 
Henrik Thorning presented his vision for Fiberline and argued exactly as he does in the 
passage above, that the profiles could be sold to every industry, thus making Fiberline less 
sensitive to changing conditions in any single industry than many other companies. This 
basic idea, which I have described as the idea of the versatility of the profiles, is the very 
reason why Henrik Thorning was so focused on selling standard profiles. The focus on 
building up a network of distributors to sell standard profiles in these early thoughts on 
sales strategy show that Fiberline still ascribed to this part of the original idea of Fiberline. 
Another example of the same can be found in Fiberline’s first written sales strategy made 
in March 1982 just after Dukadan announced that they wanted to sell their shares. The 
written strategy states that Fiberline is aiming for 75 % of the sale to come from 
international customers and that it should mainly be standard profiles sold through a 
network of distributors. It is noted that  
A well-functioning system of distributors and agents must be 
established at the desired export markets. The distributors must 
primarily be trading or engineering companies who have the technical 
and commercial knowledge to meet our goals. The distributors must 
be of a size where they can deliver an effective effort to sell 
Fiberline’s profiles.38
So far, however, only one distributer seemed to be in play, and at the August 1982 
meeting, Henrik Thorning told the board: “A key issue has been Fiberline’s participation 
in the Hannover trade fair in April where we connected with the company Arthur Krüger 
in Hamburg who is a potential distributer in Germany.”39
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The origins of the international focus 
The focus of the new sale strategy on establishing a network of distributors made sense to 
Fiberline, because it connected to the idea of selling standard profiles. But the early effort 
in sales is not only marked by this focus but also by an international focus, seen for 
example in Henrik Thorning’s eagerness to discuss exports in the board. As noted the 
agreement with Dukadan had made it most interesting for Fiberline to focus on 
international markets, as this was where they first became independent of Dukadan. This 
development coincided with the first interest in Fiberline’s products from international 
customers, which probably helped to intensify the focus. Another important element in the 
export eagerness of the company was Henrik Thorning’s prior knowledge and experience, 
both helping to make the international focus seem meaningful to Fiberline.
Henrik Thorning knew the general export success of the Danish plastic industry. His 
former experience made him used to working with international companies in the 
industry, for example the large industrial corporations that supplied fibers and other 
materials to the industry. Today, Henrik Thorning says that he considered finding a 
German distributor the first step in getting profiles out onto international markets. The 
consultant from Kolding municipality had particular experience in guiding Danish 
companies in exporting to West Germany and had a good knowledge of that market. Also, 
Henrik Thorning knew that many American pultrusion companies were subcontractors to 
the American electrical industry because of the good qualities of composite plastic. The 
German electrical industry was large and as such might be prosperous for Fiberline. 
Arthur Krüger already sold many different products to the industry, which made them 
particularly interesting to Fiberline.40 Henrik Thorning didn’t just tell the new board about 
the connection to Arthur Krüger. With great eagerness he also realted all the experiences 
of the company at the industry fair in Hannover in April: 
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The interest in our products at the Hannover trade fair was very good, 
and the participation in this fair has already led to orders, among 
others from the company Chainant Associate Co. in Bangkok, 
Thailand. Fiberline has also had a visit from Iroma Karo from Fiskas 
in Finland who is interested in cooperating about developing tubes … 
and profiles … Løgstør Rørindustri from Denmark is also interested in 
cooperating about heating pipes and manager Hübsmann has 
suggested that Henrik Thorning and he travel to U.S.A. to look at 
equipment … for the pultrusion machine. … The Swiss companies 
Gummimagg and EBO have shown interest in our products and 
August 23rd Fiberline will be visited by manager Eggli from EBO …41
Focus was clearly on international sales now and the reports from management show this 
to have been pursued with the same eagerness as the production had been developed 
earlier.42 For example, the report from management in December 1982 states that 
In the period the marketing has been characterized by cooperation with 
our German and Finnish distributors. Fiberline has trained 8 salesmen 
from Arthur Krüger in Hamburg … and Henrik Thorning has trained 
all ETRA’s sales personnel in Finland. … Niels Jørgen Kovstrup has 
been in France where he has visited three potential distributors. … 
Henrik Thorning has been in Holland to visit a large dealer of plastic 
called Eriks. Eriks will look in to the possibilities of selling Fiberline’s 
products in Holland and maybe also in Belgium and Luxemburg.43
After a short Christmas break Henrik Thorning was off again. To the board he reports
Henrik Thorning has traveled for a week with Krüger’s sales manager 
and visited approximately 25 customers in Germany. The German 
market is very interested in our products and Krüger does a good job. 
From several of the customers we got sample orders as well as 
indications that we can compete first and foremost with Grillo in 
Germany. … In January Henrik Thorning visited two companies in 
Switzerland; Magg Technic AG and Angst + Pfister who are both 
interested in being our exclusive distributer in Switzerland. … 
Fiberline have had a visit from Celtite in France who also wishes to 
market our products in France.44
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The above considerations concerning how Fiberline came to focus on sales and why this 
focus became international depicts a company that didn’t venture into international 
markets based on a plan or according to a particular model of how it should be done. 
Instead, it was an incremental process driven by necessity. I have earlier discussed the 
concept of opportunity and argued that contrary to the view of Garnsey (and many others) 
it should be seen as a construct of the entrepreneur rather than a ‘pre-existing 
phenomenon out there.’45 Considering the early internationalization of firms, Schweizer, 
Vahlne, and Johanson also take the concept of opportunity as a point of departure; as they 
note, opportunities might be created by the entrepreneur, in the sense that prior knowledge 
and experience makes the entrepreneur capable of recognizing an opportunity when he 
comes across one.46 To this rather traditional image of the entrepreneur, Schweizer, 
Vahlne, and Johanson add the concept of effectuation to explain entrepreneurial action 
and early internationalization drawing on the work of Sarasvathy.47 The point is that in 
situations of uncertainty the entrepreneur will make decisions based not on rational 
calculation but on what knowledge he has, using the resources available in the situation 
and with no clear goal besides handling the situation. This is effectuation.  
When Fiberline started to pursue international sales, the company was in a situation that - 
to use Schweizer, Vahlne, and Johanson’s words - was characterized by “no 
predictability, possibility of setting goals, or independent environment.”48 And when 
acting in this manner, Fiberline attempted to exercise control over what could be done 
with available resources, that is to say they used effectuation logic. Henrik Thorning’s 
statement mentioned earlier, that when it comes to markets a small firm can’t strategize 
but can only react, captures this logic.  
In this chapter I have so far discussed how the financial situation grew ever more 
desperate, the problems of selling the profiles, the escalating conflict with Dukadan, and 
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later the loss of E Rasmussen Industri as a customer challenged the existing image of 
context of Fiberline. This induced Fiberline to act by gradually becoming more focused 
on sales. I have also considered how the actions of the company in the situation, forming a 
sales strategy that focused on selling standard profiles through a network of international 
distributors made sense to Fiberline, because it drew on the conception of the product and 
its potential as constructed in the basic narrative of the company. By drawing on the first 
experiences of sales as discussed, and by linking these to the conception of self in the 
basic narrative, a new narrative was constructed, which I discuss in the following section. 
It explicated in what way the profiles should be sold and explained why this was the case 
by establishing a new image of context of the company, one better suited to the situation 
in which Fiberline had to act yet still connected to the self-conception already established.    
The narrative of how profiles should be sold and to whom  
Philosopher David Carr, mentioned earlier, has noted on the construction of narratives 
that “Sometimes we must change the story to accommodate the events; sometimes we 
change the events, by acting, to accommodate the story.”49 In this particular situation 
Fiberline primarily sought to accommodate to the events and adapt their story by 
formulating a new narrative about how the profiles should be sold. The new narrative 
centered on three issues: The high technological level of Fiberline’s production and 
products, international markets, and the need to supply customers with guidance. It can be 
formulated along lines such as these: 
The profiles of Fiberline are the best and most technologically advanced on the market. 
Because the technology of Fiberline is so advanced and the product is new, selling it 
requires that customers are guided. Profiles can be sold to every industry imaginable. But 
the Danish market is conservative and lacks the vision to accept new products. Therefore, 
the profiles are sold internationally.  
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As mentioned the main function of this narrative was to construct sense in the difficult 
situation of the company in the first half of the 1980s which enabled Fiberline to act and 
get active in selling the profiles. In the following sections I will unfold the narrative. I will 
show how it was linked to the basic narrative which kept the fundamental self-conception 
of the company intact throughout the crisis, while still allowing the company to act by 
moving focus from production and development to sales.  
Technology and competitive advantage  
In 1985 Fiberline wrote a prospectus—in yet another attempt to attract investors—in 
which the company presents itself. Commenting on the quality of the products, it is noted 
that
The production was started in May 1979 on a foreign produced 
machine. At the same time a development effort was begun which has 
brought Fiberline to a lead position in Europe, so that today the 
company can produce more complicated profiles of a better quality 
than any of the few existing competitors.50         
Further along in the prospectus, competitors are discussed, and it is noted that there are 
only around 10 who, like Fiberline, produce intermediates for different industries. Of 
these 10 it is further noted that 
All our competitors except Drapol in Norway use an older American 
technology that neither in quality nor in possible product range 
measures up to the technology Fiberline has developed… The 
pultrusion process is extremely complicated. Even large and 
financially strong companies have after persistent attempts given up. 
Therefore it is very unlikely that a large number of competitors will 
appear in the nearest future in spite of an expansive market…51
In an interview with the Danish newspaper Børsen in July 1985, Henrik Thorning 
discusses the market success of the company (noting that turnover had grown three years 
in a row and for a moment leaving the otherwise shaky financial state of the company 
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aside). The article states that “… even though Fiberline only has 10 employees the 
company has become the most advanced producer of profiles in reinforced plastic in 
Europe with the largest product program of around 4000 profiles.”52 Further along in the 
article, Henrik Thorning is quoted: 
One of the reasons for our leading position is that reinforced profiles 
are the only thing we produce and solely in the form of intermediates. 
Our competitors in Europe are part of large industrial groups and they 
avoid the difficult jobs because unlike us they are not forced to 
produce better and cheaper products to survive … Actually the largest 
European producers have started referring customers to us when the 
jobs becomes too difficult. I haven’t heard about others than us who 
can make as complicated profiles.53
These examples of Fiberline’s evaluation of its own position compared to the competition 
on the European market express the same self-conception, focused on the product and the 
process, as the basic narrative. As discussed the image of context constructed in the basic 
narrative was rather vague and focused on a broad idea of substituting products. Now, 
after being pressured to start focusing more on external matters as already discussed and 
by gaining new experience in sale, a more specific image of the competition is formed. It 
is, however, still tightly coupled to the basic narrative and its focus on the development of 
Fiberline’s product and production process.      
One might respond that there isn’t much difference between comparing your own market 
position to a general category of substituting industries and a rather anonymous group of 
competitors performing below your own level. I will argue that this is because this change 
or adaption of external focus was only gradually adopted into the company’s image of 
context, just as the focus on sales was only slowly developed. This is also evident from 
the fact that from the company’s founding, through the first phase of focusing on sales 
until 1985, Fiberline’s competitors were only discussed a handful of times in reports from 
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management and at board meetings – less than once a year. Only gradually did Fiberline 
construct an image of the competition in the composites industry, and at this point, in the 
mid-1980s, it was still very general. In later strategies, such as the one from 1993 for 
comparison, competitors are named, evaluated, and ranked according to a number of 
different parameters, first of all technological but also market position and financial 
state.54
When Fiberline first met competition, it was connected to the process of developing 
profiles for E Rasmussen Industri. In this process Fiberline had worked with the 
Norwegian company Plastkonstruktioner (now named Drapol). In the winter of 1981 
Drapol asked to acquire Fiberline’s knowledge about producing the profile. Fiberline 
declined. A year later Drapol went bankrupt, which put an end to further discussions of 
shared knowhow.55 But it was not only Drapol who had invested resources and was 
interested in the profile developed for E Rasmussen Industri. At the December meeting in 
1982, Fiberline’s board discussed the following, concerning Jotun, who supplied most of 
the polyester for the production:       
Henrik Thorning has been in Sandefjord … where we discussed a 
corporation agreement between Jotun and Fiberline. One of the 
problems is that Jotun wishes to sell the special polyester systems and 
color pasts that has been developed for the E. Rasmussen profiles to 
other pultrusion customers including Tehalit in Germany, which is a 
competitor and might be one of the manufactures that E. Rasmussen 
would use as supplier of the profiles … which Fiberline is currently 
making. Henrik Thorning … made it clear to the management of Jotun 
that this would be unacceptable.56
Fiberline later lost E Rasmussen Industri—to Tehalit.57 It isn’t clear, though, if Fiberline 
managed to keep Jotun from handing over knowledge concerning the profiles or if Tehalit 
simply caught up with Fiberline and could now manage to produce the same profile at a 
lower price. It is clear, however, that when Fiberline started to encounter competition, 
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price was a parameter. In June 1984, it is stated that “Our competitors have … started to 
react and fight us in markets where they have lost ground, and in some cases they have 
responded with alarmingly low prices.”58 However, rather than discussing this further 
Henrik Thorning, according to the minutes from the meeting, describes an example in 
which  competition was not on price and Fiberline was chosen instead of another German 
company, Grillo. This, he explained, was due to the superior quality of Fiberline’s 
products, which made them more suitable for the customer, who was in the electrical 
industry and needed precision in the products.59
In all, Fiberline didn’t seem particularly worried about competition on price, though price-
competition might have seemed disturbing to a company that had not only lost its biggest 
customer to a competitor delivering at a lower price but was also claiming to pursue a 
strategy of selling standard products in large quantum.  
March 1985 seems to have been a particular busy month for Henrik Thorning who was 
now, intensively, touring most of Europe in his car. His report of this month was 
extensive. Of the new Italian distributer he comments:  
March 11th and 12th Fiberline had a visit from the Italian company 
Blumer. Blumer has hired a dedicated Fiberline consultant who will be 
working exclusively with our products and at the meeting he was 
carefully introduced to these as well as clearly informed that the sale 
of standard profiles is of highest priority. Blumer has taken a market 
survey in Italy, and it was concluded that it was an interesting market 
for the company and that the market is growing rapidly. Blumer 
amongst other things brought a transcript from the Italian Register of 
Companies concerning the company Top-Glass in Milan. This 
company started pultrusion in the beginning of the 1970s. Today it has 
30 employees and a turnover of 26 million DKK. In the coming period 
it will be the task of Blumer to try and capture part of Top-Glass’ 
market shares in standard profiles in Italy.60
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The strategy for entering the Italian market focused solely on standard products; therefore, 
Fiberline could expect to compete specifically on price. This, however, was not followed 
up by further considerations about its ability to compete on this parameter. Instead, when 
considering competitors Fiberline continued to refer to their own technological 
superiority, which they saw as their own main competitive advantage. Though the image 
of context had developed under the experiences of selling profiles, it still appeared to be 
tightly connected to the self-conception of the Fiberline as first formulated in the basic 
narrative and, therefore, focused on development of the product and the production.  
Constant attention and information 
Another element of the new narrative of sale was a clear concept of how the customers 
should be handled. As described, Henrik Thorning aided new distributors in many aspects 
of the sale by accompanying them around Europe to visit customers. This was necessary, 
as customers would often be using profiles in reinforced plastic for the first time; 
therefore, they would have to rethink their own product before they could integrate the 
profiles. The vital necessity of aiding distributors in guiding customers was an experience 
Fiberline took from working with Dukadan in the start-up phase. In September 1983 
Henrik Thorning reported that
The main effort in marketing is currently in backing up distributors; 
that is traveling with the sales personnel of our distributors. It has 
proven necessary with a very careful introduction to Fiberline’s 
products … Only then does the effort yield results, as it is now clear in 
Germany.61
This was an important point for Fiberline after the experience of entering into the Danish 
market without sales consultants with the proper special knowledge for the task. It was 
already a topic in the first attempt at a sales strategy mentioned earlier, which was stated 
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that distributors should “be trading or engineering companies who have the technical and 
commercial knowledge to meet our goals.”62
The focus on delivering service to the customers in the form of help for calculations, etc., 
was not only a result of Fiberline’s experiences. It was also connected to selling special 
profiles, which—despite the focus on standard profiles—continued to generate around 
half of Fiberline’s turnover throughout the 1980s.63 In the process of developing a special 
profile, the customer would always work together with Fiberline, as a new tool had to be 
custom-made to meet their needs. By working with customers in this way, Henrik 
Thorning could draw on his previous knowledge and experience, because it was similar to 
how he had worked in Jotun. Also, the conception of the potential and brilliancy of the 
product, along with the expression of this through the focus on the technological 
superiority of Fiberline’s products in the new sales narrative, made the need for servicing 
customers seem reasonable. Help and effort seemed especially needed in selling a new 
and technologically sophisticated product.   
In considering “the composition of selling opportunities relevant to the firm,” Penrose 
notes that 
The type of product in which the consumer might be interested is in 
effect very often suggested to the entrepreneur by the firm’s resources, 
and the possibilities of successfully introducing it largely depend upon 
them.64       
She further concludes that, because of this, a great deal of innovation is connected to the 
firm’s desire to use its existing or inherited resources.65 In developing the product and the 
process of pultrusion to a level of technological superiority, as Fiberline did, there 
certainly seems to be some evidence for Penrose’s last claim about the connection 
between innovation and the inherited resources of the firm. That the firm’s inherited 
resources also have an effect on the company’s conception of selling opportunities is 
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equally evident in the case of Fiberline. The connection between Fiberline’s inherited 
resources and the selling opportunities the company saw as it began to focus on sales 
comes through in the connection that, as I have argued, exists between the basic narrative 
of Fiberline and the new narrative of sale. 
This connection between the firm’s resources and its selling opportunities seems 
particularly clear when the firm is introducing a new product. Penrose argues that “When 
firms get into the production of products about which consumers know nothing, and for 
which there is no market expression at all of consumers’ wants, overt demand is clearly 
irrelevant.”66 Elaborating on this she quotes Schumpeter: “That new commodities or new 
qualities or new quantities of commodities are forced upon the public by the initiative of 
the entrepreneurs … is a fact of common experience…”67 Schumpeter assigns the success 
of such an endeavor to qualities of leadership in the entrepreneur, which is equal to 
Penrose’s idea of the temperamental characteristics of the entrepreneur (which I have 
discussed earlier).68 In this line of thought, selling an (almost) unknown product is much 
like raising funds: it requires the same ingenuity (a form of selling ingenuity) or the same 
ability of convincing others as previously discussed.  
In traveling over Europe, putting pressure on distributors, giving constant attention to 
customers, and guiding them in their choices, Henrik Thorning can be said to exhibit this 
ingenuity in forcing his product on both current and potential customers. It is evident from 
the example of Fiberline as well as from Penrose’s argument that the resources available 
to the firm govern selling opportunities. Such efforts cannot be understood outside 
context—or without considering the self-conception and image of context of the firm, so 
important for how the firm puts resources into service.   
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The market – broad and international 
In June 1984 sales for Germany accounted for more than 50% of the total sale. Arthur 
Krüger was reported to be very positive about the development of the German market, 
and the company had presented Fiberline’s products almost exclusively at the 1984 
Hannover Fair.69 In spite of some challenges sales looked better again after the loss of E 
Rasmussen Industri. The report from management stated that  
Since the last meeting of the board, Henrik Thorning has traveled 
several times in Switzerland, Germany, Holland, Belgium, and 
Finland. … The progress is best in Germany and Switzerland, slower 
in Holland, and the sales to our distributors in Italy and Finland are 
currently very small. In these countries constant pressure and follow-
up is necessary to accelerate the development. In general it can be said 
though that the interest in composite materials is increasing rapidly, 
and we are currently engaged in several large, interesting projects with 
good chances of success.70
The attitude of the newest distributors in Italy and Finland shows that Henrik Thorning 
constant sales effort was necessary. At the meeting of the board in November 1984, the 
board discussed the sales strategy of Fiberline; some members noted that it might not be a 
good idea to focus too much on the Italian and Finnish market if they were so difficult to 
penetrate. To this Henrik Thorning responded sharply and the following is noted in the 
record:
Henrik Thorning noted that he sees the market of Fiberline as global 
and that we evaluate the concrete sales opportunity to a customer or an 
industry as opposed to evaluating the country from which the customer 
in question originates. By saying that we won’t focus on e.g. Italy, 
Spain, or other more remote countries, we will cut off large market 
opportunities. Finally Henrik Thorning concluded that he sees it as his 
responsibility where and when we must sell the products of 
Fiberline.71
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The market focus in this quote is very broad. Looking at the 1985 prospectus, written 
around the same time, this idea of the market seems to be connected to the idea about the 
potential of the product, part of the fundamental vision of Fiberline as formulated in the 
basic narrative. I have already discussed how this vision was connected to Henrik 
Thorning’s perception of the structure of industrial production (where he believed that 
profiles in reinforced plastic were missing) and the many positive properties of the 
material, when taken together, seemed to promise a product of great potential. The market 
analysis of the 1985 prospectus opens with a repetition of this fundamental vision of 
Fiberlilne:
Plastic composites are the group of materials where the sum of the 
positive technical properties of the material is largest. Furthermore the 
production of composite materials from the single element to finished 
product requires less energy than needed for producing for example 
steel and aluminum. Looking at the development of traditional 
materials for production for example steel and aluminum it is 
noteworthy that the development has moved from primarily molding 
parts to producing intermediates in the form of profiles and pipes 
because these can be combined in countless ways within many 
different areas of production.72
And in concluding the remarks on the market potential of the company, it is noted that 
The technical analysis of profiles made by pultrusion therefore is as 
follows:  
 excellent technical properties of the material,  
 pultrusion is the optimal process for producing composites,  
 the market for profiles make up a substantial part of the industrial 
market.73
Both of the above quotes reaffirm Henrik Thorning’s original vision of Fiberline, and the 
same focus is evident when the possible applications of the product are mentioned. Here 
the vision of Fiberline is also connected to a broad market focus: 
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Fiberline sells material-technical and geometric properties more than 
they sell pultruded profiles in reinforced plastic. This means that all
industries are customers or potential customers. Within the specific 
industry Fiberline are searching for the possibilities where the 
combination of properties and price is favorable for the seller as well 
as the customer.74     
This broad market focus was part of Fiberline’s image of context, which had been formed 
as the company started focusing on sales. In this broad focus, however, Fiberline didn’t 
only draw on its own basic vision. The broad market focus also seems to have been 
strengthened by the experience of losing business from E Rasmussen Industri. As 
discussed this loss had been a severe blow for the young company, following which 
Henrik Thorning really stepped up his effort in selling profiles and building up a web of 
distributors. The 1985 prospectus, in a section about the dependence on large customers, 
notes:  
Not regarding the loss of the largest customer of the company, which 
made up circa 50% of the turnover in the financial year of 1983/84, the 
turnover has been growing steadily. Since 1983/84 the targeted growth 
has been evenly spread out on markets as well as industries, so that 
Fiberline today is much less valuable than before.75
In the 1981 article mentioned earlier, Henrik Thorning compares Fiberline’s situation to 
other small companies and notes that “Fiberline is less vulnerable to industry specific 
recessions. If the construction industry is in trouble, there will be other customers that will 
place orders with us.”76 The experience of losing E Rasmussen Industri kept this idea 
fresh in mind, as in the quote above. When Fiberline constructed a new strategy in 
1992/93, a clear and prioritized object was to secure that at any given time the turnover 
generated from one customer would never be above 20%.   
Such considerations also served as an argument for seeking to sell profiles on 
international markets, the point of Henrik Thorning’s reply to the board from November 
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1984 quoted earlier, in which he fears that a focus on certain markets will limit market 
opportunities. Also I have earlier discussed the influence of Henrik Thorning’s prior 
experience and knowledge in making the company focused on international markets. 
However in making sense of the problems of selling profiles in the first years, Fiberline 
also drew on other elements that were used in the new narrative of sale to explain the 
international focus. As noted in an earlier chapter, poor sales had the potential to threaten 
the self-conception of the company, as it was difficult to explain why a product of such 
great potential turned out to be so difficult to sell. The focus on international sales as 
formulated by Fiberline in the new narrative of sales offered a satisfying explanation. In 
the 1985 article already mentioned, Henrik Thorning observes that 
Danish companies are slow in changing material for construction. 
They have too little experience with composites, and it is a bit of a 
cultural revolution for them to change construction material. … 
Sweden and West Germany that are our largest markets are generally 
much further developed.77
In a similar profile article from 1990, Henrik Thorning is asked whether the newly freed 
East German market holds potential for Fiberline. He answers, “We are speaking of 
advanced materials that are most suited for highly developed companies in Western 
Europe and USA.”78  Further along in the article it is noted that 
The new materials are a bit of a cultural revolution for many 
companies and their employees. In Henrik Thonings own words: “A 
blacksmith know what iron is, but the many different combinations of 
materials are something completely new.”79
But Henrik Thorning adds optimistically: 
A new generation of engineers has started to learn about these 
materials and they are very interested – even though it takes a certain 
time to introduce new materials. It also took many years for aluminum 
to become recognized … In theory we can become large.80
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In 2003 Henrik Thorning was interviewed about the development of the composites 
industry in Denmark for the 25 anniversary of the Composites Section of the Danish 
Plastic Industry Organization. In the interview he describes the development of his own 
company by first reaffirming the basic narrative, referencing the conception of the 
structure of industrial production as it was formulated already in the start-up: 
Basically the world consists of three different things: plates, profiles, 
and molded parts! No one had made profiles in composites before, and 
when I noticed the process of pultrusion we started. It turned out to be 
rather difficult in practice, and the market was also more skeptical and 
conservative than I had anticipated so it was 10 years before it really 
took off.81
The idea of the skeptical and conservative market is especially connected to the Danish 
market. In the new narrative of sales it serves two purposes: it explains why Fiberline had 
difficulties selling the profiles despite the brilliancy of the product, and it explains why 
the company now deals with international markets. In this way this part of the new 
narrative of sales functions to establish a link back to the basic narrative. It is instrumental 
in maintaining Fiberline’s fundamental conception of self, even though a growing tension 
between the image of context of the company and its self-conception, as discussed, had 
challenged the company to act and change its focus and its dealings.  
Conclusion – The relevant demand for profiles 
The object of this chapter has been to discuss how Fiberline started focusing on sales to 
counter a difficult situation in which its existence was threatened because sales didn’t pick 
up in the hands of Dukadan. In this situation a new narrative of how profiles should be 
sold was constructed. The function of the narrative was to enable Fiberline to account for 
the company’s reaction and changing focus. The new narrative centered on three elements 
of selling the profiles: the technological superiority of Fiberline’s products, the need for 
constant attention to and guidance of customers, and a focus on international markets. 
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Each element of the new narrative was connected to the basic narrative. Therefore, the 
meaning created by the new narrative didn’t disrupt the original conception of self of the 
company, although it allowed for the focus to change from production and development to 
sales when this was needed to survive the crisis of the first years.  
The image of context of the basic narrative was broad and unspecific in emphasizing 
substituting industries and the potential of the product. In some respects the new narrative 
was as abstract as the basic narrative. This was the case for the view of competitors 
established in the new narrative. Based on the conception of Fiberline’s own 
technological ability, it was at first rather vague. In time, however, the image of the 
competitors would become much clearer, as argued. The market focus was very broad, 
which connected to the basic narrative and the idea of the versatility of the product. Also 
the broad market focus was further strengthened by the vulnerability Fiberline felt when it 
lost the business of E Rasmussen Industri.       
Returning to the idea of the image of context, Penrose notes that “… demand from the 
point of view of the firm is highly subjective – the opinion of the firm’s entrepreneurs.”82
She further elaborates how this affects the way the world external to the firm should be 
understood:  
Many changes in the external world are appropriately treated as 
environmental changes affecting the rate of growth of firms through 
their effect on entrepreneurial expectations about productive 
possibilities. I have placed the emphasis on the resources with which a 
firm works and on the development of the experience and knowledge 
of a firm’s personnel because these are the factors that will to a large 
extend determine the response of the firm to changes in the external 
world and also determine what it ‘sees’ in the external world. This is 
particularly evident when we recognize that changes in the knowledge 
possessed by the managerial personnel of a firm will not only change 
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the productive services of other resources, but will also change the 
‘demand conditions’ as seen by the firm.83
It may be said - as a general and concluding note on how the new narrative of sale 
discussed in this chapter influenced the development of the company - that by formulating 
the new narrative about sales, Fiberline constructed a demand for their profiles.            
The conception of demand, that is Penrose’s point, in all its subjectivity gives                
the company grounds on which to act. The abstract vision of the product in the basic 
narrative already includes an idea about the relevant demand, but the new narrative served 
to clarify this demand to the degree possible without disrupting the fundamental self-
conception     of the basic narrative. Later, I will discuss how the demand Fiberline saw 
for their products was connected to productive opportunities. Before turning to this, 
however, I will further discuss the efforts of financing through the first years of running 
and seek to connect it to the general financing behavior of Fiberline.    
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7. The efforts of financing and opportunities for growth 
Earlier I discussed the difficulties Fiberline had in raising capital during its start-up. In 
this short chapter I will consider the development of the financial situation of the 
company from around 1983 till 1986. I will use the chapter to discuss the influence of the 
self-conception of Fiberline on the financing behavior of the company. I have included 
this because I see it as an example of how the company’s self-conception influenced its 
growth. Finally I will elaborate on Fiberline’s financing efforts by connecting it to the 
discussion of bootstrapping in the literature on entrepreneurial financing.  
Continued pressure after 1983 
In March 1984, the board was expecting a loss for 1983/84, because E Rasmussen 
industry had moved their business away from Fiberline: the company’s liquidity was 
pressed. An important element in this was the challenges Fiberline faced in handling the 
expensive tools needed to produce special profiles. This situation stretched the company’s 
limited resources. Fiberline tried but had problems getting customers to invest in the tools, 
and so the company often chose to invest themselves to secure the order.1 As discussed 
earlier Fiberline was now very bent on sales, and Henrik Thorning was active in pursuing 
international customers.  
In October 1984, Kai Busch wrote a letter to the board. He warned against focusing too 
much on sales because the financial situation of the company was so serious, and he found 
that the board wasn’t consulted enough, which was unacceptable. Kai Buch's letter 
expressed both concern for the rapid growth of sales and frustration caused by the 
uncontrolled development that followed.2
In the fall of 1984, as before, the strain put on the finances of Fiberline by the situation 
compelled the board to consider an increase in shared capital. They agreed that it would 
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be preferable if they could find an investor that wouldn’t demand influence in the board.3
First the faithful bank, Aktivbanken, was asked for yet another loan. Henrik Thorning also 
told the board that he had contacted a Danish investment fund called BCF, but nothing 
ever came from this. Instead a deal was negotiated with Aktivbanken in which they would 
loan Fiberline 600.000 DKK, provided that shareholders loaned the company a similar 
sum.4 At the next meeting of the board, Henrik Thorning could happily report that 
Fiberline’s immediate financial problems had been solved to his satisfaction; Fiberline’s 
investments in 1983/84 and the first half of 85 had been settled. The thoughts about 
involving an investment fund seem to have been abandoned at this point.  
It was still the opinion of the board, however, that more money was needed soon to secure 
the company.5 Liquidity was still pressed and, as indicated by the financial report of the 
first half of the year 1984/85, it was clear that Fiberline was now struggling with paying 
off the debts built up since the reconstruction in June 1983.6 Henrik Thorning concluded 
that “Despite a possible smaller profit in the financial year [1984/85], Fiberline hasn’t got 
large liquidity reserves to meet potential fluctuations in sales or unforeseen expenses. 
With the current liquidity, it will also be impossible to expand the capacity [of the 
production].”7
In June 1985, Aktivbanken allowed Fiberline an expansion on its running credit for July 
and August. Fiberline had also pressed for new loans to finance the future running of the 
company, but by this time the bank had gotten a new management team who remained 
critical.8 This let Torben Nymand to suggest that Fiberline upped its efforts to find an 
investor. He brought it up often, whereas the rest of the board only entertained the idea of 
an investor when all other options for financing the continued running of the company 
seemed to have been tried. Now, however, in light of the bank’s attitude, the option had to 
be considered again. As the board parted in June, they agreed that a prospectus should be 
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made and finished before the summer holiday—and that Torben Nymand and the lawyer 
Jens Lauersen were to make a report about the possible implications of a capital 
expansion.9
Over the summer the situation became even more difficult. The report from management 
made for the meeting of the board in end July 1985 notes that the bank had declined a 
request to extend the company’s running credit. It was the opinion of the bank’s new 
management that this couldn’t be done without a guarantee by the owners. “This puts 
Fiberline in a very unpleasant situation,” Henrik Thorning noted and continued 
Our main supplier of glass fiber has already informed us that if we do 
not balance our credit they will not continue deliveries. Therefore 
Fiberline must have the liquidity problems solved immediately if our 
production isn’t to be stopped by mid-August.10
When the board met they discussed the material made to prepare an extension of the share 
capital. Fiberline expected the bank to be active in helping them find an investor, and a 
meeting had been planned. Communications continued over the summer, but nothing 
came from it, and eventually the idea of finding an investor was yet again abandoned.11 In 
the meantime Dorthe Thorning and Knud-Erik Madsen (a newly hired accountant) would 
juggle creditors, paying what they could in an order that wouldn’t stop deliveries of the 
most important supplies and drawing on the patience of those who had some left. 
Fortunately, sales were good over the summer of 1985, and the production didn’t cause 
problems. Thanks to this and increased pressure from Fiberline, Aktivbanken by August 
decided to extend the company’s running credit.12
Clearly the challenges of securing the financial resources for investments and the general 
running of the company were many over the period from its founding and till around 
1986. After this point, however, the board rarely discussed finding new investors again.  
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Financing behavior over time 
As discussed earlier Penrose considers fund-raising ingenuity a service lent to a company 
by its entrepreneur(s) by way of personality or temperament. However, she also considers 
the general financing behavior of a firm over time, which is less bound to the individual. 
She connects this to uncertainty and risk, noting that “’Uncertainty’ refers to the 
entrepreneur’s confidence in his estimates or expectations; ‘risk’, on the other hand, refers 
to the possible outcomes of action, specifically to the loss that might be incurred if a given 
action is taken.”13 Both are subjective concepts. In the discussion of risk and uncertainty 
Penrose is inspired by Knight and the Austrian school of economics: for example, when 
she argues that uncertainty may be met by obtaining information, but is still inescapable 
and a matter of judgment in the situation.14 It may also be argued, however, that the 
narratives of the company may function to reduce uncertainty and that this may be 
observed in the case of Fiberline. As discussed earlier, it is a basic assumption of my 
project that narratives function to establish a company’s self-conception and image of 
context– or to make sense of things in and around the company. As such the narratives in 
use form the basis on which the company makes decisions and acts. That is, a narrative 
that seems convincing to the company in a specific situation will reduce the uncertainty 
experienced in that situation and serve as a (comfortable) base for making decisions and 
acting on these.
Penrose also considers the increasing risk to the financial position of the firm as 
expansion proceeds; she notes that there are two broad types of responses to risk and 
unavoidable uncertainty. One is a conservative financial politics in which expansion is 
restricted to the extent permitted by funds obtained from a specified source, for example 
the company’s own accumulated funds. The other response is to arrange the firm’s 
expansion by taking some risk – as little as believed possible. “Risk avoidance,” Penrose 
notes, “is the goal of the entrepreneur in both cases, but the effect on the expansion 
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programme of the firm is very different.”15 She then concludes: “The methods of handling 
risk and unavoidable uncertainty often become more or less a part of the tradition of a 
firm, changed only rarely under the impact of special circumstances.”16 She observes this 
behavior to be part of the company through time; as such it should be considered 
something shared that goes beyond the personal fund-raising ingenuity of the 
entrepreneur. Penrose attributes the behavior in handling uncertainty to the company’s 
entrepreneurial attitude, which as discussed in the introduction is a term she clarifies by 
reference to the company’s self-conception.17
Fiberline’s very first efforts at financing, in the beginning of the 1980s, were not 
connected to expansion – but rather to survival. However, one can safely assume that this 
entails the same kind of decisions as planning expansion. These decisions must have been 
marked by a particularly high risk, as the continued existence of the company was 
immediately at stake. Henrik Thorning, as mentioned, seemed rather liberal in his view of 
borrowing capital, and in general he doesn’t appear to have felt much uncertainty. Using 
Penrose’s terms, one could say that Fiberline’s risk-avoidance behavior wasn’t 
conservative as in the first case Penrose describes, but rather more like the second case 
she mentions. In 1987 and 88 for example, when Fiberline was getting more settled, 
production was running smoothly, turnover rising, and profit began to be made, Henrik 
Thorning invested heavily in the development of the production.18 In the terminology of 
Penrose, Fiberline was certainly running a risk, as the possible outcome of that action 
could be a loss at a time when Fiberline’s ability to handle any loss was still limited. The 
investments in 1987 and 88 did turn out to be larger than Fiberline could immediately 
handle, resulting in losses that year, which frustrated the rest of the board.19 For example, 
this problem came up in a strategy process initiated in 1992, where Ole Tandrup, a new 
member of the board, questioned if investments during the last years of the 1980s had 
been profitable.20
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As noted narratives may work to reduce the uncertainty experienced by the firm. I have 
already discussed the formulation of the basic narrative of Fiberline at length and shown 
how it was strengthened by the company’s experiences during start-up. Furthermore, the 
chapters following this one will show that the basic narrative of Fiberline was resistant to 
change and that meaning continued to be drawn from it many years after the founding of 
the company. I will argue that Henrik Thorning was willing to indebt the company and 
that he didn’t seem to be particularly burdened by uncertainty: he could continue to draw 
sense from the basic narrative, thereby reducing the uncertainty he might otherwise have 
felt in situations characterized by risk.         
One element of the basic narrative that might work to reduce the uncertainty felt by 
Henrik Thorning was the potential of the product and the brilliance of the idea so central 
to Fiberline’s self-conception. As noted earlier Henrik Thorning maintained a firm belief 
in the future success of the company; for example, he continued to bring up extension of 
production capacity in board meetings.  
Another element of the basic narrative important for the financing behavior of Fiberline 
was that the basic narrative established Henrik Thorning’s legitimacy as the right and 
proper owner and leader of the company. Henrik Thorning’s role as founder and owner 
was better maintained by providing capital through banks, which didn’t demand influence 
from the board or management.  
That Henrik Thorning’s influence was important to maintain, however, was never 
specifically noted in reports from management or minutes of board meetings. It appears to 
have been self-evident to everybody – a precondition for discussing financing. This 
apparent self-evidence of Henrik Thorning’s ownership may have been enforced by the 
larger shared narrative of entrepreneurship that focuses on the character and by 
motivations of the entrepreneur—which the basic narrative of Fiberline draws on.  
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The minutes of the board meetings reveal numerous examples of situations over the years 
when the board discussed financing and one member mentioned that it may become 
necessary to find an investor.21 The rest of the board would then usually agree. Yet, at the 
following meetings nothing would be said about the topic, which appears to have been 
dropped as soon as the financial state of the firm became just a little better (for example, if 
the credit of the bank had been extended enough to get Fiberline through the following 
months). The repetition of this pattern is the only trace of the meaning ascribed to Henrik 
Thorning’s ownership and control in reports from management and board meeting 
minutes.         
Earlier I have referenced a prospectus that was made in 1985. It is the only one of its kind 
in the archive of Fiberline, and as a source it stands out because it is among a small 
number of texts intended for external readers. The minutes of the board meetings, the 
reports from management, and the strategy documents that would later be written were 
intended only for the board and management to read. In discussing the financing behavior 
of the company and the influence of the conception of Henrik Thorning’s control of 
Fiberline on this behavior, the prospectus also stands out because the direct reason for 
formulating it was that Henrik Thorning’s ownership was under pressure. So, potentially, 
the document might undermine an important part of the company’s self-conception. 
However, in the prospectus this dilemma is dealt with by referencing what might be called 
the moral legitimacy of Henrik Thorning’s ownership, making it clear that his right to 
control Fiberline surpassed the legal right of ownership should he be forced to give that 
up.  
The prospectus opens with a reformulation of the basic narrative of Fiberline with its 
focus on the brilliancy of the product and the vision of the company. Repetition is used in 
this case to establish a common ground for understanding the company in the same way 
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as it was used before the founding to make the potential of the firm seem convincing – to 
both Fiberline and its investors. In keeping with the basic narrative, the first paragraph 
explains what plastic composites are and why they are brilliant.22 The next passage 
explains that the company was founded by Henrik Thorning and that it is an independent 
company. In the same passage the technological ability of Fiberline’s production is 
established and compared to (nameless) competitors.23 After a short presentation of the 
board, the prospectus states the company’s vision. It hasn’t changed since it was first 
formulated in 1982: “Development, production, and sale of profiles and components in 
reinforced plastic.”24 This is followed by a passage (quoted in chapter 6) concerning the 
structure of industrial production and the potential of plastic composites in this as a 
substitute for steel and aluminum, thus repeating the basic narrative in detail. Finally all 
the good properties and technological superiority of the method of pultrusion are repeated 
in detail.25 In all, the first four pages of the prospectus firmly reestablishes Fiberline’s 
vision and potential as formulated in the basic narrative. From this base, Henrik 
Thorning’s legitimate ownership is then established in the prospectus as the organization 
of Fiberline is presented. In this section it is first explained that Fiberline’s management 
consists solely of Henrik Thorning. This is then followed by his CV and the following 
remark: “Henrik Thorning founded Fiberline in 1979 and apart from being the general 
manager he also serves as development and sales manager responsible also for export and 
procurement.”26 Therefore, it may be that Henrik Thorning and Fiberline were using the 
prospectus to search for investors and that doing so might demand influence and control. 
However, the prospectus also makes it clear that Fiberline really is Henrik Thorning and 
that Fiberline will not be able to function without him.       
In more than one situation concrete offers to invest in or buy Fiberline were made by 
actors in the company's network. In 1981, when Fiberline was hard pressured to find new 
resources, E Rasmussen Industri suggested that they could invest in the company so that 
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production capacity could be expanded. The board of Fiberline declined the offer, 
however, responding that they wanted to develop more steady production before they 
engaged in an extension of the capacity.27 In 1985 (around the time when the prospectus 
was written) the large competitor, Bekaert, offered to buy Fiberline. Although Henrik 
Thorning said he would keep discussing the matter with Bekaert, nothing further was ever 
done.28
Torben Nymand seemed to be the only co-owner who ever seriously considered the 
option of finding an investor or selling Fiberline. Considering the situation the company 
found itself in during the first part of the 1980s, it would seem that the owners of Fiberline 
stood the best chances of profiting from their ownership in the future by finding a strong 
investor. But the view of Torben Nymand, though reasonable, collided with the basic 
narrative of the company as explained above. 
Observing the reaction of Fiberline in these two situations and keeping the points just 
made about the influence of the basic narrative on the financing behavior of the company 
in mind, two further points may be made. One is that Henrik Thorning’s influence and 
ownership were more important than the ability to invest in developing the product and 
the production, though a strong focus on product and process is also part of the basic 
narrative. Interest from potential investors in buying or investing in Fiberline put the 
company in a situation in which the ability to invest in developing product and production 
might be gained by offering control. But these were not terms Fiberline could accept. The 
second thing that may be observed is that this attitude, based on the company’s self-
conception, may have influenced its growth, as only Torben Nymand seemed to consider, 
by keeping the company from benefiting from a strong investor.29
124
Bootstrapping and effectuation in financing behavior 
I have argued that the financing behavior of Fiberline was based on the company’s self-
conception, which explains the company’s willingness to bare risk. Within the field of 
entrepreneurship the concept of bootstrapping has been applied to explain the financing 
behavior of small, new firms. Bootstrapping methods, shortly put, are different ways a 
company of limited resources may seek to follow opportunities without raising external 
financing for it.30         
Fiberline, as demonstrated, was very active in raising external capital: the company drew 
on personal networks not just in the founding but also later when finding investors after 
Dukadan sold its shares. In Aktivbanken the family connections of Henrik and Dorthe 
Thorning helped the company raise the necessary capital for the founding. The bank 
manager stayed positive throughout the years, even though Fiberline often faced problems 
paying down their loans, also through the reconstruction of the company in 1983. As seen 
it wasn't until a new management took over in the bank that Fiberline would have 
problems renewing loans and expanding their credit.    
However, Fiberline also applied a long line of internal bootstrapping methods to free 
resources for the continued running of the company. For example, they tried to sell off 
part of their supply of raw materials, in 1982 they built a new machine from spare parts 
from the existing machine, and they bought used machinery when developing the 
production. Niels Jørgen Kovstrup worked for free for a long period, and both Henrik and 
Dorthe Thorning invested much more time in the company than was mirrored in their 
salaries. Fiberline also considered (and used) a long line of funding options that might 
supply capital without increasing its debt to banks, for example by borrowing money from 
the owners or trying to find a company that would invest in the tools for production and 
then lease them to Fiberline.  
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The concept of bootstrapping offers a tool for guiding attention to these methods of 
generating resources. Most often, however, the literature on bootstrapping offers no 
considerations of the motives of the company or the entrepreneur, apart from securing the 
best (future) profit for the company. 31 One example is Winborg who set out to explain the 
motivations for bootstrapping in new businesses. On the basis of a questioner survey 
among 120 Swedish business incubators, he concluded that there are three reasons for 
applying bootstrapping: to reduce cost, to escape capital constraints, or to reduce risk.32
These do not, however, move the concept of bootstrapping outside the constraint of what 
might be called the profit motivation paradigm. The question of why companies act the 
way they do (Penrose echo in my head) is, basically, only seen from one perspective. 
Fiberline uses bootstrapping methods to all three ends described by Winborg, but the logic 
of the company’s financing behavior finds explanation in other motivations as well, as 
already discussed (for example, the will of Henrik Thorning to maintain control).  
Another element in Fiberline’s use of bootstrapping methods to consider is the company’s 
need to make do with what’s at hand in order to make decisions in complex and uncertain 
situations throughout the start-up. This aspect of the company's financing behavior can be 
captured by the concept of effectuation which, as already discussed, describes the 
company’s actions as it attempts to react in a situation of uncertainty by using the 
resources at hand, with no other clear goal than handling the specific situation.    
A different concept used to describe the same situation is bricolage, which like 
effectuation has been used for explaining the entrepreneur’s actions (as well as for many 
other purposes across a long range of disciplines). The concept of bricolage was adopted 
from anthropologist Levi-Strauss and based on an extensive review of the 
entrepreneurship literature on the concept. Baker and Nelson propose to define bricolage 
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as “making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and 
opportunities.”33
Through an analysis of the narrative told in the start-up of a toy store, Baker show 
bricolage to be in use in most decisions. Rather than focusing on the distinction between 
exploiting internal or external resources (as in the bootstrapping literature), Baker focuses 
on mechanisms of resource-seeking (seeking new resources) and bricolage (making do 
with what’s at hand) and shows the two to be coexisting in the narrative of his case 
company. Apart from considering the exploitation of a broad range of resources, not just 
those that are connected to financing, Baker also analyzes the use of bricolage in the 
company’s exploitation of its network. He concludes that the company most often makes 
do with what connections it already has in searching externally for resources.34 This was 
certainly the case for Fiberline. As argued, this finds explanation both in the company’s 
limited resources and the need to act in difficult situations, as well as in the perception 
that Fiberline should remain in Henrik Thorning’s control. 
Conclusion – Control and development 
In this short chapter I have discussed the financing behavior of Fiberline through the first 
half of the 1980s, when the company went through many difficulties in securing capital. 
They sought to exploit what resources they already had to the fullest and to balance the 
risk in supplying external capital. I have argued that the basic narrative of Fiberline was 
decisive for the firm’s financial behavior. Henrik Thorning proved willing to run 
considerable risk and, at the same time, didn’t seem much burdened by uncertainty. Both 
these elements of Fiberline’s financial behavior may be explained by the self-conception 
of the firm established in the basic narrative. An important element was the conception 
that Henrik Thorning was the owner and leader of the company; the risk taken in 
borrowing from banks during the first years was based on this notion. This behavior, 
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however, was also based on the conception expressed in the basic narrative of the 
product’s potential. In later years, when the position of Fiberline was more settled, the 
company’s continued risk-taking should probably mostly be viewed as an expression of 
this conception. Penrose defines uncertainty as the entrepreneur’s confidence in his 
estimates or expectations. Henrik Thorning never seemed much burdened by uncertainty. 
Along the way Fiberline rejected offers from interested investors and as such turned down 
opportunities of further developing their production and product, even though the 
technological superiority of both was an important part of the company’s self-conception. 
In this sense, the narratives in use in Fiberline may be said to have influenced the 
company’s growth. Fiberline’s attitude toward investors is also apparent, which is a 
related point. Ultimately, Henrik Thorning’s ownership and control of the company were 
more important than its immediate development.  
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8. Productive opportunities and technological base 
I have already mentioned the importance Penrose ascribes to the concept of productive 
opportunity, which to use her words again “… comprises all of the productive possibilities 
that its [the firm’s] ‘entrepreneurs’ see and can take advantage of.”1 As noted, this 
observation introduces the subjective elements of her theorizing, leading her to formulate 
the concepts of self-conception and image of context. She connects these concepts to the 
growth of the firm by way of their influence on the firm’s actions. I have argued that self-
conception and image of context can be captured by focusing on and analyzing the 
company’s use of narratives. I have discussed two important narratives of Fiberline: the 
basic narrative formulating the idea or vision of the company and a newer narrative about 
sale. I have considered the influence of these narratives on Fiberline’s development. As 
seen, the company’s actions so far have been taken more to secure survival than to 
establish growth as such. However, I have also argued that the mechanism guiding the 
actions of the firm is the same in both cases.  
The object of this chapter is to discuss the influence of Fiberline’s self-conception on the 
productive opportunities the company saw and the decisions it made to take advantage of 
these during its development from circa 1985 to the middle of the 1990s, a period when 
growth finally took off. Therefore, I will discuss diversification suggested by Penrose as a 
potential path of growth.     
The basic narrative constructed the overall opportunity Henrik Thorning saw in founding 
the company: his vision. In this chapter I will focus instead on how Fiberline sought to 
take advantage of the more specific opportunities the company saw in the course of its 
operations. Discussing the economics of diversification, Penrose notes that “A single 
‘opportunity’ in the sense used here is merely one of the components of the whole 
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productive opportunity of the firm…”2  It will become clear that opportunities as 
perceived by Fiberline came in many different forms, some more easily recognizable than 
others. Some were brought to the attention of Fiberline from external pressure, whereas 
some were exploited by internal inducement.  
As noted, Garnsey argues that the last step in a firm’s early growth is a phase of 
consolidating. She observes that “From the time when productive activity that yields 
returns is under way to the time when levels of profitability assure self-sufficiency, major 
problems center around securing the viability of the enterprise.”3  As already seen, 
Fiberline’s prior phase of learning was long; it stretched out over a couple of very difficult 
years in the beginning of the 1980s. The same can be said for the consolidating phase, as 
it was not until the end of the 1980s, almost 10 years after the founding, that the continued 
struggle for survival was over. The mid-1980s was a period of unsteady growth after 
which growth became more steady.  
First, I will describe Fiberline’s overall growth in a bit more detail and connect it to the 
general development of the Danish plastic industry in the period. I will then discuss the 
development of production and products in the period, showing the company applying 
different logics to perceived opportunities and using already existing narratives to 
different ends in different cases. All these examples illustrate how the firm’s narratives 
constructed its self-conception and influenced the perception of opportunities, the 
decisions to act on these, and thereby the growth of the company in this period.   
The growth of Fiberline and of the Danish plastic industry from the mid-1980s until 
the late 1990s  
The three years after 1979, during Fiberline’s start up, had shown poor growth in the 
Danish plastic industry, influenced by the economic crisis in both Denmark and many of 
the countries the industry exported to at that time. In 1984, however, the Danish industry 
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and the plastic industry in particular were back to the high growth rates known from 
before the crisis.4 From 1984 to 85, industry turnover grew by more than 20%, mainly 
because of export sale accounting for almost 2/3 of the growth.5 The largest export 
markets were Sweden, West Germany, England, and Norway.6
Around the middle of the 1980s, the Danish plastic industry mirrored a general European 
development of specialization among producers (as already discussed). This specialization 
was primarily attributed to the technological development of the industry from the 1970s 
onward, creating a long range of different options for manufacturing specialized products 
with export potential and good competitive strength. The Danish plastic industry was part 
of this development, evident in the growing export sales and the often rather weak home 
market positions of the companies in the industry.7
In 1985 Fiberline exported 60 % of their products to 9 different European countries. The 
company was probably benefitting from the same positive factors as were many others. 
However, during the 1980s, Fiberline’s limited resources at times seemed to hinder the 
company from taking full advantage of the market opportunities they saw. For many other 
Danish plastic producers, the good market conditions of the 1980s led to better earnings 
and new investments in production and development.8 For Fiberline, however, 
development became a challenging balancing act, which took up much attention as the 
company, to paraphrase Garnsey, sought to consolidate.  
From April 1985 to April 1989, Fiberline’s turnover grew 27% a year in average, and as 
such the company might be said to be in growth. As seen previously, when discussing the 
narrative of sale, this was also how Henrik Thorning described development in this 
period. However, Fiberline’s ability to generate a profit largely remained to be seen. 
Investments continued to be made in developing production and the product; at the same 
time the production was often running with problems causing waste and slowing down the 
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output rate.9 This meant that the profit margin continued to be low until 1989 (see 
appendix 1). 
Though turnover grew and production was extended in this period, the number of 
employees didn’t grow at the same rate. It had been part of Henrik Thorning’s 
considerations before the start up that the method of pultrusion wasn’t labor-intensive and 
that, as production got more effective and employees increased their skills, more could be 
produced without increasing the number of people in the production. In 1987 there were 
12 people in Fiberline: A foreman for the production and one for the processing 
department, 5 people in the production, three in the administration, and Henrik and Dorthe 
Thorning.10 At this point in time it was, however, also viewed as a problem that Fiberline 
was now at a size where it was becoming more demanding to manage the production, yet 
the company could still not afford to hire an engineer to administer and plan it.11
By 1987 the growth in the Danish economy at the start 1980s had been replaced by a 
recession.12 Private consumption in Denmark declined in both 1987 and 1988. In the 
plastic industry, though, a great part of the companies now exported most of their 
products, which generally secured their continued growth throughout the period. Thus, the 
Danish plastic industry was benefitting from the fact that the industry’s large export 
markets hadn’t experienced a drop in growth at the same level as in Denmark.13 In 1988 
taxes on Danish industry were lowered, only a modest rise in wages occurred, and the 
exchange rate of the Danish krone dropped compared to the largest export markets. This 
further contributed to improved export conditions,14 and after a period in the middle of the 
1980s, in which the prices of raw materials had grown, the price was again declining, 
which also had a positive effect on the competitiveness of the industry.15
Through 1986 and the first half of 1987, Fiberline’s sales were growing fast; production 
continued to do its best to keep up, and debate about extending the capacity continued. By 
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late summer of 1987, Fiberline invested in two new pultrusion lines, and a processing 
department was established.16 These investments were financed by lending capital from 
three different banks. Extension of the production, however, immediately led to a number 
of problems, and for a longer period efficiency was falling and delivery times growing.17
Fiberline continued to invest in production and buildings through 1988. In the same 
period, many resources were also invested in developing new profiles made with phenol, 
a form of plastic that could be used in profiles for more advanced purposes but was more 
expensive than polyester and more difficult to work with.18 Heavy investment meant that 
even though turnover had almost doubled in two years, Fiberline experienced a deficit for 
1987/88 (as mentioned earlier). Once again the board considered expanding the share 
capital as more investments were planned. In the end, however, Fiberline decided instead 
to take out another mortgage on the buildings.19 As mentioned in the former chapter, 
Henrik Thorning was very reluctant to use any method of providing capital that might 
threaten his control of the company.   
In 1988/89 Fiberline experienced a profit, judged to be primarily a result of the production 
now running more efficiently, whereas sales hadn’t live up to the budget through the 
year.20 Fiberline, which had gotten better at controlling and planning the production, was 
now benefitting from the investments of the previous years. 1989/90 showed the same 
tendency, with a turnover that was even now declining, but with a very good profit rate 
making it the best year yet. Most of that year’s profit was used immediately to buy out 
three of the co-owners in the spring of 1990. Henrik Thorning bought all of their shares. 
His shares were then converted into A-shares, and the shares of the last co-owner Torben 
Nymand were converted into B-shares, ultimately leaving Henrik Thorning in complete 
control of the company.21
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After the steady growth in the Danish plastic industry during the boom of the late 1980s, 
many started to invest in production like Fiberline. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
however, demand had fallen and overcapacity was driving prices and profit margins 
down. This was, for example, often the case for the suppliers of plastic components to the 
electrical industry, where some of Fiberline’s large customers were located.22 Fiberline’s 
financial reports in the first years of the 1990s show that, like other companies in the 
industry, they too were experiencing falling prices. From 1990 to 91 the turnover more 
than doubled but the profit margin was now falling again. In 1991/92, turnover fell and 
then grew very slowly through the following years, as did the profit margin. 
Manufacturers in the Danish plastic industry were generally concerned about the market 
and price structure in the beginning of the 1990s, and some, for example those producing 
packaging for the consumer industries, were harder hit by the recession and drop in 
demand on many European markets than Fiberline. During this period, when there was a 
tendency to increased turnover but weak profits margins, Fiberline started up its first 
process of formulating a written strategy, which I will return to later. 
The five years from 1992 till 1997 were marked by extensive growth in Fiberline—taking 
off especially around 1994. This growth was particularly shaped by two new customers. 
One was a European manufacturer of systems for windows and doors.23 By using a profile 
in reinforced plastic with high insulation properties inside frames, the window 
manufacturer could produce lighter windows in new and thinner designs that could still be 
fitted to meet the authorities’ growing demand for insulation.24 Therefore, Fiberline 
developed a new profile, and the Swiss company grew to become both a large and steady 
customer.  
The other customer that was particularly present in the development of Fiberline 
throughout the 1990s was LM Glassfiber (known today as LM Wind Power), the large 
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Danish producer of wind turbine blades. The wind turbine industry was growing fast in 
the 1990s. Three of the 10 largest producers in the world were situated in Denmark at the 
time, and the industry estimated that by around 2000/01 more than 14.000 people worked 
in the industry in the country, including the large group employed by sub-contractors like 
LM Glassfiber.25 They had factories across the globe, had captured around 40-45% of the 
world market for wind turbine blades, and were by far the largest Danish producer of 
reinforced plastic.26 The wind turbine industry’s technological development demanded 
larger turbines that could generate more power. To make larger blades there was a need 
for further reinforcement than that offered by the existing glass fiber constructions. 
However, this change required specialized knowledge and resources for production that 
LM Glassfiber didn’t possess: the company produced mostly by employing a lay-up 
method that wasn’t suited for making the new, necessary reinforcements.27 Fiberline 
developed and produced a blade root made with carbon fiber, giving the root more 
strength and allowing for larger blades.28 LM Glassfiber soon became Fiberline’s largest 
customer so far.      
The global growth of the wind turbine industry and the significant role of Danish 
companies in this growth ensured that the Danish plastic industry as a whole made it 
through the economic crisis of the early 1990s without the decline that many other 
industries experienced.29 Overall, the Danish plastic industry maintained growth rates 
around 5-6 %. It was clear, however, that had it not been for the rapid growth amongst 
producers of reinforced plastic, the Danish plastic industry would have declined through 
these years. The large wind turbine manufactures, their sub-contractors, and their sub-
contractors bore the growth of the industry in the 1990s.30 However, the last years of the 
decade, from 1996 till 1999, also indicated that it could be difficult for sub-contractors in 
the wind-turbine industry to remain profitable under pressure from large customers and 
growing competition.31 This was also the case for Fiberline. The company’s turnover and 
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number of employees grew rapidly through those years, but profit margins remained low. 
Through the period Fiberline invested heavily in development and expansion of the 
production. As shall later become clear, the return on these investments was debated, and 
not everyone on the board believed that it was the right path to growth for Fiberline.  
In the two following sections, I will consider a number of examples of how productive 
opportunities were conceived and what decisions were then taken in order to act on these. 
All are dependent on the self-conception of the company. In some cases Fiberline would 
prove to be very reluctant to move into what might otherwise look like a very good 
opportunity, because it conflicted with the basic narrative of the company. In other cases, 
the company was quite eager to exploit a perceived opportunity because it was born out of 
its fundamental self-conception.  
External inducements to diversification - Processed profiles and systems  
While discussing Fiberline’s basic narrative, I described the special position not only of 
the product but also of the production process in the company’s self-conception. As 
mentioned, the history of Fiberline as told in the 25th anniversary publication opened with 
Henrik Thorning finding not just his product but also his process.32 The basic narrative 
raises Fiberline’s product to a level of perfection, which not only refers to the versatility 
of reinforced plastic profiles but also to the product’s potential as a form of revolutionary 
re-newer of industrial production. I have discussed how the focus and status of the 
production was enforced through the first experiences of the company in the start-up. For 
example, Jens Johansen spoke of the feeling of conquest in learning to control the 
production, and Henrik Thorning told about learning pultrusion in its extreme.33 I have 
also noted how this self-conception, focusing on product and production, influenced the 
company’s image of context, causing Fiberline to rank competition according to their 
production capabilities and establishing Fiberline’s own technological knowledge and 
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resources as its main competitive advantage. As discussed in a previous chapter, Fiberline 
later established a new narrative, allowing the company to focus on sale. This narrative 
drew on the same basic conception of the product and even furthered the company’s focus 
on technological ability. As such it didn’t disrupt the self-conception captured in the basic 
narrative, which continued to thrive alongside the new conceptions of sale.   
Using a concept from Penrose, it may be said that Fiberline’s technological base was and 
is the process of pultrusion. Penrose defines the concept of technological base in 
discussing diversification which is a central tool of growth:  
Each type of productive activity that uses machines, processes, skills, 
and raw materials that are all complementary and closely associated in 
the process of production we shall call a ‘production base’ or 
‘technological base’ of the firm, regardless of the number or type of 
products produced.34
A firm may have several such technological bases, and they may be very unlike from firm 
to firm. Different bases can be distinguished from each other, she notes, by the fact that 
moving into a new base “… requires a firm to achieve competence in some significantly 
different area of technology.”35 Clearly, however, Fiberline has only one technological 
base – profiles made by pultrusion - and that base is not merely a product of inherited 
resources or knowledge and experience. The base is closely linked to the company’s self-
conception, and it may be argued that this base was even part of Fiberline before any 
production, products, competitors, or customers. Fiberline’s technological base, captured 
in the focus on product and process as well as technological ability in the company’s 
narratives – both the basic narrative as well as the narrative of sales, is strong and 
affirmed by experience.  
A firm may diversify, Penrose further notes, within or outside its area of specialization. 
To diversify inside the firm’s own area of specialization means that it will start producing 
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new products based on the firm’s existing technology and sold on the firm’s existing 
markets.36 Penrose notes that 
In any given circumstances … much diversification is almost a 
necessity, in the sense that no firm would expect to compete 
successfully if it did not produce at least a minimum product lines or a 
minimum of its own intermediate requirements, the number of 
products involved depending on the circumstances.37    
As seen earlier, when discussing the standard profile program developed at great expense 
by Fiberline in the early 1980s, the company clearly saw an advantage in offering a 
number of product lines. That no firm, as Penrose argues, can expect to compete 
successfully without a minimum of intermediate requirements seemed less clear, however, 
to Fiberline. This is evident, for example, from the company’s unwilling attitude toward 
processing profiles. In the following I will argue that this unwillingness was based on the 
strong product and production focus that was part of the company’s self-conception.  
Fiberline established a connection to the company Arthur Krüger already in 1982 when it 
became Fiberline’s distributor on the German market as already mentioned. Almost 
immediately, Arthur Krüger started pushing Fiberline to process profiles to make them 
easier for customers to use directly in their own products.38  This could, for example, be 
by cutting them into desired lengths or by drilling holes in them. However, Fiberline was 
reluctant and didn’t seem to perceive any opportunity in the situation. The company tried 
to convince Arthur Krüger that if they wanted profiles processed, they could process them 
themselves or find another firm that could. Fiberline would be happy to deliver the 
profiles. The reluctance followed Fiberline for almost five years, during which they tried 
different options to avoid processing profiles—even though they felt pressure from 
distributors and customers. In the 1985 Prospectus, three years after Arthur Krüger first 
brought it up, it is noted that       
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The market for processed standard or special profiles is growing, as 
more and more customers inform us that they find the material 
excellent. However, they are not able to process the profiles 
themselves, because they do not possess the special processing 
technology required. Therefore, Fiberline in cooperation with a 
subcontractor has started delivering processed profiles.39
It was further noted that there appeared to be good earnings to be made in processing and 
that they might consider processing. However, it wasn’t until 1987, that a processing 
department was finally established as part of a large investment in production.  
After 10 years of interest from customers in 1993 when the first written strategy was 
formulated, the processing department had become a fully accepted part of the production, 
now described as part of the firm’s competitive advantage. In the material made to 
prepare the discussion of the strategy, board member Ole Tandrup paints a picture of how 
he sees the company in the beginning of the new millennium then years into the future. 
True to the basic narrative of the company, the vision starts out by concluding that the 
basic operation of the company will be the same in the future: namely that Fiberline will 
be a pultruder of components in reinforced plastic.40 When elaborating on this under the 
heading of Technology, processed profiles are described as an integrated part of 
production:  
The special competence of Fiberline (that we master the technology of 
pultrusion) is exploited fully. The production is concentrated on a 
small number of processes. Strategic alliances have been made 
concerning the production of complementary products (e.g. 
grating/plates). In our production of finished products, we won’t step 
our customers on the toes. The processing department is large and 
advanced. Our speed of production has increased significantly.41
Processing the profiles is an example of how Fiberline saw a productive opportunity in 
diversifying inside its own technological base by offering not more product lines but 
rather more functionality to the existing product. But it took a long time for Fiberline to 
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grasp the opportunity, which was originally forced on the company by customers (through 
Arthur Krüger). The company was reluctant to pick it up, because it conflicted with the 
basic conception of Fiberline as a pultruder. The passage quoted above mentions two 
further examples of how Fiberline would diversify inside its technological base: the 
production of complementary products and that of finished products. Both opportunities 
were, like processed profiles, forced on Fiberline by customers and only reluctantly 
picked up by the company.  
The idea of selling complete systems was already considered in 1983 when it is noted in a 
report that “Currently the possibility of selling complete systems is being explored.”42 The 
1985 prospectus explains that apart from profiles “… systems includes parts for 
assembling as well as fittings, so the customers can assemble the profiles to a finished 
product in a very easy way. This is very common in aluminum and steel profiles …”43 But 
further along it is concluded that  
Fiberline doesn’t deliver finished products partly because we do not 
wish to compete with our customers partly because Fiberline is first 
and foremost a profile manufacturer …44
The idea of selling complete systems mostly came from Arther Krüger, who for example 
saw possibilities in selling grating systems ready for use. This would require that Fiberline 
assembled the profiles into a finished product. Today, Henrik Thorning says that he 
resisted this change because he didn’t believe it to be part of the idea of Fiberline, which 
is also clear from the quote above. Today, he also notes that he tried to convince Arthur 
Krüger that if they wanted to sell complete systems they should arrange production 
themselves and that Fiberline could then deliver the profiles.45 This form was chosen 
throughout the first years, evident from the 1985 prospectus where it notes: “Our 
distributor in Germany, Arthur Krüger, Hamborg, delivers a system for control boards 
based on our profiles.”46
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As with the processed profiles, the 1993 strategy plan reveals a new realization of the 
opportunity in selling finished systems. The plan was written up and signed by the board 
in 1993, but it had been drafted and discussed in the board since the first half of 1992. In 
the draft, written by board member and management consultant Ole Tandrup, there had 
been no mentioning of making finished systems a sales objective. However, in the final 
version from 1993, it has been added and even listed as the prime target in sales.47
Around 1990, after customers and distributors had pushed for years for a system, Henrik 
Thorning came up with a new and easy way of making a grating system that required a 
minimum of processing and in which Fiberline’s standard profiles could be used. These 
were then put into production. They turned out to be a very good idea; the production was 
relatively easy to control and they sold well at a good price.48 Undoubtedly, this is why 
finished systems were singled out in the sales objectives of the 1993 strategy. Now, as 
Fiberline could see that they were earning a profit from selling these systems, they began 
to conceive of them as an opportunity and not just something forced on them from 
outside.  
Fiberline was rigid in keeping to its core process and didn’t attempt much diversification. 
When it was attempted, it only occurred within their technological base and only as a 
result of external pressure after long hesitation. The almost obsessive focus on product 
and process of the basic narrative meant that broadening the company’s productive base 
was difficult to reconcile with its self-conception. Therefore, some productive 
opportunities were actually first constructed as such only after Fiberline had engaged in 
them to comply with pressure from customers. In other words, it took a long time for 
Fiberline to realize that some intermediate offerings enhanced its competitive advantage 
and could contribute to the company’s growth.  
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Throughout the 1990s, Fiberline also had other indications that diversifying outside its 
technological base might add to its competitive ability. In August 1993, for example, there 
was some interest especially from the offshore industry in buying complete crating 
systems to be used for footbridges on oilrigs. Fiberline’s profiles could be used for railing, 
etc., but the tough environment meant that the fittings on Fiberline’s own grating system 
weren’t suitable and that molded or casted grating in reinforced plastic was required.49
However, Fiberline couldn’t mold, and in a report from management it is noted that 
Henrik Thorning has been in the USA to find a suitable supplier of 
casted grates in fiberglass. The reason for this is that the market in a 
number of industries demands this type of grating, and if we do not 
have these in our program, it will give competing companies a 
possibility of selling their products.50
The board discussed it, and the minutes of the following meeting concluded: “Molded 
grating was discussed as there would be a good synergy, but Fiberline will not produce 
these.”51 The company clearly had no interest, although Fiberline already had good 
experience in working with reinforced plastic and the process of casting was believed to 
be easier to control than pultrusion. Though it took Fiberline a while to find a supplier of 
casted grating that could satisfy quality demand, the company would rather use a 
subcontractor than diversifying outside their own technological base.  
The small narratives that Henrik Thorning is constructing in minutes and reports 
concerning finished systems and processed profiles are drawing meaning from the same 
fundamental self-conception as the basic narrative constructed in the start-up. This is for 
example the case when Henrik Thorning is telling that Fiberline is first and foremost a 
profile manufacturer and that therefore the company will not process profiles or make 
finished systems. For why should Fiberline do anything else than manufacture profiles? 
Before Henrik Thorning founded Fiberline he did, as already mentioned, analyze and 
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compare all the existing methods of producing fiber reinforced plastic and he concluded 
that pultrusion was the best. Or as it was later put in the jubilee book: “Henrik Thorning 
had found his process!” This is part of the self-conception first formulated in the basic 
narrative and as I have noted earlier it raises Fiberline’s product and process to a level of 
perfection. The small narrative Henrik Thorning establishes concerning processed profiles 
and finished systems are sensible and convincing to him because they draw on the 
conception established in the basic narrative. Because of this connection between the 
situation where Henrik Thorning is pushed by external force to consider processed 
profiles and finished systems and the basic conception of the company Fiberline was slow 
in conceiving opportunities in the situation.        
Internal inducements to diversification – phenol based profiles and construction 
profiles      
Both processed profiles and finished systems are examples of productive opportunities 
conceived and acted upon very hesitantly by Fiberline. In both cases the company’s self-
conception and especially its strong focus on the process of pultrusion meant that 
Fiberline was unwilling to enter into the diversification (within or outside its 
technological base) necessary to exploit the opportunities at hand. In this section I will 
discuss a very different way of conceiving of and acting upon opportunities also used by 
Fiberline and also influenced by the meaning expressed in the company’s narratives. 
When the self-conception of the company made Fiberline resist external inducements, it 
had to process profiles and produce finished systems; the same self-conception fueled the 
development of construction profiles, from internal inducement as it were.  
I have earlier discussed what Penrose notes to be a typical attitude of an entrepreneur 
driven mostly by his own enthusiasm and less by any specific idea of a market. She uses 
this to exemplify how demand is a constructed and subjective phenomenon.52 As 
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discussed in a previous chapter, Fiberline originally saw the demand for their product to 
be broad and really without limitations. A consequence of this conception was that the 
small company, in spite of a very fragile financial situation in the early 1980s, invested 
close to a million DKK in developing a combination tool to be used for building up an 
extensive program of standard profiles in the belief that these could be sold at numerous 
markets. This was an early example of an internal inducement to act founded on the self-
conception of the company. Fiberline’s strong focus on product and process was decisive. 
This focus, coupled with the engineering spirit established as Henrik Thorning’s main 
motive for founding the company, continued to influence how the idea of demand was 
constructed in the company and on what productive opportunities were conceived.53 The 
result, as I will discuss in the following, was a tendency to engage in often very expensive 
and difficult development projects inspired primarily by internal inducement and without 
knowing if a concrete market existed for the product once it was developed. Clearly this is 
a very different path of development involving a different use of the company’s narratives 
than what I have just discussed as the path to selling processed profiles and finished 
systems.         
Ever since the company’s founding, Henrik Thorning was aware of and often mentioned 
the possibility of using other materials than glass fiber and new types of plastic in 
production. Adding other matrix materials or other forms of fiber would give the profiles 
new characteristics, making them attractive to even more different industries. An example 
that this was part of Henrik Thorning’s vision for the future development of Fiberline 
since the company’s inception occurs an article from 1980 in a magazine called 
Ingeniøren in which he talks about production and notes that  
By using other resins and other fiber materials for example epoxy and 
carbon fiber strength, rigidity and heat resistance can be further 
tailored to various purposes. The possibilities are endless.54
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This thought was closely connected to the idea of the product’s versatility and potential in 
the basic narrative and, as such, made good sense to Fiberline. Henrik Thorning held on to 
this idea while developing production in the start-up and past the development of the 
combination tool for making standard profiles. At the end of the 1980s, Fiberline started 
developing profiles using phenol instead of polyester. Phenol, for example, would give 
the profiles high fire and temperature resistance, meaning they could be used for electrical 
installations in challenging environments. But producing with phenol was difficult, and 
developing the new type of profiles turned out to be as demanding as learning to pultrude 
in the start 80s. By December of 1992, Fiberline still hadn’t managed to produce profiles 
of a decent quality in phenol. The challenges were much like those in the start-up, for 
example, difficulties getting the surface of the profiles even.  
But in 1994 Fiberline mastered the production with phenol at a similar level as polyester. 
In a five page article written for the magazine Plast Panorama Scandinavia Henrik 
Thorning with great enthusiasm tells about these new profiles and how they are produced. 
If the process of learning to control the production of the phenol profiles was like first 
learning to pultrude the narratives told about the phenol profiles are like the ones told in 
the start-up about pultrusion. In the article Henrik Thoning concludes that the properties 
of phenol based profiles are even better than polyester based profiles and that the possible 
use is almost endless. “Composite materials based on phenol are amongst the construction 
materials of the future,” he concludes.55 Such tales of the potential of the product and the 
process, as argued when discussing the basic narrative of Fiberline, expresses Fiberline’s 
fundamental idea and vision – its self-conception.   
Many resources were invested in developing the phenol based profiles, but experimental 
production was expensive and caused waste. In March 1993, this development process 
and the general investments in the production were questioned by the board; some weren’t 
145 
certain that phenol profiles would sell in an amount that would make development 
profitable any time soon.56 The same skepticism is mirrored in discussions throughout the 
second half of 1992, leading up to the first written strategy in 1993. The very thorough 
background material for the strategy made by Ole Tandrup includes a list of strategic 
topics discussed in the process. For example, the following questions are raised:   
Should Fiberline invest in being in the technological lead instead of 
cashing in now?  
Have the returns on the last investment of 3-4 million DKK been good 
enough? 
Can Fiberline be developed into the competence center of the future?57
The last question expressed Thorning’s hope, and he often repeated it in Fiberline’s 
communications in the period. The first two questions indicate, however, that he was not 
unchallenged in the decisions he made about developing the company. Some of the board 
members realized that other paths to growth than continuously seeking the technological 
lead might also be possible—that other strategies might suit the company’s resources 
better and should at least be discussed.58
In the end, though, these discussions that questioned the self-conception of the company 
didn’t leave much trace in the written strategy from 1993: both Fiberline’s competitive 
advantage and an evaluation of the competition focus heavily on production and product 
development as well as technological ability. Like processing the profiles or selling 
complete systems, phenol-based profiles became a diversification inside the technological 
base of Fiberline. However, this one was driven rather than impeded by the self-
conception of the company and its image of context or perception of demand.  
This was also the case when Henrik Thorning in the mid-1990s decided to start the 
development of a program of profiles for construction. In August 1992, Fiberline finished 
developing a single beam for construction made in cooperation with the consulting 
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company Rambøll og Hannemann and used for a specific project.59 Fiberline continued to 
deliver profiles for constructions for projects, but it wasn’t until the spring of 1995 Henrik 
Thorning really started engaging in the development of profiles for construction. In a 
report from management from March of that year, he describes a trip he made to USA in 
which he visited an American company producing profiles for construction, as well as 
some of the customers using these products:  
… We made a number of visits to different firms where we saw 
grating and construction profiles in use and had the opportunity to 
discuss the function of these with the customers. An extremely 
interesting visit which just confirms our view that the market is 
developing positively.60    
After this trip Fiberline started to focus on development of a complete program of profiles 
for construction. The basic idea was that reinforced plastic could be used to substitute 
steel in construction work, as it could deliver the same strength but also offered a number 
of other positive properties. Profiles weren’t particularly difficult to develop, and already 
in the fall of 1995 Fiberline ran a campaign focusing on selling them.61 The company also 
developed and patented a bracket system for assembling profiles, thus making these easier 
to use.62 On top of the development of the program of profiles for construction, however, 
came the more difficult task of making a design manual. In a report from management it 
is noted that
… we are running campaigns … particularly aiming at selling our 
construction profiles. Parallel to this we are working intensely on the 
documentation material, like our Design Manual that we for different 
reasons haven’t finished completely yet, partly because of some 
technical difficulties with documentation of strengths and partly 
because of difficulties of translation as it is hard to find translators for 
language as technical as in this case. However, we are counting on 
finishing it in Danish, German, and English by the end of September.63
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To use these profiles, architects, engineers, and technicians had to be able to calculate the 
properties needed for each particular construction. Since reinforced plastic was a new 
material and most were used to working with steel, Fiberline had to provide assistance in 
order to sell these profiles. This was the point of the design manual. It was a basic idea 
expressed in the already established narrative of how profiles should be sold, and as such 
the project made good sense to Fiberline. The design manual would make it quicker and 
easier to design and create structures based on Fiberline’s profiles. But it took almost nine 
months to develop the extensive manual. In this period, Henrik Thorning would turn his 
attention to this task and to some extent leave the sales effort to Fiberline’s sales 
department, which had now been established.64   
In December 1995 the manual was finally ready in a Danish version and half a year later, 
in June 1996, in English and German.65 It had been very expensive, because so many tests 
had been made to document every aspect of the construction system. Being extensive, it 
was also expensive to produce, and more than a 1000 copies had to be sold to cover the 
expense.66 Fiberline expected a lot from the new profiles and the design manual; the 
company perceived a very good market potential for a system that could be used in 
constructions of any kind. For example, they had already delivered some to the off-shore 
industry and for wastewater treatment plants. The 1996 strategy plan notes that, as 
something new compared to former plans, construction and project sale should make up at 
least 30 % of the turnover.67    
As discussed in a previous chapter, the experiences with its start-up and the difficulties 
Dukadan had in selling the profiles made Fiberline conceive of sales in a particular way, 
focusing on information and counseling.  Fiberline also perceived the market in general as 
rigid and slow in adapting to new materials. Therefore, Henrik Thorning had from early 
on talked about the importance of working the entire value chain in the relevant 
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industries. Now, as the program of construction profiles had been developed, Fiberline 
invested many resources in marketing them in a quite unusual way. Henrik Thorning 
contacted the municipality of the city of Kolding and offered to build and co-finance a 
footbridge the municipality was planning. Rambøll, the consulting engineer Fiberline had 
worked with earlier, and Fiberline’s suppliers of glass fiber and polyester were engaged in 
the project and also sponsored part of the expenses. The idea of the project was to 
construct the bridge using only reinforced plastic to demonstrate the possibilities of the 
material and the profiles for construction.68 Fiberline took care to market the opening of 
the bridge, also used as an occasion to host a conference for engineers and others focusing 
on construction in reinforced plastic. In an interview concerning the project that was more 
than two years in the making, Henrik Thorning commented: 
With our bridge we have proven that plastic-based composite is an 
excellent material for building bridges and that it can live up to high 
safety demands and that even large constructions can be made by 
regular standard profiles … we believe that the many obvious qualities 
of the material will mean that it will now get its great breakthrough in 
larger constructions.69
The bridge project fell in line with Fiberline’s narrative about how profiles should be sold, 
and it drew on the firm’s image of context as established in this narrative. The object was, 
on the one hand, to create general as well as industry-specific awareness of the unknown 
material and on the other to offer consulting to engineers through the conference. The 
hope was that activities such as these might erase the rigidity Fiberline conceived as part 
of their market context.      
Fiberline had begun developing the construction profiles and the design manual based on 
incipient interest from the off-shore industry, for example, but without more than a 
general conception of demand. It was imagined that the new profiles would sell well in 
the German construction industry, as Henrik Thorning had seen them do on the American 
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market. The construction profile program had the same qualities of versatility and 
potential as the original standard profile program.70 It connected to the basic narrative as 
well as the narrative of sale: therefore, it made sense to the company to engage resources 
in developing it. However, sales of the construction profiles didn’t live up to the 
expectations. Already in February 1997, when Fiberline revised its strategy, the company 
had lowered expected sales of construction profiles to 20 % of total sales.71
One problem was the general unfamiliarity of the product which continued to be a source 
of wonder and frustration to Fiberline. Another (related) problem was that customers 
actually willing to take up the challenge of working in a new material, especially those in 
the German construction industry, were asking for a common standard for the profiles that 
might guarantee their quality. None existed, which was believed to damage the sale of the 
construction profiles. However, Henrik Thorning also saw this as an opportunity: he 
engaged in developing a standard, investing as many resources and as much attention in 
this as he had done in the design manual and drawing heavily on the manual in the 
process. In February 1997 Henrik Thorning reported:  
… Fiberline has attended a meeting in London concerning 
standardization of construction profiles, the leading companies of the 
pultrusion industry, which means Topglas in Italy, DTP in France, 
Bekaert in Belgium, Fiberforce in England, and Fiberline in Denmark, 
agrees that the time has come for standardizing construction profiles. 
Among the companies mentioned there is no doubt that Fiberline is 
leading with Bekaert as number two and that our input and attitude 
towards standardization will be decisive. Here it is fortunate that we 
have developed our Design Manual, as it can’t help providing the basis 
for future ways of calculating and designing composited constructions. 
The standardization committee will meet again in March when we will 
also participate and have one of the main assignments.72
In the end Henrik Thorning managed to push through a standard matching Fiberline’s 
construction program as described and defined in the design manual. As Fiberline was 
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almost alone in being able to meet this standard, they agreed to make an A (E17) and a B 
(E23) standard. Fiberline could then conform to the A standard and most others to the B 
standard.73 This was a long and frustrating process, however, and the standard was not 
introduced until 2001—and only after much effort from Fiberline and Henrik Thorning.74
It may be argued that through this effort Fiberline won an influence that wasn’t really 
proportionate to its size compared to its European colleges; still, when considering 
Fiberline’s self-conception and the company’s image of its competitors as described 
earlier, taking the lead in this process clearly reaffirmed the meaning established by the 
company’s narratives.  
Conclusion – The diversity of diversification  
In this chapter I have discussed a number of different productive opportunities that 
Fiberline conceived of and acted upon in the years from the mid-1980s to the end of the 
1990s. My point in the discussion has been to show how the narratives in use, formulating 
the company’s sense of self and context, have had a decisive influence on this process. 
The company’s self-conception have sometimes worked to constrain and at other times to 
generate action, thereby influencing its diversification and growth.   
Considering why firms choose to plan for expansion, Penrose argues that the firm is either 
inspired by internal or external inducements or cautioned by internal or external 
difficulties in acting upon productive opportunities.75 In choosing to expand, the firm has 
two options: expand by requiring new resources from outside, putting these into service, 
or seek to take advantage of unused resources of its own and put these into new use and 
service. Within Penrose’s framework, this choice leads to two basic growths paths, as the 
firm can either grow by merger or by diversification.76 Diversification in the work of 
Penrose includes entering into new markets with new or familiar products. She uses the 
term market area, a point I will discuss further in the following chapter. In this chapter I 
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have primarily discussed diversification in reference to the development of new types of 
products—what Penrose calls technological base(s).77
As noted Penrose argues that in most cases some degree of diversification is necessary, 
because it is difficult for a firm to compete without offering a minimum of product lines 
and/or intermediate products. As seen in this chapter, Fiberline was rather rigid in its 
diversification and kept to its technological base, pultruison. This base is closely linked to 
Fiberline’s self-conception, and it may be argued that this base was even part of Fiberline 
before the founding of the company. The technological base of Fiberline as expressed in 
the focus on product and technological ability in the company’s narratives – both the basic 
narrative as well as the narrative on sale – is strong and affirmed by experience. In this 
chapter I have discussed different ways in which Fiberline conceived of and acted upon 
productive opportunities, all closely connected to the company’s technological base.  
Fiberline did not easily perceive the production of processed profiles and finished systems 
as an opportunity, even though in this case external inducements seemed strong. Since the 
start-up, customers were interested in having Fiberline deliver processed profiles, and 
distributors were also eager to have Fiberline develop finished systems. But Fiberline 
conceived of itself first and foremost as a pultruder. This conception, as I have argued, 
was the basic explanation for Fiberline’s hesitant attitude toward processing as well as 
production of finished systems. 
The case of developing a program of construction profiles and the design manual for 
using it was driven by the self-conception of the company in a more direct fashion. When 
Henrik Thorning was inspired by the use of profiles for construction in America, he saw a 
concept that fit firmly into Fiberline’s basic narrative. The potential and versatility of 
profiles in reinforced plastic had induced Fiberline early on to develop the difficult 
combination tool, which would enable Fiberline to deliver a broad range of standard 
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products to many different industries. This was also the case with the program of 
construction profiles that also drew on the conception of the product as a form of 
structural revolution in industrial production. As discussed, there turned out to be some 
important external difficulties for selling the construction profiles in the amount Fiberline 
had imagined. The board questioned whether the resources invested in both the program 
and manual were proportionate to the potential.       
In all it may be concluded that, of the productive opportunities discussed in this chapter, 
Fiberline seemed most keen to act upon those that would enable the company to develop 
its technological base. This was so, because Fiberline’s technological base – the process 
of pultrusion – was the essential idea behind the company, the key to Fiberline’s self-
conception. In Fiberline a close relationship exists between self-conception, product, and 
technological development.  
When discussing the economics of diversification, Penrose describes a situation that she 
finds common in the competitive behavior among some technologically advanced firms in 
the modern economy. These operate on a market “where consumers and producers alike 
are caught up in an almost compulsive obsession for that which is ‘new.’”78 Referencing 
Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction, she notes that firms who manage this 
situation (and here she specifically talks about large firms) are not destroyed, but are 
rather forced to become more creative. In today’s world so rich in innovation lingo, this 
probably seems like a positive scenario to many. Penrose also observes: “The process 
finds great favour in the eyes of those who see it as an important means of sustaining 
investment in a highly developed capitalist economy.”79
In pointing to the behavior of this kind of company, Penrose appears to think primarily of 
‘fads of fashion’ associated with the consumption of consumer goods.80 However, she 
also notes that such obsessions of course have to reside not only with the consumer, but 
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also with the producer. If the firm doesn’t see a relevant demand in the situation, it will 
probably not take any action to develop new products. My point in mentioning Penrose’s 
discussion of this form of competitive behavior is that in the case of developing 
construction profiles, Fiberline acts like a company obsessed with that which is new, 
driven not by demand from consumers but, as argued, by its self-conception and idea of 
demand. Furthermore, I have argued that this was a pattern of development followed in 
other cases – in developing the combination tool or the phenol-based profiles, for example 
– and as such an important pattern in the growth of Fiberline.   
However, Penrose generally describes the position of these firms as vulnerable and notes 
that this specific pattern of competitive behavior has consequences for their growth:   
… it has considerable significance for the pattern of growth of firms. 
On the one hand it intensifies the vulnerability and restricts the process 
of growth for firms that confine themselves to a narrow range of 
products; on the other hand, it compels firms to specialize in a 
relatively narrow range of basic areas of production and restricts the 
rate at which they can diversify their fundamental activities.81
Fiberline certainly didn’t want to diversify its fundamental activities. The company 
specialized in a very narrow range of basic areas of production (really only one) and kept 
to a narrow range of products. To counter the vulnerability that might arise from this 
situation, it sought instead to diversify its market activities. In doing so, Fiberline was as 
driven by its self-conception and image of context as it was in developing products and 
production, which will be the focus of the following chapter.   
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9. Market focus and developing the sales organization  
In the previous chapter I discussed the concept of diversification, linking it to productive 
opportunity as Penrose does by arguing that diversification is one of the firm’s two basic 
growth paths. So far, I have mostly considered productive opportunities and 
diversification regarding Fiberline’s development of its technological base, and by 
extension I have focused on the development of production and products. However, as 
noted earlier, the firm’s productive opportunities comprise all of the productive 
possibilities that the firm sees and of which it can take advantage. As Penrose argues, 
diversification may also involve entering new markets or offering new products on old 
markets.1 This is a matter of the firm’s market focus, which will be the topic of this final 
chapter of the analysis.  
As discussed in an earlier chapter, Fiberline developed a narrative of how profiles should 
be sold in order to allow the company to account meaningfully for the challenges of 
selling the product in the start-up and to establish a reasonable explanation for the actions 
deemed necessary to cope with this situation by starting to focus on sales. This narrative 
was based on three ideas: the technological superiority of Fiberline’s products, the need 
for constant attention to and guidance of customers, and a focus on international markets. 
Although elements of this new narrative were connected to the basic narrative, it offered a 
more concrete image of the context, drawing on the experience of sale. In some respects, 
however, the ideas expressed in the narrative of sale were also abstract: for example, the 
view of the competitors, which was in vague and not very concrete the beginning. 
In addition, Fiberline’s market focus, as formulated in the narrative of sale, is very broad. 
As discussed it connects to the vision of the versatility of the product in the basic narrative 
and it is really only specified further by the international focus. The tendency to perceive 
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Fiberline’s potential markets very broadly was also strengthened by the vulnerability 
Fiberline felt when it lost the business of E Rasmussen Industri in the beginning of the 
1980s. This loss made the company conceive of the broad market focus as a safeguard 
against becoming too dependent on only a few large customers.  
The object of this chapter is to discuss how Fiberline’s market focus developed and to 
consider the role of this development in the company’s growth. I will discuss how the 
market area was diversified and consider the influence of the company’s self-conception 
and image in this. Focus will be one the roughly 10 years from the middle of the 1990s to 
around 2004. First, I will briefly describe the development of the composites industry at 
the turn of the millennium. I will then discuss Fiberline’s general development in the 
period before turning to the development of Fiberline’s market focus and sales 
organization, connecting both to the use of narratives in the company. 
The composites industry around the turn of the millennium  
As discussed at length, Henrik Thorning had a very clear vision for Fiberline when he 
founded the company. This vision was connected to his idea about the structure of 
industrial production in which he envisioned reinforced plastic profiles as a competitor to 
steel and aluminum profiles. Therefore, he also saw and described the market potential of 
the profiles as infinite and, as already seen, Fiberline continued to refer to substituting 
materials as their main competition. Yet, this “cultural revolution,” as it was often 
described by Fiberline, in which reinforced plastic would substitute for steel and other 
traditional materials, had been long in the making. At one point Henrik Thorning, when 
he spoke of the revolution, started adding that it would take a generation of engineers to 
adapt to the new material.2
In view of developments in the worldwide sale and production of fiber reinforced plastic 
composites up to the turn of the millennium, this last point would appear to be accurate. 
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However, one might even speculate that one generation of engineers would not suffice. A 
2002/03 report on the European manufacturers and suppliers of reinforced plastics 
concludes that growth in the use of these materials haven’t lived up to the prospects as 
described at the time of the first commercialization of these materials. By the turn of the 
millennium, only 1.1% of all materials used in production across the globe were estimated 
to be reinforced plastic, and the industry continued to grow merely around 4% a year 
worldwide depending on economy in general.3 The information about the industry in the 
report was primarily based on a detailed questioner distributed amongst more than 1500 
European companies in the industry.4 The report opens by stating that the industry is so 
diverse regarding production methods and output that it can seem difficult to describe it as 
a single industry. There are, however, common factors and generally the competitive 
position of the reinforced plastic producers is estimated to be rather weak. 
As discussed earlier, suppliers of matrix (plastic) materials were for the most part large 
international producers of chemicals. This had been the case when Fiberline was founded, 
and more than 20 years later, in 2002, these companies had grown few and even larger by 
a long line of mergers and acquisitions. The producers of reinforced plastic were generally 
not these companies’ main customers and tended to have a weak position in which it 
could, for example, be difficult to avoid that prices followed the development of the oil 
price closely.5
The producers of glass fiber, by far the most used form of fiber in reinforced plastic, had 
undergone a similar development in which production was found only in a few very large 
companies. By the end of the 1990s, growth in the sale of glass fibers was only around 2-
3% a year, and the price had dropped 25% over 3-4 years. This might of course be a good 
thing for customers. Yet the development meant that only few investments were made in 
production capacity; many producers seemed to focus instead on diversifying into new 
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materials and markets. This was the case, for example, for Owens Corning, one of the 
World’s largest manufacturers of glass fiber. Also, the long-term development of the 
market for glass fiber was estimated to be quite uncertain in the report.6   
In general, the position of the reinforced plastic producers compared to their large 
suppliers was weak, a situation intensified by the structure of the companies in the 
industry around the turn of the millennium. These were generally small compared to their 
large suppliers.7
The report on the international market for reinforced plastic points to the development of 
the wind turbine industry as a (rare) example of a prosperous, growing industry using 
fiberglass in many different forms. The Danish companies in the industry are perceived as 
driving this development. As the technological leaders of the industry at that time, they 
were also believed to be a source of innovation for the reinforced plastic industry.8 From 
1996 to 2000 the global wind turbine market had grown 25-30% a year—and it was 
expected that it would more than double in the following five years.9 In many countries, 
for example, German investments in wind energy were encouraged by different forms of 
legislation or systems of subsidies, and here, as well as in Spain and USA, the market was 
growing rapidly. In 2002/03 LM Glasfiber had 47% of the global market for wind turbine 
blades.10 As noted Fiberline had already started delivering to LM Glasfiber in the early 
1990s, and the growth Fiberline experienced from the middle of the 1990s to the middle 
of around 2005 was closely connected to LM Glasfiber (and a couple of other large 
customers). The difficulty of being a sub-contractor of plastic products in the wind turbine 
industry have already been mentioned as one of the reasons for the low profit margin 
many Danish producers of composites experienced in the early 1990s. In general, 
dependence on public grants and subsidies of the wind turbine industry were both 
worrisome, as was the general structure of the industry, with a very few large producers of 
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wind turbines and a large group of often small and highly specialized sub-contractors in 
weak bargaining positions.  
Seven good years of development and organization building 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the five years from 1992 till 1997 were marked by 
extensive growth in Fiberline especially taking off around 1994. Yet, even though their 
turnover and number of employees grew rapidly throughout those years, profit margins 
remained low. Throughout the period Fiberline invested heavily in development and 
expansion of production. In an interview Henrik and Dorthe Thorning gave to Plast 
Panorama Scandinavia in 2006, the magazine of the Danish plastic industry organization, 
they talked about the difficult start-up. Dorthe Thorning noted that it had been seven very 
difficult years, but that coming through them they continued to believe that seven good 
years were waiting ahead.11 They were—but not until the beginning of the new 
millennium. The seven years from 1999/2000 until 2006/07 were, by all comparisons, the 
best in the history of Fiberline. With the exception of 2002/03, turnover grew rapidly 
throughout these years; the profit margin continued to stay above 10% and topped at 18% 
in 2005/06. After 2003 the number of employees also grew rapidly and topped at 162 in 
2007 (see appendix 1). Many of these new employees were in production, which was 
continually expanded. In 2000 Fiberline produced profiles on 12 machines in two 
different production sites.12 Fiberline, which now owned all the buildings of the old 
machine factory in Nørre Bjert, had extended these as much as possible, after which they 
started production in a second location. To this end, Henrik Thorning had found some 
buildings in Middelfart on the island of Funen, approx. 20 kilometers from Nørre Bjert, 
and here three machines were installed in 1997.13
Alongside the expansion in production, the rest of the organization grew too. In the 
middle of the 1980s, an accountant was hired, and around the beginning of the 1990s 
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Fiberline hired its first sales personnel. Most focus had fallen on establishing Fiberline’s 
own sales organization in Kolding through the first years of the 1990s, in line with the 
important role of sales given by the establishment of the new narrative (as discussed in the 
introduction of this chapter and the topic of a former chapter). Around the middle of the 
decade, however, Henrik Thorning also started taking on engineers for quality control and 
documentation. The first was hired in 1996.14  As discussed in the previous chapter, many 
resources were invested in developing the program of construction profiles and writing 
the design manual throughout the late 1990s, and the development department was 
established during this process. It grew to become a large and important part of 
Fiberline’s organization. This development fit nicely into the meaning expressed in the 
narrative of sale focusing on both the technological superiority of Fiberline’s products and 
the need for consulting customers in developing their products. The development 
department would be part of this process and would also handle documentation, which 
was becoming increasingly important to many customers. Many resources were invested 
in the department, and it was given special status by Fiberline. Even though research and 
development was sensible with reference to the customer, the main explanation for the 
position of the research and development department from the mid-1990s is the 
connection between this department, Henrik Thorning, and the basic narrative of the 
company.  
In the 25th anniversary publication from 2004 discussed earlier, the research and 
development department is central. The publication notes that:  
It is true that from the outside Fiberline looked like any other 
traditional smaller production company, but in the humble buildings 
there was a knowledge-based company, that was constantly building 
up competencies of industries, materials and production…15
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This passage, part of a section that tells about the focus on research and development in 
the 1990s, reconstructs parts of the basic narrative of Fiberline by referring to the constant 
development of competencies connected to the product and the process. As already seen, 
the idea about the potential for developing the product and the process was part of the 
basic narrative. This potential helped to formulate the fundamental idea of Fiberline and 
in the context of the anniversary text the potential of the product is connected to the 
special position of the company’s R&D department. This is also evident in another 
passage in the anniversary publication concerning the development of R&D. An engineer 
who did his internship at Fiberline was interviewed about his impression of the research 
and development department. He said that to him Fiberline was an amazing place, partly 
because resources were available to startup most projects the engineers could come up 
with but mostly because, as he put it, Fiberline has “a certain indefinable creative spirit 
where development is enthroned.”16
When establishing the basic narrative of Fiberline in the opening chapter of the analysis, I 
discussed how motives of creativity and joy of creation were part of the arguments used to 
establish Henrik Thorning as a right and proper entrepreneur. The same values are 
expressed more than 20 years later when Fiberline talks about research and development, 
as in the above quotes. I will argue that the fundamental meaning of or vision for 
Fiberline expressed in the basic narrative and connected to Henrik Thorning as an 
entrepreneur was passed on to the company’s research and development department. This 
happened as the formal organization of the company was established, when Henrik 
Thorning engaged heavily in the effort of developing new products, for example, the 
program of construction profiles and the design manual. It meant that Henrik Thorning 
incorporated the legitimacy of his role in the self-conception of Fiberline into the research 
and development department.  
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In the previous chapter I mentioned that Henrik Thorning, as the sales organization began 
to function in the middle of the 1990s, directed most of his attention to development of 
products and production. Reports from management after this point indicate that, in 
general, he appeared to have traveled less to meet customers. I have also discussed how 
the narrative of sale was formulated in the 1980s to cope with a difficult situation that 
demanded focus on sale. From that discussion it was clear that the new narrative was 
tightly linked to the basic narrative and didn’t disrupt the basic self-conception, focused 
on product and process. Henrik Thorning’s “refound” focus on development from the 
mid-1990s and the special status attributed to research and development should, I would 
argue, be perceived as his return to the original idea of Fiberline: He had set the original 
idea a little aside to focus on sales in order to secure the immediate survival of the firm in 
a difficult situation.     
Penrose describes industrial research (what would be called research and development 
today) as “… the deliberate investigation of the as yet unknown properties of the materials 
and machines used in production…”17 She describes this as an important and dynamic 
part of diversification and notes that it is especially valuable to the long term growth of 
the company if it is not too specifically connected to a particular product.18 The 
importance of research and development, as Penrose describes it, is “… the logical 
response of the individual firm to the challenge inherent in the Schumpeterian ‘process of 
creative destruction’.”19 If an industry is populated with firms competing hard to get 
ahead by innovation, this would certainly seem the case. However, Penrose also notes that 
some firms mostly undertake research because they are convinced that at some point some 
new opportunity will come from it. Put another way: “Many entrepreneurs very early on 
perceived the possibilities for improving the long-run profitability of their own firms 
through systematic research … because they dreamed of new things.”20 This last 
description of the motivations for engaging in research and development is clearly in line 
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with Fiberline’s perception of productive opportunities in general (as described in the 
previous chapter) and the company’s self-conception, so closely coupled to the vision of 
the potential of the product and the process.  
As already noted, Penrose is skeptical about this particular form of “innovative attitude,” 
and in discussing industrial research she concludes that  
The vision of unlimited opportunity thus invoked is a mere mirage for 
many. New knowledge may be gained, but at great expense, and for 
the small firm the use of its resources for ‘research’ in general is as 
likely to be wasteful as it is to be profitable unless the firm has a 
specific and reasonably original idea upon which it is working.21
Fiberline continued to recognize pultrusion as a very specific and original idea worth 
investing in for further development. Yet, as discussed in the prior chapter, Fiberline 
sometimes had problems matching its conception of productive opportunities to the needs 
or wants of the market. Fiberline, however, attributed this to the rigidity of the market 
rather than the value of the company’s offerings as expressed in the narrative of sale—or 
when Henrik Thorning talks about the revolution of composites dragging out (for 
example, in the articles from 2003 and 2006 already mentioned).  
Penrose concludes her discussion of industrial research by noting that “Research is 
essentially speculative activity, frequently adopted under necessity or as a matter of 
faith.”22 The development of Fiberline’s R and D department exemplifies the last of these 
two. It is, however, not just this department that may be characterized by engagement in 
speculative activities. The same may be said for Fiberline’s sales organization: the 
development of the sales effort was just as dependent on the self-conception of the 
company as was the development of R and D. Sales effort is the central topic of this 
chapter to which I will now turn.
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Establishing the sales organization 
In an earlier chapter I discussed the situation in which the narrative of sale was 
formulated. I showed how Fiberline had difficulty coming to a point where they could 
start focusing on sales, because the basic narrative made them preoccupied with 
production. Drawing sense from the basic narrative and emphasizing the versatility and 
brilliancy of the profiles, Fiberline had originally imagined that if the profiles were only 
produced well enough they would sell themselves. Vague as it seems, this was the image 
of context as formulated within the basic narrative. However, Dukadan’s inability to sell 
profiles meant that this image of context came under pressure to change, as Fiberline 
gradually realized that Dukadan wouldn’t be able to help them sell profiles. On top of 
this, renewed crisis occurred when Fiberline lost its largest customer who had generated 
around half of its turnover. The result, as discussed, was a growing conflict between the 
company’s image of context and its self-conception. The narrative of sale was formulated 
to supply Fiberline with a revised conception of itself and its context in this situation. It 
allowed Fiberline to act when the financial state of the company threatened to overcome 
it, Dukadan was pulling out, and their largest customer moved business to a competitor.       
Arthur Krüger became Fiberline’s first international distributor. Hearing Henrik Thorning 
tell about his thoughts prior to establishing this connection and considering the 
communications Fiberline had with the business consultant before they entered into the 
German market, one might say that the company appeared rather well prepared and 
deliberate in focusing on this particular market. Based on the experience of working with 
Dukadan, Fiberline had also some ideas about the kind of distributor it wanted to work 
with, as mentioned in the first written sales strategy from 1982. Preferred distributors, like 
Arthur Krüger, had good technical and commercial knowledge. 
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After signing the first agreement with Arthur Krüger, Fiberline quickly found more 
international distributors. As mentioned, Henrik Thorning traveled intensely all over 
Europe, where he sought to connect to new potential agents. Soon Finnish, Swiss, Dutch, 
and Italian distributors were found; by 1985 Fiberline had agents in 9 different countries 
in Europe.23 When making agreements with distributors, he would take care to instruct 
them as much as possible in the use of profiles by inviting sales personnel to visit 
Fiberline for training. Henrik Thorning also continued to support distributors by traveling 
with them when they were visiting customers.    
In 1985 Fiberline hired its first sales consultant who was to serve the Scandinavian 
market. It was difficult, however, to find people who were qualified, and the company 
didn’t find a sales consultant with the right technical understanding and good experience 
with sales until 1990.24 Though he was supposed to focus on the Scandinavian market, he 
soon aided Henrik Thorning in serving the rest of Europe where interest in their products 
was better.25 It was also in the early 1990s that Fiberline established its first sales 
subsidiary in Germany. This had been mentioned as a possibility already in the first 
written sales strategy, but now it mostly came about by chance. Arthur Krüger had a 
department dedicated to the sale of Fiberline’s products, and in January 1991 the manager 
of this department announced that he had accepted a job from a competitor and would 
therefore leave his position. This was problematic for both Fiberline and Arthur Krüger. 
They agreed to establish an independent sales company together and to offer the manager 
part of the ownership. The new company would operate from Stuttgart in the Southern 
part of Germany, so as not to be in direct competition with Arthur Krüger, whose main 
market was in the Northern part of Germany.26 In January 1992, a British sales consultant 
was hired in a similar construction, though without Arthur Krüger’s involvement, of 
course. The British sales consultant had worked for a British agent that Fiberline was no 
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longer dealing with, but Henrik Thorning believed the sales consultant to be qualified for 
the job.27   
Back home in Kolding, the sales department grew over the 1990s; the first sales 
consultant hired in 1990 proved efficient and advanced to sales manager with a small 
team of sales consultants working in the department. They serviced the Scandinavian 
market, but they also worked on other European markets, helping agents and servicing 
customers.  
Through the last part of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, most board discussions 
on sales had focused on establishing a market in Denmark by creating a sales department 
in Fiberline. Later the board mostly discussed how the two sales companies in Germany 
and England could be controlled and become profitable. Since the first written sales 
strategy was formulated in the beginning of the 1980s, no more structured discussion on 
sales had been part of the reports from management or in the minutes from the meetings. 
By the middle of the 1990s, however, the sale organization had grown large and 
complicated; Fiberline undertook selling efforts in many different markets with a large 
geographical spread as well as in many different industries. They did so through a number 
of different channels (agents, distributors, sales subsidiaries, and their own sales 
department).   
Diversification and uncertainty 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Penrose states that diversification in her 
framework involves both the production of new products and the entrance into new 
markets. Penrose’s discussion of diversification following this definition is primarily 
concerned with diversification of production, which fits well with her overall focus on 
industrial production. Yet, the basic points concerning diversification that Penrose makes 
are valid of product as well as market diversification. In discussing how diversification 
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can be used as a solution to specific problems, Penrose considers diversification as a 
means to reduce uncertainty: 
Diversification to deal with the temporary fluctuations in demand that 
are definitely expected but that cannot be estimated with sufficient 
accuracy to make profit calculations more than informed guesses 
comes very close to diversification as a device for coping with a 
generalized uncertainty. The larger and more pervasive effects of 
uncertainty – which give rise to a feeling that it is somehow safer to 
maintain a diversified portfolio, and to a general distrust of putting all 
eggs in one basket, even if that basket is closely watched – are not 
overcome simply by adjusting net revenue calculations. Many a firm 
has proclaimed the philosophy that its security is greater if it produces 
a wide range of products instead of focusing on those products which, 
even after all practical allowances for risk have been made, seem to be 
the most profitable. In other words, diversification becomes a hedge, 
not against those changes that are definitely expected… but against 
changes of any sort which the ‘luck of the game’ may bring.28
Here Penrose is speaking about product diversification, but the same observation may be 
made concerning diversification of markets. A broad market focus may also be seen as a 
device for coping with generalized uncertainty. This, I will argue, is how the 
diversification of Fiberline’s markets described in the section above should be understood. 
In developing the sales organization and the sales effort to become broad, and in 
continuing to be unfocused on this development, Fiberline was acting according to the 
image of context formulated in the early 1980s and based on the company’s experiences 
then. Fiberline continued to believe that profiles should be sold on numerous markets to 
avoid dependency on a few large customers.  
In the first chapter of the analysis I discussed how the idea of independence from a single 
industry, which Henrik Thorning, for example, expressed in some of the early articles 
about the company, became part of his considerations in founding a company based on 
the method of pultrusion. Henrik Thorning connected this idea of independence to the 
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product’s versatility of the product. An example of this is the article from 1981 discussed 
in the first chapter of the analysis in which he talks about the success of Fiberline 
compared to other start-ups. Generally in the discussions about sales, Henrik Thorning 
references or restates the potential of the products, rather than addressing any fear of 
vulnerability. They are, however, two sides of the same coin. When I discussed the 
financing behavior of Fiberline in an earlier chapter, I noted that narratives could be used 
to reduce uncertainty. A narrative that seems convincing to the company in a specific 
situation will reduce the uncertainty experienced in that situation. Therefore, when 
considering sales strategy and organization, Fiberline—in the period described here—
continued to face the vulnerability of dependence on a few very large customers. Within 
that context I would argue that the many references to the potential and properties of the 
profiles functioned to reduce the uncertainty felt in that situation.   
In the following section I will give examples of how Fiberline’s sales organization and 
strategy were discussed and developed in the period from the mid-1990s until 2004/05. 
This will show that Henrik Thorning became increasingly challenged on the broad market 
focus, both from the board and from his leadership group. It will also show that the 
process of developing a focused market strategy was difficult, slow, and continued to 
draw on the meaning created in the start-up years—and not only regarding fear of 
dependency on a few large customers.  
Sales and the strategic plans of Fiberline in the early 1990s 
As discussed in the chapter concerning Fiberline’s first focus on sale, apart from the short 
and general formulations in the 1982 sales strategy, Fiberline’s 1985 prospectus was the 
first time the company expressed any systematic thoughts on the market for its products. 
The prospectus contained a market analysis and as already noted it opens by repeating the 
fundamental vision of Fiberline. It is stated that  
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Plastic composites are the group of materials in which the sum of the 
positive technical properties of the material is largest. Furthermore, the 
production of composite materials from the single element to finished 
product requires less energy than needed for producing, for example, 
steel and aluminum.29
And in the concluding remarks on the market potential of the company, it is noted that 
Fiberline sells material-technical and geometric properties more than it 
sells pultruded profiles in reinforced plastic. This means that all
industries are customers or potential customers. Within the specific 
industry Fiberline is searching for the possibilities where the 
combination of properties and price is favorable for the seller as well 
as the customer.30
A bit further along in the prospectus this broad focus is motivated, and the experience of 
losing the business of E Rasmussen Industry becomes clear: 
Since 1983/84 the targeted growth has been evenly spread out on 
markets as well as industries, so Fiberline today is much less valuable 
than before.31
As argued the potential of the product as narrated in Fiberline worked to reduce the 
uncertainty of dependency on large customers. Here, within the context of the prospectus, 
they are presented together. The point of the prospectus was to raise capital. Therefore, it 
was necessary to account in some meaningful way for why that need had arisen. Thus, the 
loss of E Rasmussen Industri, which was still very fresh in mind, was mentioned. 
Generally, however, it seems that Fiberline would rather talk of the potential of the 
product and how it could be sold than of the unpleasant situation of dependency. In the 
period described in this chapter, Fiberline was, as just mentioned, very dependent on two 
large customers, and in the minutes of the board meetings and reports from management 
they were discussed at length. These discussions centered mostly on how better prices 
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could be negotiated, how much they could be expected to buy, and how deliveries were 
going.32
By the second half of the 1990s, Fiberline’s sales organization had grown large and 
complicated. As mentioned above, the organization served a highly diversified market; 
Fiberline was active in many different European countries and many different industries. 
This would become a much debated topic in board and management. The years from 
1995/96 till 1998/99 were characterized by growth in turnover, heavy investments in 
production, but also a declining profit margin, which furthered the discussions of the sales 
strategy and organization. Yet, already from the beginning of the 1990s, the path taken in 
sales was being questioned.  
As mentioned earlier, the sales consultant hired in 1990 soon advanced to sales manager 
and amassed a small team of consultants in his department at Fiberline. The sales 
manager, Stig Krogh Pedersen, was the first to raise the discussion concerning market 
focus in 1991 by suggesting that Fiberline should present some thoughts on the 
segmentation of markets to the board.33 In wishing to discuss market focus and 
segmentation, Stig Krogh Pedersen was soon joined by one of the newer members of the 
board, Ole Tandrup. As mentioned, he was a management consultant who pushed for a 
new strategy to be made. He wrote the comprehensive background material for the 1993 
strategy, which was based on the first discussions held by the board in 1992.  
This material included a formulation of Fiberline’s vision and main goals, which 
functioned as a reaffirmation of the firm’s self-conception as first formulated in the basic 
narrative. I have argued earlier and noted many times that this narrative established the 
fundamental idea of Fiberline, which was connected to the product and the process. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this self-conception continued to be strong in Fiberline 
through time and had a strong influence on both the perception of productive 
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opportunities and the decisions made concerning specialization. It also frames the written 
strategy of 1993, along with background material. For example, the vision statement 
included in the material is a restatement of the very first idea of the vision of the company 
as expressed in the basic narrative; it is very close in wording to the first vision statement 
made in the first sales strategy from 1982. 
The background material states that Fiberline’s vision is to “Develop, produce and sell 
profiles and components in reinforced plastic materials,” and it goes on to clarify a three 
step mission, of which the first step is “to develop and maintain a production program 
based on advanced production processes and complex geometries of a quality that is at the 
top level of the industry.”34 Here, in the background material for the strategy process, 
made after the first discussions of the new strategy, common ground was established by 
referencing the fundamental self-conception of the company.  
The background material also includes a document called Fiberline annum 2002, which 
was Ole Tandrup’s attempt to imagine and describe the company 10 years into the future 
(to inspire discussion in the board). In this document, Ole Tandrup formulated his critique 
of the current state of sales in Fiberline through his vision of sales in the future. The 
following was noted on marketing and sale:  
The web of distributors has been adjusted with an increased influence 
for Fiberline. Our own sales department will cover the Scandinavian 
market… [we will have] joint ventures or sales subsidiaries on the 
most important European markets … our sales organization will 
function at three levels:  
 Expert sale - directly to large important customers where 
Fiberline is placed as a strategic supplier. 
 Project sale – profiles, components and finished goods made on 
order.
 Retail sale – standard profiles, standard components and 
standard finished goods.35
172
It was implied that all of this was rather far from the state of the sales department in 1992. 
Ole Tandrup concludes his comments on the strategy process by noting, under a heading 
called Sale/Product mix, that 
Based on analyses of the development of demand and intensive 
monitoring of the competition, Fiberline should map out the future 
needs of the market and on that basis intensify development from a 
mostly product and production oriented to a mostly market oriented 
basis.36
The passage expresses Ole Tandrup’s basic point. The strategy was discussed at many 
meetings, as well as a one day seminar of the board over the second half of 1992. In the 
end Ole Tandrup’s encouragement made Fiberline formulate a strategy that accounted for 
the actions believed necessary for starting to move in the direction sketched in Fiberline 
annum 2002. In the strategy as it ended up being formulated and signed by the board, the 
following is noted about markets: 
It is the aim that 
 A prioritization of the markets is made on the basis of market 
analyses and estimates. 
 That the prioritized markets are worked in the following way:  
Primary: through own sales department/sale subsidiaries or 
through joint ventures (who will have a department exclusively 
selling Fiberline products) 
Secondary: through distributors/agents.37
This is the first time any thoughts have been offered on prioritizing markets. Here, in the 
1993 strategy plan, no further thoughts are given to how the prioritization of the markets 
should be done. The idea of organizing sales efforts into three levels as described in the 
quote from the vision text, was repeated in the final strategy. The thoughts expressed in 
the 1993 strategy plan of how the markets could and should be focused were still very 
broad. In addition, a line of general principles of the sales effort are also listed. The 
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principles were stated as objectives that Fiberline would strive for in the sales effort. Here 
it is noted that:
It is the aim that 
 The sale is promoted in the areas where the sum of the positive 
properties of the products is largest and where the possibilities 
of substitution to competing products are least. 
 The customer base is spread both geographical as well as in 
different industries and is made up by both public and private 
organizations. 
 No more that 20% of the turnover is generated from a single 
customer.38     
This example illustrates how fear of dependency had made its way into the strategy. The 
first of the three objectives is basically a repetition of the potential of the profiles as it was 
formulated with connection to sale already in the 1985 prospectus. The point of the two 
last objectives is clearly to reduce dependency. 
In 1992 Fiberline had only had a sales department for around 2 years, and it was still 
small. Apart from that the company was dependent on the network of distributers that had 
been built up through the second half of the 1980s. Carrying through market analysis and 
organizing the sales effort in three levels, as dictated in the strategy, seemed quite a task. 
However, since the sales manager had asked the board and management for some 
considerations on this point, it must be assumed that the sales department was ready to try 
taking up the task.    
About a year after the 1993 strategy was written and signed, long-time member of the 
board Kai Busch wrote a letter to the other members of the board. He had done the same 
once before in a situation in the middle of the 1980s when Fiberline was in crisis and he 
feared that management (read Henrik Thorning) wasn’t taking this seriously enough and 
therefore kept investing in the production. He wrote the second letter in 1994 because he 
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was worried about the company’s long term development. He noted that it was his 
impression that the company was now at the brink of a growth phase, but that he feared 
that the development of the organization wouldn’t be able to keep up as currently 
organized. He notes that to him it seems a basic problem that Fiberline had a tendency to 
develop a lot of new products and to sell these on more and more new markets. Therefore, 
what Kai Busch was asking for in the letter, and what he wanted the board to discuss, was 
which path of diversification they wanted to take. They would have to make up their 
minds. If they would like to continue making more new profiles, then it should be 
considered if that were not best done in markets in which they already had experience. If, 
on the other hand, they wanted to continue finding new markets, then they should stick to 
the profiles they were already very good at producing.39 This was clearly a critique of the 
state of things as they were in Fiberline and, all things considered, a pretty precise 
analysis of the situation.
The board discussed the letter at the following meeting and concluded, apparently, that it 
would be best for Fiberline to focus on a few different uses of the profiles. But the only 
decision made at the meeting was that more money should be invested in research to find 
out where the profile’s properties would be best put to use. Kai Busch’s letter might have 
been an occasion to discuss the overall development of the company, but it doesn’t appear 
to have been used as such. It was, however, a critique of the company’s very broad market 
focus, which that made it clear that not everybody saw sense in this path.  
As mentioned, Stig Krogh Pedersen had voiced his opinion early on that the sales effort 
should be segmented. Therefore, he probably saw the 1993 strategy plan as a step in the 
right direction, and in 1995 the sales department made a comprehensive sales strategy 
with the 1993 plan as a point of departure. Written by Stig Krogh Pedersen, it was edited 
and approved by Henrik Thorning before being discussed by the board.40
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The purpose of the sales strategy was threefold: to give a status of the sales effort 
compared to the objectives in the 1993 strategy, to discuss the market development, and 
finally to formulate a sales strategy and suggest a new sales organization based on that.41
In the status report which opens the plan, the first observation is that Fiberline is too 
dependent on two large customers, each of them above the limit of 20% of the turnover 
for a single customer stated in the 1993 Strategy and together buying just above 50% of 
Fiberline’s products.42
The plan states that sales should be done through subsidiaries, sales office (in Kolding), 
joint ventures (for example with a distributor), distributors, and agents. Prioritization of 
primary and secondary markets was done geographically; it was noted that the founding 
of the two subsidiaries in England and Germany, as well as an intense focus on the Swiss 
market from the Danish sales team, pointed to these markets being primary.43 Basically 
the strategy stated that, so far, the primary markets were where focus already was. Also 
the three levels of sale mentioned in the 1993 strategy are part of the structure of the sales 
organization as described in the 1995 sales strategy, and an organizational chart is 
included. The chart maps out sales as they had developed before strategy discussions 
began and sort of raises experience up to become strategic. It lists 7 geographic focus 
markets. Each of these is divided in three levels according to the 1993 strategy: Expert, 
Project and retail sale. The chart then has 21 specific areas of sale; in 14 of those the sales 
organization is, it is noted in the chart, expected to undertake direct sale to all industries. 
Above all the sales strategy in the 1995 plan is a textual representation of the sales 
organization and effort as it had developed so far, which as discussed was not done by a 
coordinated plan but rather as a coincidental process.  
Because different sales channels are discussed, the strategy also mention that in the future 
Fiberline will be more critical in choosing agents and distributors. Usually they would 
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make agreements with distributers about exclusive rights to work the market in a 
particular country or region, but now, as stated in the sales strategy, it was time to choose 
distributors and agents with knowledge in specific industries, for example off shore, and 
then have more than one company representing Fiberline in each country.44 This is the 
only part of the 1995 sales strategy that points toward a new line of work in sales.  
Looking at the 1993 strategy, it might appear that the company was ready to start focusing 
its sales effort, and the comments of Stig Krogh Pedersen, Ole Tandrup, and Kai Busch 
also seem to make clear the rational of doing so. Yet, considering the 1995 plan of action 
for sale, it seems that one goal was to become more focused on particular markets, and 
another was to start acting differently. So far the sales effort was as broad and unfocused 
as before, although it had now been put on paper. I do not perceive this as the result of a 
lack of resources. As seen, large investments were made in the same period in production, 
the sales department was expanded with more personnel, and investments were made in 
the two new sales subsidiaries. 
Operational systems and the strategic plans in the late 1990s 
In 1996 the board started a new strategy process—or a brush up as they called it—of the 
1993 strategy. Once again, Ole Tandrup opened the debate with a letter explaining his 
thoughts on the matter. The point of the letter was that more planning was necessary in 
sales and that the sales organization should have manuals for operations for every 
distribution channel (subsidiaries, joint ventures etc.). He didn’t question the sales 
strategy as such but rather suggested a number of administrative systems that he believed 
were necessary to build up a focused sales organization.45 The board seemed to agree, and 
in the 1996 brushed up strategy plan, a long line of operational systems that were to be 
established in order to control sales were described as target points. Apart from this, the 
sales strategy is described as in the 1995 document. The 1993 strategy plan only stated 
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that the market should be divided into primary and secondary markets, but these are not 
defined clearly. In the 1995 sales strategy the primary markets are, as mentioned earlier, 
described as markets in which Fiberline was already active. In the 1996 brushed up 
strategy plan the primary market of Fiberline is now defined as Europe and everything 
else is secondary.46
It seems that Fiberline was still struggling with the idea of focusing its markets. On one 
hand board and management could see and understand the reasons for focusing their 
markets, and they could also see that it would take systems of operations and planning to 
develop the firm in that direction. On the other hand, however, it doesn’t seem that 
anything really changed in their way of working with sales. The effort was still very 
broad, the organization large, and the establishment of systems was so far only an 
intention.  
 In 1997, Poul Rind Christensen became a member of the board of Fiberline. He was a 
professor of management at the University of Southern Denmark and, like Ole Tandrup, 
he had a firm focus on strategy in his work in Fiberline’s board. During 1998 Poul Rind 
Christensen frequently asked for more discussions concerning segmentation of the 
customer base. Leading up to a new strategy process in 1999, he made a 10-page paper for 
discussion of how the customers – not the markets – could be grouped in portfolios and 
how their value to the business of Fiberline could be estimated. Also, Poul Rind 
Christensen suggested, just as Kai Busch had done some years before, that Fiberline 
should consider whether the company wanted to be a producer of special products to a 
small number of industries or if it wanted to pursue a strategy of selling standard products 
in high volumes.47
In 1999 there seemed to be very good reason to think about Fiberline’s situation. On the 
surface things looked good. Turnover was growing fast and every indication showed that 
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it would continue to do so in 2000. The profit margin was also better now than in previous 
years. The problem was that this large growth was mainly due to the largest customer. If 
not for that business, turnover would actually be declining.48 In both England and 
Germany there were many problems of controlling the sales subsidiaries, and none of the 
companies had made any real profits yet. Fiberline was now in the process of closing the 
German company down because of massive problems in working with the two managers 
running the company. 49 The English company closed not long after.50 In a plan for the 
development department from 1999 till 2000, the development manager noted that 
planning the work of the department was difficult, because years of developing new 
profiles meant that many recipes and different reinforcements of almost the same 
properties were in use. Fewer different profiles would make it easier both to plan the 
production and for the development department to keep up with testing and 
documenting.51 In all there were many challenges in running Fiberline at the turn of the 
millennium, and a clear point to be drawn from most of them was that Fiberline would 
benefit from a more structured and focused sales effort.  
The sales department also made a plan for the year 1999-2000. In this plan Fiberline for 
the first time attempted a segmentation of its market, and as such there seems to be 
coherence between the situation of the company at the time and the action taken. In 
segmenting its markets, Fiberline returned to some of the first thoughts and experiences 
about the market formulated in the narrative of sale almost 20 years earlier.  
The 1999 plan of action for the sales department opens with a market analysis. 
Commenting on the analysis and the growing sales to the two largest customers, the 
analysis concludes: “The original goal is still to make us more independent of these two 
important customers by increasing the sale of … profiles for other customers.”52 Also it is 
noted that Fiberline’s six sales consultants spent around half of their time aiding 
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distributors and agents but that in spite of this Fiberline’s own consultants were still more 
effective in their sale than the distributors. It is stated that “This only underscores the 
conclusion that the most effective path to growth is through a very direct presence at the 
market … which in reality means more people that should be based in Kolding.”53
As part of the aims of the 1999/2000 plan, it is stated again, as many times before, that 
Fiberline will work to  
Promote sales in the areas where the sum of positive properties of the 
product is greatest and where the risk of substitution to competing 
materials is smallest. Apart from that to secure that 
 No more than 20% of the sale is for one customer 
 The customer base is spread both geographically and in different 
industries54
And under main targets the plan states: “We are in a situation where the market 
possibilities are by and large endless and the production program is better than ever.”55
In these four passages Fiberline is repeating the first images of the market and the 
potential for the product, which had been part of the company’s self-conception since its 
start-up. The passage concerning the right way to penetrate the market, indicating that it 
takes very direct pressure, was part of the first considerations about sales from the first 
half of the 1980s. As in the 1985 prospectus, the idea of the product’s potential and the 
wide market possibilities are connected to the fear of dependency, a fear that had been 
with Fiberline since it experienced the loss of E Rasmussen Industri’s business in 1983.  
The 1999 plan for the sales departments concludes with a sales strategy which opens with 
the following observation: 
We are working with products that are highly specialized. These are 
used within a specific number of customer groups. This means, that 
we should work according to a focused strategy where specialization 
will give us the opportunity to differentiate ourselves.56
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Considering the narratives that had been in use in the same plan, in the four passages just 
mentioned, to reduce the feeling of uncertainty of dependence on a few large customers, 
this may seem a bit contradictory, as the conception expressed in the old narratives is that 
market potential is almost endless and every industry is a potential customer. This may be 
taken as a sign, as in the strategy plans of the early 1990s, that Fiberline knew and 
understood the rational for focusing its market efforts. However, the company still had 
difficulties reconciling this with their self-conception in which the potential of the product 
was the central issue.  
In 1999, however, focusing market efforts had been a discussed topic for many years in 
Fiberline. It may even be claimed that a counter narrative, explaining the rational of a 
focused strategy, was challenging the meaning established in the older narratives—the 
basic narrative as well as the narrative of sale. So, Fiberline formulated a focused sales 
strategy and drew up a new chart of the sales department. It may at first seem like an 
example of the situation that Carr describes in which the narrative is changed to 
accommodate events. Yet, in formulating three new focus areas in the sales organization, 
Fiberline actually stuck very close to its basic understanding of the product and used it as 
a point of departure. This is basically the same situation as in 1982 when Fiberline 
formulated the very first sales strategy and noted that the point was to supply production 
with the most effective blend of products.  
In the first chapter of the analysis, I used a line of quotes from Henrik Thorning to present 
his vision of the company. In these quotes he talks about the product’s properties (the sum 
of which has been mentioned so many times since). In the 1999 sales strategy, these are 
used to focus markets and define three new focus areas. The three areas are: Insolation, 
Transport & Mechanics and Resistance. How these categories would make it easier for 
Fiberline to focus and structure their sales is not clear, as the three are as broad as the old 
181 
idea of selling either standard or special profiles. But, the three new focus areas were well 
suited to bridging the gap between what I have called the counter narrative of the need to 
focus the sales effort and the basic narrative with its fundamental idea of Fiberline and its 
prosperous product.  
The transition from having a very broad market focus to becoming more narrowly focused 
was slow indeed. Yet looking at the strategy plan following the one from 1999, one 
realizes that even though Fiberline continued to formulate its target areas in broad 
categories according to the properties of the product, they got still more used to thinking 
of the market not as unlimited but as focused. 
In 2004 Fiberline undertook a new and very comprehensive strategy process in the plan 
that followed the 1999 plan. As a part of the new strategy the sales organization was 
sketched. From this it is clear that the three original focus areas defined in 1999 had been 
altered and redefined and a new focus area had been added. Still expressing the same 
sense as earlier, the four target areas were: Strength & lightweight, Thermal insulation, 
Electrical insolation, and Load-bearing constructions.57
During the discussion leading up to the 2004 strategy, each of these focus areas was 
analyzed, discussed, and its potential evaluated, which had never been done in detail 
before. Each of the four focus areas was assigned a sales team; for the strategy process, 
each team had analyzed their focus area and described the industries in which they were 
active. All in all, the 2004 process was much more focused not only on sales and product 
properties but also on target industries and end users, indicating that Fiberline was in the 
process of adapting its image of context to fit the actions deemed necessary to secure a 
profitable business as expressed in the counter narrative mentioned above. That it was still 
a slow progress is, however, clear when considering the conclusion of the strategy 
process. Under the heading of Focus Areas, 21 different areas of use falling in almost as 
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many different industries are mentioned. All of these were included in one of the four 
main focus areas.58 Before formulating the list, comprehensive material evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of each area of use. None however are deemed uninteresting or 
given up in order to focus on more prosperous uses. Therefore, Fiberline would continue 
to focus on selling concrete reinforcement, door steps, structural columns, and beams for 
cooling towers in nuclear power plants, as well as tables for scanners to the medical 
industry and much more. 
Conclusion - Product properties and the development of sales     
The object of this chapter has been to discuss how Fiberline’s market focus developed and 
to consider the role of this development in the company’s growth. I have discussed how 
the market area was diversified and a large and complex sales organization was built up. 
In this I have considered the influence of the company’s self-conception and image of 
context throughout the roughly 10 years from the middle of the 1990s to around 2004.  
Penrose, as discussed, is most elaborate in discussing the firm’s productive opportunities 
in reference to the development of new products. She also notes, however, that in seeking 
new markets the firm is reacting to perceived opportunities in the same way as when it 
develops new products. This is done using the same logic as when new products are 
developed by drawing on the firm’s self-conception and image of context in constructing 
opportunities. In the previous chapter I discussed how Fiberline constructed and acted 
upon productive opportunities. I argued that due to the strong sense of product and 
process expressed in the company’s use of narratives Fiberline primarily saw 
opportunities that would entail a development of their core technology, pultrusion. This 
meant that Fiberline was very reluctant to diversify outside a single production base.  
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As seen in this chapter Fiberline’s self-conception and image of context also had a strong 
influence on the development of their market focus. However, whereas Fiberline was very 
reluctant to diversify production, the company was most eager to diversify its markets.  
Penrose, as noted, states that diversification may be used as a device for coping with a 
generalized uncertainty, and I have argued that this was an important part of the 
explanation for Fiberline’s market behavior over time. The experience of losing the 
business of E Rasmussen Industri in the early 1980s made Fiberline very focused on 
avoiding, if possible, dependence on the business of large customers. This was a clear 
reason for Fiberline’s broad market focus, but as I have argued only one part of the 
explanation for it. The vision of Fiberline, formulated in the basic narrative, draws on 
Henrik Thorning’s perception of the product: he repeatedly stressed the product’s 
potential connecting it to the structure of industrial production and claiming that it could 
and should be sold in most industries. These two issues, the potential of the product and 
the fear of dependency, were two sides of the same coin. Both worked to make a broad 
market focus seem sensible to Fiberline, which meant that Fiberline kept acting in line 
with this rational.  
The development of the sales department, the sales effort, and the strategy described in 
this chapter indicate that—where the market is concerned—Fiberline’s self-conception 
and image of context worked to limit the strategic choices available in trying to formulate 
a sales strategy. I have shown how, over a long period, a counter narrative concerning the 
segmentation of the markets developed. This counter narrative presented a clear rational 
for focusing the company’s market effort. However, Fiberline was slow and rigid in 
reacting to it, because it was in opposition to the self-conception and image of context 
formulated years ago in the stable and strong narratives of the start-up phase. At the turn 
of the millennium, Fiberline began to adapt to the rational of focusing by drawing on the 
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firm’s fundamental self-conception to formulate the proper way of focusing their markets. 
Therefore, the first attempts were done with reference to the properties of the product. In 
this situation as before Fiberline adapted its actions to fit the fundamental self-conception 
of the company. This was also the case in the early 1980s when the narrative of sale was 
constructed. It also drew heavily on the original idea of the product’s potential and 
became somewhat of an appendix to the basic narrative. 
It may be concluded that in the case of developing Fiberline’s market focus, the 
company’s self-conception and image of context were as influential as they were in acting 
on productive opportunities and developing the firm’s technological base. 
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10. Discussion
The focus of my analysis has been Fiberline’s process of growth, and the purpose is to 
discuss the connection between the company’s self-conception and image of context and 
its growth. As discussed in the introduction, this connection in one Penrose points to but 
doesn’t explore further. Her point is that concepts of self-conception and image of context 
form the basis on which firms make decisions and take action. Therefore, these concepts 
are important for understanding the process of growth. In this chapter I will discuss my 
findings and the research literature they may contribute to.  
I will begin by discussing my analysis and the case of Fiberline in reference to the overall 
purpose of the project, along with the theoretical choices I have made. I will then discuss 
how this dissertation contributes to both the literature on firm growth and to business 
history. In the introduction I drew on both fields and sought to place my analysis within 
them. Finally, I will discuss the relevance of my study to the field of entrepreneurship 
studies as well as studies of internationalization. Through my analysis of Fiberline, I have 
drawn on literature from both fields; I believe there is new insight provided for both. After 
the discussion of these issues in this chapter, I will end my dissertation with a short 
concluding chapter mainly rounding up my analysis and its results.        
The case of Fiberline and the theoretical choices I have made 
As just mentioned the object of my dissertation is to discuss the connection between the 
process of firm growth and the firm’s self-conception and image of context. As I 
formulated my research strategy, I argued that self-conception can be compared to the 
concept of meaning construction as presented in the cultural theory of Geertz. Based on a 
discussion of the use of narrative methods in business history, I further argued that firms 
use narratives as tools for constructing meaning. Therefore, a basic assumption of this 
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project is that focusing on the firm’s use of narratives can help render visible the firm’s 
self-conception and image of context.  
Penrose’s discussion of the concepts of self-conception and image of context form a 
mechanism by which firms act. As such these concepts function as the key to explaining 
what Penrose calls the subjectivity of productive opportunities, which makes firms exploit 
their resources in particular ways and grow by certain paths. Yet to Penrose, the concepts 
of self-conception and image of context are inaccessible. They are, she claims, an 
extremely personal aspect of the growth of individual firms because they are dependent 
on the ingenuity and preferences of the firm’s entrepreneur(s).1 Therefore, she doesn’t 
explore these aspects of growth further, neither theoretically nor empirically. I have 
argued, however, that by considering construction of meaning along those lines suggested 
by Geertz, the subjective elements that Penrose points to may be treated not as 
unknowable, personal fads of the entrepreneur, but as shared cultural expressions of the 
firm.  
In my introduction I posed a number of research question that were to guide me as I set 
out to discuss the influence of Fiberline’s self-conception and image of context on the 
company’s growth over the 25 year period of the analysis. Central in these questions were 
the matter of how the company yielded service from their resources, what productive 
opportunities they pursued, how they diversified, and what was their market focus. In 
discussing these questions through the analysis, I have provided a number of examples of 
how the company’s self-conception and image of context influenced Fiberline’s decisions 
and actions and thereby its growth.       
The concept of growth 
The concept of growth has been central in this dissertation, and I have repeatedly 
described growth as a process of development. In the opening of The Theory of the 
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Growth of the Firm, Penrose discusses the concept and notes that in regular discourse it is 
used with two different connotations:  
It sometimes denotes merely increase in amount; for example, when 
one speaks of ‘growth’ in output, exports, sales. At other times, 
however, it is used in its primary meaning implying an increase in size 
or an improvement in quality as a result of a process of development.2
In economic theory, Penrose further argues, only the first of the two connotations is used. 
Traditional economic analysis examines  
… the advantages and disadvantages of being a particular size and 
explains movement from one size to another in terms of the net 
advantage of different sizes. Growth becomes merely an adjustment to 
the size appropriate to given conditions; there is no notion of an 
internal process of development leading to cumulative movements in 
any one direction.3
In this project growth has been treated as a process of development in the sense suggested 
by Penrose. Focus has been on the method and direction of growth in Fiberline. Penrose, 
however, also discuss the firm’s rate of growth. She mainly describes rate of growth as an 
aspect of the firm’s available managerial resources, which at any point in time set a limit 
on the expansion that may be planned and undertaken by the firm.4 Therefore, she is also 
skeptical about attempts to measure growth rate. Penrose does actually offer an entire 
chapter in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm to discussing how growth rate over time 
may be measured. She is, however, so critical to the endeavor, makes so many special 
assumptions and has so many reservations, that it seems clear that this is not the intended 
use of the theory she suggests. One suspects that Penrose mostly takes up the discussion 
because it is a much-debated issue of firm growth in economic theory and therefore 
difficult not to address in the context in which she has formulated her theory.      
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My analysis offers no considerations of Fiberline’s rate of growth and no attempt at 
speculating whether Fiberline could have grown (in Penrose’s first sense of the concept) 
more or less had Henrik Thorning made different decisions or acted differently. That lies 
outside the scope of my analysis, as does any attempt to formulate tools to measure or 
predict the firm’s rate of growth. I have, as noted above, focused on the method and 
direction of Fiberline’s growth.  
The growth of Fiberline 
Over the span of years discussed in my analysis, two overall conclusions may be drawn 
from my analysis of the growth of Fiberline. One is that Fiberline maintained a clear focus 
on its technological base and was quite reluctant to diversify outside. This led them to 
become specialists in a single process or technology. Even before the company’s 
founding, Henrik Thorning had a very clear vision for Fiberline, one closely connected to 
the process of pultrusion. This meant that the core of the company’s self-conception was 
the production process and product. Self-conception was constructed and expressed 
through the company’s basic narrative, which was reinforced by the first experiences of 
the start-up. This product and process focused self-conception influenced the services 
yielded from the resources of the company and led to the accumulation of still new 
resources of production and product development. The basic self-conception of the 
company, as well as Henrik Thorning leadership, meant that as the organization grew the 
research and development department came to enjoy a special position in the company. 
Also, this particular self-conception influenced the productive opportunities perceived by 
the company and made the company more inclined to act on opportunities that would 
enable it to further develop technological abilities. This mechanism is really at the core of 
the argument: over the course of years the mechanism made Fiberline highly specialized, 
as the company stuck to its technological base and didn’t enter into product 
diversification.  
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The second overall conclusion to be drawn from my analysis of Fiberline’s growth is that 
while the company was reluctant to diversify outside its technological base, it was more 
than willing to diversify its market area, maintaining a very broad market focus. The 
reason for this is found in the company’s initial experiences in the early 1980s. Fiberline 
had experienced a situation in which the company was threatened in its survival; it turned 
out to be very difficult for the distributor, Dukadan, to sell the profiles Fiberline produced. 
This left Fiberline in a critical state. The company was slow to react, because the focus of 
the start-up had been mainly on developing the product and the production. On top of this, 
the largest customer of the company withdrew its business, around half of the turnover, 
and moved it to a competitor. In this crisis Fiberline reacted with a new focus on sales, 
developing a new narrative used to make sense of the situation. This narrative explained 
why it was difficult to sell the product, although to Fiberline it continued to be an 
extraordinary product. Within that narrative of sale, an image of a very broad international 
market was formulated. The company based this image on the experiences of failing on 
the Danish market and losing the largest customer but also on the original idea of the 
product as a potential re-newer of industrial production to compete with steel and 
aluminum in every industry. Over the years until the middle of the 1990s, this image of 
context led Fiberline to pursue market opportunities at very broad markets; at the same 
time a large and complex sales organization was established. This was, however, difficult 
to control for Fiberline: the company lacked the resources to control the sales subsidiaries 
it, somewhat by coincidence, had established in the late 1990s in Germany and England. 
Also it became more and more difficult to overview the profitability of production for the 
myriad profiles sold for many different industries. By 1993 the board was already 
discussing these problems, and over the following years they were repeatedly addressed. 
Attempts were made to formulate specific focus areas in sales. These were made, 
however, with reference to the general potential of the product. Since these were 
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conceived by Fiberline as almost endless, the market focus continued to be as broad and 
difficult to control as before. Each strategy discussion from the middle of the 1990s until 
and including the one in 2004 was motivated by the need to decide how sales should be 
focused and organized. But, as the broad market focus was a consequence of the 
company’s image of context, and as the fear of dependency on large customers was deep 
rooted in the company’s experience, it remained a difficult task for Fiberline. Despite this 
fact, the company also knew that a focused market effort and a simpler sales organization 
would benefit its ability to control business and make it more profitable.        
These two developmental paths of Fiberline, the determined focus on a single area of 
specialization and the broad market focus, were both connected to the company’s self-
conception and image of context. Put roughly, it may be concluded that over the first 25 
years of its existence, Fiberline developed to become highly specialized generalists.  
Penrose describes the growth of the company as a path dependent process unique to every 
firm. Therefore, she suggests that firm growth is best studied at company level and 
through historical analysis. Fiberline’s behavior in keeping to a single technological base 
and in continuing to focus on broad markets shows the path-dependencies of their 
development. It seems clear that had the company’s growth been studied only over a 
couple of years, it would have seemed quite different. The effect of self-conception and 
image of context on the firm’s growth would have been difficult to track down.    
Resistance to change and pressure to change 
Looking at the growth of Fiberline and considering the use of narratives over time, it is 
striking that Fiberline was rather rigid in its self-conception and image of context. Over 
the 25 years covered by my analysis, the company never really seemed to have much 
doubt in either. As mentioned earlier, Carr is interested in the construction of narratives, 
and he notes that sometimes the story is changed to accommodate the events and at other 
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times the events are changed, as action is taken to accommodate the story.5 From this 
perspective Fiberline seems, through the 25 years covered in my analysis, mostly to have 
struggled to change events to accommodate its narratives. The company had been rather 
headstrong in acting, or so it would seem. 
That Fiberlien’s self-conception and image of context have been so resistant to change, 
however, does not indicate that the development of other companies would be marked by 
an equal consistency in their use of narratives over time. Nor does it imply that the self-
conception and image of context of Fiberline that I analyzed until 2004 has necessarily 
remained unchanged since or will continue so in future. My analysis is not intended as an 
example of Stinchombe’s concept of organizational imprinting, in which the institutional 
setting of the founding of the company, its earliest experiences and the entrepreneurial 
character of the founder, is imprinted in the company’s DNA as an inescapable past.6
There may be many explanations why Fiberline’s narratives were resistant to change 
throughout the period I have described. Clearly it is connected to Henrik Thorning’s 
leadership. As discussed earlier, throughout the analysis I have frequently used Fiberline 
synonymously with Henrik Thorning. At one point in the chapter concerning the financial 
behavior of the company, I even noted that “Fiberline really is Henrik Thorning.” The last 
10 years of the analysis covers a period in which Fiberline had a well-established 
organization with a group of middle managers who were given individual responsibilities. 
Still, it was Henrik Thorning as owner and managing director who had the final say in all 
major decisions. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that though Fiberline had its 
share of crisis and difficulties, it is still a company that at least since the middle of the 
1990s has grown steadily within parameters like the ones mentioned earlier when 
discussing growth rate: sales, output, profit. It may be argued that there isn’t much reason 
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to suspect either the self-conception or the image of context of Fiberline to have been 
under much pressure to change.  
In the last two chapters of the analysis, I discussed Fiberline’s market position and 
development in terms Penrose uses to describe specialization, diversification, and market 
focus. I pointed to several ways in which the position and development of Fiberline could 
be seen as fragile. Such observations, it should be noted, are not the same as claiming that 
the company’s experience has been one of constant crisis or uncertainty.   
Yet, this situation may have changed in the years after 2004, which I haven’t covered in 
my analysis. The years from 2004 until today have been turbulent, and much has changed 
in and around Fiberline. After 2007 Fiberline, like so many other companies in the period, 
suffered falling demand. The company also experienced growing pressure from its largest 
customer, driving down prices and pushing Fiberline to invest in and start production of 
certain products in China.7 Furthermore, Fiberline moved in 2007. They combined the 
two old production sites into a new, very ambitious and large factory. The timing of these 
events surely might have been more fortunate for the company. In the financial year 
2007/08, Fiberline barely broke even, and over the years that followed they suffered 
heavy losses.8 One could safely say that in that period Fiberline experienced difficulties 
the likes of which they had not seen since the early 1980s.  
In 2007 Fiberline carried out a new strategy process. The main result of that process was a 
reorganization of the sales department and a new sales strategy focused on 4 target 
industries. The catchphrase used throughout the process to describe the change intended 
was “From entrepreneurial inventor to market driven producer,”9 which was a clear 
restatement of Ole Tandrup’s 14 year old formulation from the 1993 strategy quoted in 
the prior chapter. During this process, several market areas were abandoned as Fiberline 
decided to focus on the four industries considered most important and most prosperous to 
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the company. Considering the points I have made throughout my analysis and particularly 
concerning market focus, it seems that Fiberline was acting differently than before; it may 
be that the strategy of 2007 marked both a change in the company’s self-conception and 
image of context. Perhaps some of the frailty Penrose noted to be connected to a position 
like Fiberline’s - highly specialized with a focus on innovation as well as an unfocused 
market strategy – had now become clearer to Fiberline.  
In 2005 Dorthe and Henrik Thorning’s eldest son Peter Thorning began working in 
Fiberline, first as an area sales manager and later as production manager. In 2011 Henrik 
Thorning passed the position as managing director on to Peter Thorning. Ownership of 
Fiberline was gradually given to all of Dorthe and Henrik Thorning’s three children. 
Today, Henrik Thorning still handles a few customers and also takes part in different 
projects in research and development and quality control. 
Over the summer of 2014, I was invited to follow the latest strategy development process 
at Fiberline. It was the first, I believe, that has been carried out under the sole leadership 
of Peter Thorning. The discussions in the leadership group during this process reveal an 
even more determined market focus than in 2007. The aim of the process is to define the 
industries that have the best sales and profit potential and where the potential for creating 
synergy in developing and documenting new products is best. Today this approach is 
based not on a broad idea of potentially serving every industry, but on the pool of 
industries that Fiberline currently serves and has experience working in.10 Surely, much 
seems to be changing in the way Fiberline acts, and the stable and enduring narratives that 
were the center of my analysis may be changing too.
The role of the entrepreneur 
As already noted the stability of the narratives used by the company over the first long 
period of its development seems reasonably connected to Henrik Thorning’s leadership 
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and the connection between him and the company’s self-conception and image of context. 
As discussed the reason why Penrose was reluctant to investigate these concepts further in 
her work was that she considered both to be personal matters in the sense that both self-
conception and image of context were connected to the character of the firm’s 
entrepreneur(s). As also discussed in the introduction, this point was my very argument 
for drawing on the cultural theory of Geertz: he captures how the individual actor makes 
sense of existence by a process based on a continuous interplay between the interpretation 
of a specific situation and the context surrounding it. Geertz establishes both meaning and 
action as shared or social phenomena.11 The social nature of both meaning and action, as 
argued, has very practical analytical consequences; it moves the study of meaning and 
actions away from the mental sphere, which is at best very difficult to access, and into a 
shared sphere, where it can be studied. Geertz makes it clear that meaning creation is not a 
psychological but a cultural process. 
In describing and analyzing Henrik Thorning’s actions, and in seeking to connect these 
actions to the narratives used in the company, I focused specifically on this social process 
of meaning creating. Henrik Thorning didn’t act in a vacuum but always in context, which 
I have sought to capture. My analysis is not an attempt to portray Henrik Thorning’s 
person, nor have I attempted to connect any decisions of his to personal fads. I have made 
no attempts to sketch Henrik Throning’s character but have focused, instead, on his 
actions, their context and the narratives used. I will argue that my analysis does offer a 
suggestion for moving the study of self-conception and image of context away from the 
private, psychological sphere and into a shared social space.      
Granted, Henrik Thorning, without a doubt, played a very important role in my history of 
Fiberline. I have often talked about “Fiberline” making decisions or acting in situations 
where it was not the company as such but Henrik Thorning who actually made the 
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decision or acted. This, I will argue, exemplifies the importance ascribed to the role of the 
entrepreneur in the start-up firm as a constructer of convincing stories, as Hjorth point out. 
This role becomes quite clear in the case of Fiberline and Henrik Thorning. As discussed 
previously, this image of the entrepreneur is anchored in larger shared narratives about the 
entrepreneur and the proper way to act as one.  
Through my analysis I have not only shown how Penrose’s idea of self-conception and 
context has been important for the growth of Fiberline and for the decisions made and not 
made. I have also demonstrated empirically at the micro level that a start-up company 
does not grow according to a predetermined plan or strategy, but in a constant interaction 
with its context; technology, customers, competitors etc. These are results that couldn’t 
have been made by large cross-sectional quantitative analysis of specific variables across 
many companies. My results contribute to furthering our knowledge of start-up companies 
and to our understanding of the contribution of research literature in the fields of 
entrepreneurship, firm growth and internationalization. In the following sections I will 
discuss my contribution to these three literatures in turn. Also I will discuss my study in 
reference to the field of business history which is my home field as it were.      
How does the dissertation contribute to the study of firm growth and path 
dependency? 
The object of my analysis has been to discuss the growth process of Fiberline which I 
have followed over a period of 25 years. In the introduction I discussed the existing 
studies of growth of which three general observations may be done. The first is that 
growth is most often studied over a short span of years – typically 1, 3, or 5 years, which 
at least to me was quite surprising. Secondly, these studies are mostly quantitative and of 
the kind that Penrose describes as typical in economic theory. Growth is treated primarily 
as an increase in size measured by one or the other parameter that allows for 
196
quantification, like assets, turnover, or profit. Thirdly, extensive reviews of the literature 
on growth show that so far it hasn’t been possible to isolate variables that have a 
consistent effect on firm growth across studies. Compared to the overwhelming number of 
studies of this kind, the number of studies treating growth as a process are few. As 
mentioned, Davidsson, Achtenhagen and Naldi note that “… a mere mapping out of the 
phenomenon would constitute worthwhile contributions.”12
It may be argued that my analysis does exactly that. Through the microscopic method I 
have used, my study maps out the process of growth in Fiberline. My analysis offers a 
detailed description of the growth process of a single firm over a long span of years. Seen 
as such it is a contribution to the study of growth, a contribution that offers the beginning 
of an explanation why it has been very difficult to isolate variables with a consistent effect 
on firm growth. My study shows that the Fiberline’s growth was an unplanned process, 
heavily influenced by its context as well as by resources, knowledge, and experience 
unique to the company. 
In the introduction I also discussed the general influence of Penrose’s work. I noted that it 
is mostly used in strategic management with the aim of pinning down what makes a 
resource unique and therefore a source of competitive advantage. My study may 
contribute to a (re)introduction of Penrose’s theory of growth into the field it was 
formulated as a part of, namely growth studies. As discussed, a few others, for example 
Pettus, Connell, and McGovern and McLean, have attempted the same introduction by 
using Penrose’s theory to analyze firm growth as a process.  
In Pettus’s study, he discusses path-dependency and notes that most seem to agree that 
resources are developed in a complex path-dependent process as suggested by Penrose. 
However, so far there is no explanation of the phenomenon. As mentioned Pettus then sets 
out to formulate tools that may help predict growth paths over time, testing his method on 
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a sample of 59 companies. My analysis of Fiberline is also concerned with path-
dependency but at a micro-level. It offers an example of how resources are developed 
through a path-dependent process (something Penrose also did in her Hercules study) and 
connects it to the firm’s self-conception and image of context. The point is to show that 
both are basic elements of the way resources are exploited and by extension the way path 
dependency is created. I agree with Pettus that the concept of path-dependency lacks 
description, precision, and definition. Also I agree that the work of Penrose is a good 
place to start looking for a theoretical discussion of the process and an explanation that 
goes beyond concluding that history matters. But I do not agree with Pettus that tools to 
predict growth patterns and separate them into different stages will help explain the 
process of path-dependency. Penrose was certainly critical of such attempts to measure 
and quantify firm growth.  
I have provided detailed examples of the connection between the exploitation of resources 
and the development of path-dependency in Fiberline, which as I have just argued is in 
itself a contribution to the study of firm growth. Werther or not I also offer an explanation 
of the path-dependency of firms that goes beyond focusing on resources by connecting 
their exploitation to the company’s self-conception and image of context depends on the 
strength of my argument and the example I have provided for the influence of self-
conception and image of context on Fiberline’s growth. I would, however, hope that my 
project may contribute to the study of growth by introducing concepts of self-conception 
and image of context and a new, closer reading of Penrose.      
The concept of path-dependency is also much discussed in organization studies—a field 
which has even been said to experience a historical turn, in which the organization’s past 
is theorized. In a 2004 article Clark and Rowlinson discuss the treatment of history in 
organization studies. The object of the article is to question “whether even as organisation 
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studies has become more historical, the treatment of history could be said to correspond to 
an historical turn.”13 From this skeptical standpoint they review the perception of history 
in organizational economics, organizational sociology, and organizational culture, all 
constituting major discourses of the field.14 A historic turn, they argue, is not just the 
consideration of more historical facts. As every piece of knowledge (historic or other) is 
based on interpretation, a historic turn rather calls for a consideration of the relationship 
between the past and history as well a consideration of the understanding and use of the 
past by the actor (in the present).15 To the business historian who may dream of 
conversing with organizational studies, Clark and Rowlinson note that: “Our review 
should serve as a warning for business historians to be wary of the apparent 
accommodation of history in organisation studies.” Their point is that as the concept of 
history in organization studies is most often that of the totality of past human actions, 
business history risks being reduced to a large box of past reality.16
One way of theorizing the past in organization studies would be the development of the 
concept of path-dependency which entails a consideration of the understanding and use of 
the past by the actor, as Clark and Rowlinson suggest. I would argue that Penrose offers a 
way of theorizing path-dependency that is sensitive to the use of the past by the actor and 
that I provide an example of this in my study. By considering the influence of self-
conception and image of context on the actions of the firm, its exploitation of resources 
and the development of path-dependency, it would be possible to offer a way of working 
with the organization’s past. This would be compatible to the interpretative tradition of 
some parts of organization studies, yet would unfold the concepts of past and history in 
more detail than has so far been the case. As Clark and Rowlinson note, there might be 
business historians out there dreaming of conversing with organization studies. However, 
there are also interesting discussions to be had within business history, and in the 
following I will consider how I might contribute to these.      
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How does the dissertation contribute to the study of business history?  
Penrose’s Hercules study was published in Business History Review in 1960. To 
commemorate the 50 years anniversary of this guest appearance of a “superstar” in a core 
journal of the field of business history, Pitelis wrote an article featured in 2011 in the 
same journal discussing the contribution of Penrose to the field of business history. He 
opens by noting that The Theory of the Growth of the Firm is one of the most cited books 
in the field of business history.17 Yet through the discussion in the article, this statement is 
left without further elaboration or reference; instead, Pitelis points to and discusses many 
other fields in which the work of Penrose has been widely applied. Returning to the matter 
of history, however, Pitelis discusses Penrose’s research methods and points out that they 
are first and foremost historical. He formulates this as the theory-history nexus of 
Penros’s work. Given the purpose of the article and the bold statement in the introduction 
concerning the influence of Penrose in the field of business history, Pitelis then reaches 
the rather surprising conclusion that historical analysis using this nexus has been given 
scant attention.18
This last point might have been a better place of departure, as Pitelis set out to discuss the 
influence of Penrose’s work in the field of business history. To me, at least, it is baffling 
that Penrose, despite the fact that her work deals with the past of firms, both empirically 
and theoretically, is mostly overlooked in the field of business history. My dissertation 
serves as an example of how Penrose might be used for historical studies of firm 
development and as a step toward introducing the historical method suggested by Penrose 
into the field of business history. Further research or discussion might then take up the 
question of why the field of business history has been so indifferent to the work of 
Penrose, although it clearly offers so much to the historical study of firms.     
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Also, the discussion offered by Penrose on the development of path dependency in the 
firm (discussed in the prior section) should be of interest to historians as it maps out that 
process in detail. As argued, the microscopic analysis mapping out the construction of 
path-dependency in Fiberline constitute a contribution to growth studies, and the same 
may be argued in relation to the field of business history.  
In my analysis the construction of path-dependency and the process of growth in general 
have been linked to Fiberline’s self-conception and image of context, introducing 
interpretative theory into the study of firm growth processes. As discussed in the 
introduction, interpretative cultural theory and methods are now being introduced into 
business history. My project contributes to the field as part of this introduction and as a 
demonstration of the possibilities of applying such theory and methods on still new 
questions. As I have mentioned several times now, in her discussion of the company’s 
self-conception and image of context, Penrose notes that these concepts comprise the 
basis on which companies act and makes decisions. The strength of drawing on theory of 
sense making or meaning creation, applying methods like narrative analysis, is that it  
may facilitate the understanding of fundamental mechanisms of action and decision 
within the firm.  
Finally, before leaving the field of business history, it should be added that the Penrosian 
framework offered in this study may also contribute to the historical study of 
entrepreneurship, now much debated in the field of business history. Drawing on a 
discussion of the contribution of Schumpeter, pointing out that his methods were 
historical, Jones and Wadhwani plea for a reintroduction of his work into business history. 
This might, they argue, contribute to the historical study of entrepreneurship. Using the 
work of Schumpeter to study entrepreneurship historically will undoubtedly offer insights 
into many interesting aspects of this phenomenon. Penrose, with her focus on the 
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development of the individual firm and the discussion of entrepreneurial resources and 
their use in the company, offers still other insights as I have demonstrated by my study. 
I the following section I will further discuss the concept of entrepreneurship. As noted, I 
have drawn on several studies of entrepreneurship through my analysis and discussed 
Penrose’s use of the concept in detail. Both entrepreneurship studies as well as the field of 
internationalization are, I will argue, closely connected to processes of growth. It is my 
impression that my study may offer insight to both fields. Therefore, I will first discuss 
entrepreneurship studies in the following before turning finally to the field of 
internationalization. As I haven’t discussed either of these fields earlier, as I had with 
growth studies and business history, I will begin by a short discussion of each of the two 
fields in general.  
How does the dissertation contribute to the study of entrepreneurship?  
Over the last 30 years the field of entrepreneurship has grown considerably—almost 
explosively since the 1990s.19 It is a common assumption in the field that this is due to the 
various effects of globalization, which has resulted in a growing political and general 
interest in entrepreneurship from the 1970s and onwards, boosting academic interest in 
the phenomenon and securing steady funding for research.20 Fundamental to the political 
interest is an assumption that small entrepreneurial companies are of growing importance 
for securing continued (or renewed) economic growth.21 This belief, as well as a search 
for ways to spur more entrepreneurial activity, has fed streams of research drawing on 
economics and behavioral science (especially psychology) respectively.22 But today the 
field is drawing inspiration from many other fields as well. A recent bibliometric analysis 
of published articles on entrepreneurship shows that most contributors to the field use 
theory from other fields and are themselves often visitors from these other fields, e.g. 
management or organizational theory.23
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The enormous growth of the field as well as the many different approaches used to study 
the phenomenon has led to a degree of fragmentation in the field. Shane and 
Venkataraman believed this fragmentation was diminishing the theoretical development 
and academic achievement of the field. They wanted to formulate a definition of 
entrepreneurship studies wide enough to include many different approaches yet precise 
enough to function in attempts to synthesize the field:  
We define the field of entrepreneurship as the scholarly examination of 
how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future 
goods and services are discovered, evaluated, and exploited … 
Consequently, the field involves the study of sources of opportunities; 
the processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of 
opportunities; and the set of individuals who discover, evaluate, and 
exploit them.24
In Shane and Venkataraman‘s definition of the field, two major streams of research are 
echoed. One sets out to discuss and explain the function of entrepreneurship either in the 
market or more generally in society, drawing mostly on either economic theory or 
sociology. The other is preoccupied with understanding how entrepreneurship unfolds,
which is either understood as a result of individual initiative or as a process.  
The first stream of research, aiming at explaining the function of entrepreneurship in 
society and/or the economy, is also the most significant research interest when business 
historians study entrepreneurship. Jones and Wadhwani conclude that “The historical 
study of entrepreneurship has been particularly concerned with understanding the process 
of structural change and development within economies.”25 This field has been heavily 
influenced by Schumpeter, who saw entrepreneurship as the key to economic 
development and stressed the importance of studying it historically (as already 
mentioned).  
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Schumpeter’s theory also inspired sociologically oriented studies in business history, for 
instance seeking to explain differences in economic performance of nations by studying 
the supply and character of entrepreneurs in these.26 Though the focus varies somewhat in 
these studies, the point is much the same, namely to understand the role of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth. More recent research in business history has been 
interested in similar questions concerning the effects of culture and other institutions on 
entrepreneurial performance. These newer studies often draw on historical institutionalism 
and offer interesting insight into the role of entrepreneurship in a broad institutional 
setting.27
The stream of research focusing on how entrepreneurship unfolds also found inspiration 
in Schumpeter and his early writings, which focused on the personal traits and motivation 
of the entrepreneur.28 Earlier, I gave an example of Schumpeter’s description of this 
focus. Such descriptions of the entrepreneurial nature spurred interest, and a number of 
studies mostly applying psychology or social psychology sought to define them and 
explain what motivates the entrepreneur.29 In her review of the entrepreneurship literature, 
Ericson concludes that “… a substantial body of small business research attests to the 
qualities of just one person who scans for opportunities and exploits opportunities that 
others miss.”30
These two classical approaches to entrepreneurship, however, have also been challenged 
by newer studies. Some of these treat entrepreneurship as an organizational process much 
closer to Penrose’s thinking about entrepreneurship and closer to the way I have used and 
discussed the concept in my analysis.         
The entrepreneurial process, new firms and Penrose 
In his seminal 1988 article ““Who is an Entrepreneur?” Is the Wrong Question,” Gartner 
challenged the focus on the character of the entrepreneur by claiming that 
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entrepreneurship is not defined by a single person, but rather by the process of building an 
organization.31  “Entrepreneurship is about organizing,” he also claims.32 This processual 
take on entrepreneurship has since been explored in a number of studies drawing on 
theory from many different fields, e.g. behavioral science, organizational and 
management theory, and recently also anthropology.33 The notion that entrepreneurship is 
a process of organizing fits well with Penrose’s theory of growth; when discussing 
process theory, she emphasizes that innovations should be treated as purposive attempts 
of men to do something—to organize.34
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm is one of the most cited books in the field of 
entrepreneurship.35 However, as in the strategic management literature, Penrose’s work is 
mostly used to define what resources are necessary, in this case for a start-up company, to 
become successful. The processual perspective in Penrose’s work on the other hand is less 
discussed in the field of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, most studies in the field focus on 
the very early start-up phase and do not discuss the firm’s further development as part of 
the entrepreneurial process.36 As discussed earlier, Penrose’s description of the firm’s 
entrepreneurial resources and her point that they are put to service in conceiving of and 
pursuing productive opportunities indicate that the concept of entrepreneurship is central 
to firm action and by extension to the growth of the firm, not only in the start-up phase 
but continuously. This way of thinking about entrepreneurship as a form of firm resource 
is quite different from Schumpeter’s discussions about entrepreneurial character.  
My dissertation is a micro level analysis of the entrepreneurial process analyzed by a 
penrosian framework. In my analysis, especially in the chapter discussing productive 
opportunities, I have given examples of how Fiberline put its entrepreneurial resources to 
service in pursuing productive opportunities, for example when developing the new 
system of structural profiles. The study is an example of how entrepreneurship can be 
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analyzed as a process by offering a new and closer reading of Penrose’s work. This 
reading doesn’t put the nature of the resources of the firm at the center of analysis but 
focuses instead on the conception of productive opportunity and the exploitation of 
resources, both closely linked to the firm’s entrepreneurial resources. This, I would argue, 
is a new perspective on entrepreneurship as a process.  
My analysis also provides an example of how the entrepreneurial process can be 
described using interpretative theory and method. Interpretative approaches to 
entrepreneurship, however, are more developed in the field than Penrosian process 
thinking.    
Narratives in entrepreneurship studies 
Hjort and Steyaert begin their introduction to the 2004 anthology Narrative and 
Discursive Approaches in Entrepreneurship by noting that—though the influence of the 
linguistic turn has been great in organization studies—it has taken some time to reach 
entrepreneurship studies, where it has yet to unfold and still “lacks the breadth and depth” 
these approaches could bring to the study.37 The point of the contributions of the book is 
to demonstrate different ways of working with narrative or discursive approaches in the 
study of entrepreneurship to catalyze the introduction of this line of thought in the field. 
The articles, a couple of which I have discussed in my analysis, consider many different 
aspects of entrepreneurship: for example, entrepreneurial vision, group dynamics, 
entrepreneurial identity, and legitimacy building.38
In defining entrepreneurship, Hjort and Steyaert note that: 
…we prefer to refer to entrepreneurship as forms of social creativity… 
Entrepreneurship is a societal force: it changes our daily practices and 
the way we live; it invents futures in populating histories of the 
present, here and now. In such processes, entrepreneurial processes, 
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the present and the future is organized in stories and conversations, the 
primary form for knowledge used in everyday practices.39
This way of perceiving entrepreneurship clearly draws on the same form of interpretative 
reasoning as the sensemaking perspective suggested by Weick or as Geertz’z cultural 
theory. As noted earlier, a distinctive aspect of Geertz’s concept of meaning creation is 
the social setting in which it is constructed. In the quote above, entrepreneurship is 
described in the same manner as a shared and negotiated process, in which the conception 
of the present and future (sensemaking or meaning creation) is decisive for action. This 
process is clearly connected not only to the start-up of the company but also to the firm’s 
general development.  
The call of Hjort and Steyaert for development in this area of entrepreneurship theory 
inspired Gartner. He notes that, though his seminal 1988 article mentioned above has 
mostly been used to argue for a processual take on entrepreneurship, the primary point of 
his article was to draw attention to the “great diversity of individuals involved in 
entrepreneurial activities, and by implication, the insight that it is unlikely that scholars 
will be able [to] identify a particular entrepreneurial ‘type’.”40 Engaging in more in-depth 
analysis he came to appreciate what he calls the ‘critical mess’ of entrepreneurship. But 
Gartner was frustrated that the field of entrepreneurship didn’t offer methods for 
analyzing this mess and therefore also failed to offer insight into “the 
intention/action/circumstance condition (IACC) in entrepreneurship.”41 This, he notes, is 
the complex setting in which entrepreneurship plays out, but the field in general still 
prefers to define parameters and variables to look for general patterns. Gartner conclude 
that
Generalizable principles – ‘on average’ – are offered in these studies, 
but the nuances of particular entrepreneurial situations, the nuances 
that actually characterize how individuals go about thinking through, 
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over time, the complications of utilizing their capabilities and 
resources as they are both informed by, and seek to change their 
circumstances, is ‘averaged’ away.42
This prosaic nature of entrepreneurship, as Steyart would have it,43 can be captured and 
expressed through narrative approaches as mirrored in the Hjorth and Steyart quote above. 
As already discussed the same methods and approaches have been introduced into 
Business History using similar arguments.  
Since the introduction of narrative theory and approaches into the field of 
entrepreneurship, interest has been growing, and still new aspects of narrativity are 
included in the study. A 2007 special issue of Journal of Business Venturing demonstrates 
this by letting a number of authors discuss the same narrative about the start-up of a toy 
store. Apart from offering examples of how narrative methods can be used in the study of 
entrepreneurship, it also discusses how researchers and teachers in the field use and 
produce their own narratives, a sign I suppose of such theory and practice becoming more 
established in the field.44
The articles in the 2004 anthology on narrative and discursive approaches, the 2007 
special issue of Journal of Business Venturing, as well as the 2010 first issue of ENTER: 
Enterpreneurial Narrative Theory Ethnomethodology and Reflexivity, all picture 
entrepreneurship as a process driven by the meaning creation of the actors and expressed 
in some form of narrative structures.45 I hope that my project may be taken as a 
contribution to this new stream of narrative studies of entrepreneurship. One contribution 
is that my analysis is an empirically example that entrepreneurship is clearly not about 
start-up alone, but is a form of resource – which Hjort and Steyaert call social creativity as 
in the quote above. Also my use of Penrose’s theory-history nexus, to use the concept of 
Pitelis, can be a way of introducing the concept of path-dependency and a concrete way to 
analyze it empirically into entrepreneurship studies. The connection between the past and 
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the present—as captured also in the quote of Hjort and Steyaert—is only now being 
debated in the field of entrepreneurship as part of an older debate of the concept of 
opportunity, which I will discuss in the following section.   
Opportunity and historical reasoning in the process of entrepreneurship 
In the field of entrepreneurship, the notion of opportunity has been discussed from many 
different perspectives. These discussions often focused on the question whether 
“opportunities exist as an objective reality, existing before the entrepreneurial process 
starts and awaiting discovery by an alert individual, or whether they are socially 
constructed.”46 Shane and Venkataraman’s much debated definition of entrepreneurship 
quoted earlier has been important for moving the concept of opportunity to the center of 
attention. They claim that the core of the field is the study of the sources of opportunity, 
which they describe as processes of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation.47 In this 
debate, as a result of the beginning narrative turn of the field discussed in the section 
above, there are recent examples of historical insight being applied in the study 
concerning how opportunities (productive or otherwise) are constructed by the company 
and placed into narratives.        
When critiquing the “discovery view” of opportunity as expressed by Shane and 
Venkataraman, Dimov has argued that it entails a narrative of the entrepreneur as a 
“prescient progenitor following a hidden but linear path.” This narrative makes 
opportunity an “elusive construct,” because it brings to the fore the tension between past 
and present in the concept.48 As Dimow explains, only by looking at an opportunity from 
a point where it has already unfolded can it be described or constructed as a process of 
discovery, recognition, and identification.49 Therefore, Dimov concludes that although the 
concept of opportunity is theoretically interesting it is “empirically elusive;” it exists at 
one point in time, but can only be recognized as an opportunity at a later point.50 Dimov 
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suggests an approach aimed at making sense of how entrepreneurs actually perceive 
opportunity and act; by consequence of the nature of the phenomenon, this approach may 
be done historically.51 This is very close to Penrose’s discussion of productive 
opportunities and self-conception, as well as to her argument for applying historical 
methods.  
Dimov’s critique of the understanding of opportunity in entrepreneurship studies has 
excited interest in business history for two reasons, one being rather pragmatic the other 
theoretical. To an historian, the notion that opportunities (and by that the process of 
entrepreneurship) can best (or only) be studied backwards is of course intriguing. As 
noted by Mason and Harvey, “There is a lack of contemporary datasets that can track the 
real-time thoughts and actions of entrepreneurs whist they are starting a business. 
However, this is not a constraint for historians…”52 Thus, this take on opportunity 
provides business historians with an argument for bringing historical studies to the center 
of entrepreneurship studies.  
On a theoretical level the tension between past and present as coined by Dimov is 
interesting also in a business history setting, because it draws on ideas of construction of 
meaning. Dimow specifically mentions both sensemaking and narrative approaches as 
ways to study the entrepreneurial process. The fact that his ideas have been applied in 
business history marks an incipient interest in reconsidering both the concept of history 
and the role of interpretation in this field. Popp and Holt offer an example of this in their 
article on The Presence of Entrepreneurial Opportunity in which they tell a story of the 
start-up of a merchant house in Calcutta in the seventeenth century. Following Dimov’s 
argument, they focus on how entrepreneurs actually act. They demonstrate the creation of 
powerful constructs about the present in the start-up situation. These are strong enough to 
overcome the radical uncertainty of the situation and spur action; therefore, the 
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opportunity of doing business in Calcutta at that point in time was not discovered but 
constructed by the merchant.53 They conclude:  “What we argue is not simply that 
entrepreneurial processes exist in interplay with historical contexts but that we need to see 
them in relation to the unfolding of time as a making present.”54
In my analysis I used Hjort’s analysis of Iago’s role in Othello to conclude that in 
Fiberline’s start-up Henrik Thorning used the basic narrative of the company, formulating 
the vision for Fiberline, to convince others as well as himself that Fiberline was a good 
idea. I also noted that his prior experience and knowledge were decisive in making his 
argument convincing. The process of making present as described by Popp and Holt 
might also have been used to discuss the start-up of Fiberline and how Henrik Thorning 
came to see an opportunity in pultrusion in a particular context and time. In such a 
discussion, the influence of Henrik Thorning’s prior knowledge and experience may have 
been drawn in to explain how Henrik Thorning created a construct about the present, 
making him able to overcome the uncertainty of the start-up situation.  
Certainly the field of entrepreneurship has offered me many ways of thinking about this 
concept, as well as the concept of opportunity that have inspired me in my study of 
Fiberline. Reading my analysis in this context, it could be seen as a contribution to a new 
stream of research on entrepreneurship drawing on interpretative theory. Mine is, as far as 
I know, amongst the first to describe the construction and exploitation of opportunities in 
a firm over a long period showing at a micro level how the firm develops habits of 
conceiving particular forms of opportunities.       
How does the dissertation contribute to the study of internationalization? 
In this final part of my discussion I will turn to studies of internationalization. In my 
analysis I have drawn on several studies of internationalization. In general, it may be said 
that if considered to be a process many points may be made about internationalization, 
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which may also be done in a study on growth drawing on insight from this field. As with 
the field of entrepreneurship, I will begin by discussing the internationalization literature 
in a few more general terms, which I haven’t done so earlier. Following this my main 
discussion will be of the so called Uppsala model of internationalization and its 
development over more than 3 decades. I see the relevance of my study in connection to 
this model.   
In her review of the internationalization literature, McGaughey notes that sometimes the 
literature distinguishes between an economic- and a process-view on internationalization. 
However, as some work drawing on economic theory actually applies a process 
perspective, she prefers to distinguish between economic and behavioral streams of 
literature.55 I will discuss the literature drawing on economic theory very shortly before 
turning to process studies originally inspired by behavioral theory, specifically in the 
Uppsala model. Following this section, I will discuss newer streams of literature focusing 
on the rapid internationalization of young companies labeled born global firms or 
international new ventures and often described by the concept of international 
entrepreneurship. I will discuss this stream of literature because it often entails a critique 
of the Uppsala model and as such should be considered.   
Why do firms engage in international interaction? 
Generally the literature on internationalization applying economic theory has focused on 
explaining foreign direct investments (FDI) rather than other forms of international 
interaction, such as exporting or licensing.56 Buckley and Casson, for example, proposed 
to explain FDI as a way of reducing transaction cost by internalization, whereas Dunning 
proposed an eclectic theory drawing on the earlier work of Hymer as well as Buckley and 
Casson. Dunning referred the decision to engage in FDI to ownership- or location-specific 
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advantages and internalization.57 Naldi, in her extensive review, labeled these theories 
drawing on economic reasoning “The ‘why’ literature of internationalization.”58
In 1997, Madhok introduced dynamic capabilities (the firm’s ability to leverage 
knowledge and experience) as a rational for considering internalization and argued that 
such capabilities are as important as minimizing transaction costs. Even more so, he 
argued, because opportunities to develop the firm’s dynamic capabilities through 
internalization not only facilitate competitive advantage at a specific point in time, but 
also in future.59 Both the resource-based view and the dynamic capability perspectives 
have been influential in the internationalization literature; however, as in Madhok’s 
perspective, focus has often been on positioning the firm in the market by using resources 
or capabilities to create (sustained) competitive advantage.60 Therefore, Naldi includes 
these studies in the “Why” literature on internationalization, although the theoretical 
framework behind both perspectives has also been used to engage in studies of 
internationalization as a process. Earlier, I discussed how the field of strategic 
management has drawn on Penrose to develop the resource-based view of the firm (and 
later the dynamic capability perspective). Focus has been on facilitating competitive 
advantage and the possibilities for positioning the firm in the market. The resource-based 
view, as well as dynamic capabilities perspectives, has been used in much the same way 
in the internationalization literature.
The Uppsala model and the process of internationalization  
McGaughey defines firm internationalization as “increasing involvement in international 
operations over time.”61 From this perspective internationalization is essentially a process 
and should be studied as such. Naldi labels processual studies of internationalization the 
“how” literature consisting of three different models: the Uppsala model, the network 
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model, and the innovation model.62 I will only discuss the Uppsala process as I find it 
most relevant for my study.     
Johanson and Vahlne were decisive in introducing studies of the internationalization 
process based on behavioral theory and drawing on Cyert and March. Johanson and 
Vahlne focus on the firm as the unit of analysis, emphasizing the decision-making process 
and applying a bounded rationality perspective.63 In their 1977 article, Johanson and 
Vahlne described internationalization as an incremental process:  
We do not believe that [internationalization] is the result of a strategy 
for optimum allocation of resources to different countries where 
alternative ways of exploiting foreign markets are compared and 
evaluated. We see it rather as the consequence of a process of 
incremental adjustments to changing conditions of the firm and its 
environment.64
This incremental process, Johanson and Vahlne argue, is fuelled by a dynamic 
interrelation between learning and the decisions of the company. The firm develops by 
learning from the experience of operating in foreign markets. This newly gained 
knowledge might spur so-called commitment decisions made to strengthen the company’s 
position on the foreign markets, which then leads to new knowledge. This accumulative 
process, Johanson and Vahlne conclude, results in a pendulum motion between stability 
and change. By extension, the internationalization process will typically fall in stages.65
This argument has continued to be at the core of the Uppsala model of internationalization 
through many revisions and extensions by both Johanson and Vahlne, as well as a number 
of other internationalization scholars over the last 35 years.66
Often, however, the Uppsala model of internationalization is pictured as a rather rigid 
stage model (a point for which it is often criticized). This is because Johanson and Vahlne 
in their seminal article draw inspiration from an earlier study by Johanson and 
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Wiedersheim-Paul. This study identifies four stages of the internationalizations process, 
based on a study of four Swedish exporting companies: Stage 1 with no regular export 
activities, stage 2 with export via independent representatives (distributors or agents), 
stage 3 with establishment of international subsidiaries, and stage 4 with international
production units being established.67 Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul name these stages 
the establishment chain and note that the companies in the study start exporting once they 
have secured a solid domestic market. It is also concluded that internationalization is often 
a slow process that follows the same pattern, one new international market (country) at a 
time, and frequently starting in markets that are close to the domestic market.68 Yet the 
specific stages described by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul are not elaborated by 
Johanson and Vahlne in the 1977 article. Their point was rather to theorize the cumulative 
process of gathering and exploiting experiential knowledge as the driver of the 
internationalization process. Though Johanson and Vahlne speculate that this process falls 
in phases of stability or change, no predetermined stages are part of their framework. 
Their main point is that the development is incremental. The same point is raised by 
Madsen and Servais, who in a discussion of the field note that though the born global 
literature often claims to disprove the stage model of Johanson and Vahlne, “A 
falsification of the surface manifestations is, however not necessarily the same thing as a 
falsification of the reasoning behind the traditional models.”69           
Johanson and Vahlne draw on Penrose in defining knowledge and conclude that 
especially experiential knowledge is important because it is difficult to come by and 
impossible to duplicate. This is the same argument used in the strategic management 
literature to formulate the sources of competitive advantage in the firm, but Johanson and 
Vahlne further conclude that  
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An important aspect of experiential knowledge is that it provides the 
framework for perceiving and formulating opportunities. On the basis 
of objective market knowledge it is possible to formulate only 
theoretical opportunities; experiential knowledge makes it possible to 
perceive “concrete” opportunities – to have a “feeling” about how they 
fit into the present and future activities.70
Though perhaps not very elegantly stated, this expresses some of the subjective sense of a 
productive opportunity described by Penrose. I would argue that Johanson and Vahlne’s 
description of how experiential knowledge is used in the development of the firm might 
just as well have been described as an example of entrepreneurial resources being put into 
service following Penrose’s line of thought. As discussed, Penrose’s aim is to formulate a 
general theory of growth. That is to say, the mechanisms described are assumed to govern 
the growth of any company at any point in time and in any context.71 In line with this 
Penrose notes:  
There are differences between national and international firms but the 
differences are not to require a theoretical distinction between the two 
types of organizations, only a recognition that national boundaries 
make an empirical difference to their opportunities and costs.72
The study of internationalization in a Penrosian sense is an investigation of such empirical 
differences and the effect these might have for the productive opportunities the firm 
recognizes.  
Johanson and Vahlne have continued to discuss their original 1977 model of 
internationalization drawing on new contributions to the field. In a 2010 article 
coauthored with Schweizer, they describe internationalization as an entrepreneurial 
process, reaffirming and clarifying their original argument that internationalization is 
driven by experience and learning in the firm as is development and growth in general.73
In this way they have moved still closer to Penrose’s argument that the difference between 
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internationalization and general development is circumstantial—that is a matter of 
context, or the context the firm perceives. 
The object of the Schweizer, Johanson and Vahlne article is to explain how the 
internationalization process unfolds at a micro level—how decisions are made on the 
basis of internal and external knowledge and experience in what they describe as an 
entrepreneurial process. In this endeavor, they draw on two specific concepts in the 
entrepreneurship literature: opportunity and effectuation.74 I have already discussed the 
concept of opportunity and argued that, in the context of my study, it should be perceived 
as a construct in line with Penrose’s description of entrepreneurial resources and 
productive opportunity. I have also discussed the first internationalization of Fiberline 
using the concept of effectuation and drawing on Schweizer, Johanson and Vahlne.   
The point of effectuation is that in situations of uncertainty the entrepreneur will make 
decisions based not on rational calculation but on what knowledge he has, using the 
resources available in the situation and with no clear goal besides handling the situation.75
Andersson, who has also discussed effectuation in working with international 
entrepreneurship, notes that  
Sarasvathy refers to Weick (1979) who argues that the environment 
does not directly affect an organization. Decision-makers interpret the 
organizations’ environments and due to earlier experience have 
developed different cognitive schemas and come up with different 
interpretations and decisions.76
It is through the same understanding of effectuation that Schweizer, Vahlne and Johanson 
have moved closer to the subjective points made by Penrose. As such, the framework 
offered by the newer and elaborated Uppsala model of internationalization is informed by 
interpretative ideas compatible with the theoretical concepts informing my analysis.  
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The concept of the establishment chain and the stage model of internationalization that 
Johanson and Vahlne draw inspiration from in their original article have been questioned 
by newer studies. The Uppsala model is often discarded entirely on that basis. However, I 
would argue that the general point—that firm internationalization happens through an 
incremental process of exploiting knowledge and experience—still has validity. The 
stages and speed of the process in the firm is (to paraphrase Penrose) a matter of empirical 
difference in their opportunities and costs. The concept of effectuation lends explanatory 
power to the Uppsala model at a micro level. I agree with Schweizer, Vahlne and 
Johanson who, when drawing on this concept, conclude that 
… entrepreneurs attempt to exercise control over what can be done 
with available resources … rather than decide what ought to be done 
given a set of preconditions about what happens next… Such a view of 
rationality corresponds better with the often unintentional 
internationalization of a company as the result of managerial or 
entrepreneurial efforts … we claim that the contexts in which 
entrepreneurs, managers, or other decision makers operate are better 
described as situations where there is no predictability, possibility of 
setting goals, or independent environment.77
My study exemplifies the internationalization process as described here by Schweizer, 
Vahlne and Johanson, and in this it will constitute a contribution to the field of 
internationalization. The analysis of Fiberline shows that the internationalization of this 
company did not follow any specific plan; it was a more or less chaotic development in 
which the company drew on the experience it got along the way and used the resources it 
possessed. Fiberline’s internationalization then seems to be mostly a result of effectuation. 
Furthermore, the analysis of Fiberline stretches over a long span of years and shows that 
effectuation logics is not just a start-up phenomenon. In the case of Fiberline effectuation 
is a lasting method of internationalization stretching beyond the difficult start-up period of 
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extremely limited resources. This is a new insight into the process of internationalization 
to be taken from my study. 
Born Globals, International New Ventures, and International Entrepreneurship 
As mentioned the study of born global firms, international new ventures, or international 
entrepreneurship is critical to the Uppsala model of internationalization. Therefore, I will 
briefly consider these streams of literature before ending this chapter with a discussion of 
studies of internationalization in the field of business history.  
From around the middle of the 1990s, a new focus on small, young, and international 
companies became prevalent in the study of firm internationalization. The basic 
assumption behind this is that the globalization of our days makes for fundamentally 
different patterns of firm internationalization calling for new theory on the field. This 
theorization has been done using different concepts. Yet, I will argue that first the study of 
born global firms, the focus on international new ventures, and now the interest in 
international entrepreneurship are all basically part of the same stream of literature in 
internationalization studies, and I will discuss them as such.  
In their comprehensive review of the field, Jones, et. al., show it to have a 
phenomenological focus; researchers in the young field have mostly been interested in 
describing the object of their interest.78 Oviatt and McDougall’s 1994 article, one of the 
most quoted in the field, is a good example of this, as the object of the article is to map 
out the phenomenon and seek to define it.79 They named the young and rapidly 
internationalizing companies International New Ventures and defined them as follows:  
We define an international new venture as a business organization 
that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage 
from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries. 
The distinguishing feature of these start-ups is that their origins are 
international, as demonstrated by observable and significant 
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commitments of resources (e.g., material, people, financing, time) in 
more than one nation.80
A point often made in the literature is that the internationalization of young, small 
companies is done by use of limited resources. Cavusgill & Knight describes this as a 
distinctive feature of Born Global firms; it is a point often drawn upon to show that the 
focus of classical internationalization theory on large companies no longer is enough to 
explain the internationalization of firms. Also, the nature of company resources is 
significant in Oviatt and McDougal’s framework. Their conclusion is that international 
new ventures often have the advantage of unique resources (often in form of knowledge) 
that can give a competitive advantage at international markets. This idea has led to much 
research on the resources of Born Global companies. However, focus in these studies has 
mostly been on competitive advantages and the market positioning of the firms—and less 
on the process of putting resources to service.81
More recently scholars have found inspiration for studying internationalization of small, 
new companies in the entrepreneurship literature, now seen as a field in its own right: 
international entrepreneurship. So far this has mostly led to studies concerning the 
significance of the entrepreneur for the performance of these companies. For example, 
focus has been on the entrepreneur’s prior knowledge and experience, a perspective that 
has been coupled with the strong resource focus of earlier studies of international new 
ventures.82 Yet, it holds for these newer studies of international entrepreneurship, as well 
as for the earlier on international new ventures, that the process of internationalization as 
it unfolds in the company has not been given much attention.  
McGaughey, however, offers an interesting example in her study of a cluster of small 
international New Zealand based companies. The study is process oriented, her 
perspective focused on how the experience of the internationalization of companies is 
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narrated by actors within those companies. The study draws on interpretative theory, 
which is now finding is way to the study of internationalization.83 An early example of 
this is Rasmussen, Madsen & Evangilista’s study of Danish and Australian born global 
firms, which seeks to explain the foundation of their case companies by looking at the 
sensemaking of the founder and his use of networks. It offers interesting conclusions 
about the founder of the companies, showing that they are less coordinated than is usually 
assumed.84
An interesting aspect of McGaughey’s study is that it is longitudinal in the sense that she 
asked her informants to tell about their experience of internationalization in the past and 
in the present at the beginning of her study. She then returned and recorded new narratives 
later and used all three set of narratives to map out the process on internationalization in 
the case companies.85 Therefore, she answers a call in the field of international 
entrepreneurship for longitudinal and in-depth studies focused on process. The call is 
often repeated, but so far not many studies have been made.86
Jones and Coviello note that there is “… a dearth of literature capturing the time-based 
dynamics of various behaviours and processes pertinent to entrepreneurial 
internationalization.”87 Their aim is to formulate a general theory of entrepreneurial 
internationalization that takes both behavior and time into consideration. As they further 
note: “Time is … fundamental to internationalisation research in that each firm has a 
history composed of internationalization events occurring at specific points in time.”88
Jones and Coviello formulate and discuss variables that may be applied for quantitative 
research on firm internationalization. Although they consider different constructs of time, 
they primarily consider it a matter of sequence, more of a methodological concern than a 
theoretical construct.   
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Generally, the born global and new international venture literature focues on other issues 
than in-depth, interpretative studies of the process of internationalization (over time). The 
literature on international entrepreneurship has mainly been interested in the performance 
and positioning of young, small, and international firms. Focus has been on the influence 
of the entrepreneur, the exploitation of resources, and the role of networks.89 However, 
studies like McGaughey’s  or Schwitzer, Vahlne and Johanson’s offer evidence  of other 
perspectives being introduced into the field, which might open it to new processual and 
interpretative takes on (early or small firm) internationalization.90
I have already discussed the work of Schweizer, Vahlne and Johanson and the Uppsala 
model in general. I have argued why I see this body of work as relevant to the study of the 
internationalization process as it describes a basic mechanism driving the development. 
Though both the born global and the international new venture literature offer many 
discussions of the Uppsala model, this issue has been left largely unaddressed in the 
critique.91 The context of starting up and doing international business today is obviously 
very different from earlier, say in the 70s when Johanson and Vahlne made their first 
contribution to the field. But I do not agree with the basic assumption of the born global 
and international new venture literature that this change in circumstance in and of itself 
calls for new theory on the process of internationalization. My study of Fiberline, 
describing its process of internationalization in detail exemplifies the influence of the 
basic mechanism of internationalization as described by Schweizer, Vahlne and Johanson. 
It shows the importance of the entrepreneur’s perception of self and context leading to the 
use of effectuation logic in internationalization decisions. As such my dissertation 
contributes to the study of internationalization by questioning the theoretical distinction 
between basically different forms of internationalization upheld in the born global and 
international new ventures literature. To paraphrase Penorse the difference in 
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internationalization paths (between fast and slow development for example) is empirical 
and a matter of context.         
Business History and Internationalization  
As a final topic in this chapter, I will shortly consider the concept of internationalization 
in business history. Jeremy and Tweedale, in their review article, note that international 
business history particularly gained traction in the 1980s, when Mira Wilkins and 
Geoffrey Jones, for example, introduced new perspectives to the study. Jeremy and 
Tweedale conclude that  
The new champions of business history were less likely to be 
interested in company history narrowly defined, but took their cue 
from models created by Chandler, with the emphasis very much on the 
evolution of business structures, managers, and entrepreneurship … 
Some were influenced by Douglass North; others found congenial 
Michael Porter's analysis of competitive advantage and clustering.92
The quote highlights a preference in business history of studying internationalization 
mostly at the industry level, with a focus on why firms internationalize and with less focus 
on the process as such. Jones and Khanna also demonstrate this focus in their 2006 
proposal to reintroduce business history into international business studies. They draw up 
four suggestions for how business history could facilitate the development of 
internationalization theory. Their first point is that history holds a reservoir of empirical 
material that is well suited to doing time-series studies and that may also aid economic 
theory in this effort. As a second point they note that historical studies may facilitate a 
comparison of the development of different organizational types over time. Thirdly, they 
suggest that through historical studies the concept of path-dependency may be unfolded 
and that by drawing on Penrose’s concept of resources, the reasons for international 
market entrance and causal links between this and performance might be elaborated. 
Fourthly, they suggest that the study of FDI may benefit from analysis covering longer 
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than usual periods.93 None of the four suggestions invites the researcher to elaborate how 
internationalization unfolds in the company.  
There are of course many examples of studies focusing on one company in business 
history – it might even be called a classical genre of the field – and many of these describe 
international or multinational companies. However, examples from business history of 
focusing particularly on internationalization as a development process are rare. The work 
of Wilkins stands out. She notes that internationalization is “… a process developing over 
time out of the requirements of the innovative business enterprise.”94 Wilkins draws 
inspiration from Penrose to theorize the strategic options of the multinational company 
based on its available resources. Through a study of the development of large American 
multinationals, she then formulates a three-stage development model of the 
internationalization process and analyzes the extent to which the model can predict 
internationalization dynamics in various sectors. Buckley notes that Wilkins anticipates 
the (early) Uppsala model.95
I have just argued that I find the Uppsala model of internationalization relevant to the 
study of firm internationalization over time and noted that the strength of the model is that 
it points to a fundamental mechanism of the growth of the firm. Therefore, and because 
the Uppsala model holds potential to describe the path-dependency that might also be part 
of internationalization processes, I would argue that the field of business history shouldn’t 
settle with Wilkins hinting at or anticipating the Uppsala model. Rather, it should be used 
directly in historical studies of internationalization, where it can offer new perspectives on 
the internationalization process of the firm through an in-depth focus of how that process 
unfolds. I have already argued that my study of Fiberline with its in-depth focus illustrates 
the chaos of such unfolding processes. As such, it may contribute to an introduction of 
this line of thought and of Schweizer, Johanson and Vahlne’s revisited Uppsala model 
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into the field of business history. In this way, it might be particularly useful in the new 
interpretative and narrative studies that are now becoming part of the field.         
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11. Conclusion
The object of my dissertation has been to discuss the role of self-conception and image of 
the context in the growth of Fiberline over 25 years, from the company’s founding till 
around 2004. In her theory of the growth of the firm, Penrose suggests these two concepts 
as decisive for the growth process, because they determine the company’s actions. I have 
argued that I view self-conception basically as meaning creation and narratives as tools 
for constructing meaning. Therefore, focusing on the firm’s use of narratives can help 
explain the change and growth of firms, because this usage lays bare the grounds on 
which organizations act and make decisions. Penrose describes how the firm’s self-
conception and image of context influence the productive opportunities that the firm 
perceives and acts upon and its exploitation of resources, as well as its decisions and 
actions in diversifying and specializing. Therefore, I raised a number of research question 
focusing specifically on these aspects of Fiberline’s growth as I sought  to capture the 
influence of self-conception and image of context by analyzing the company’s use of 
narratives. The research questions were as follows:   
What narratives does Fiberline use and what self-conception and image of context is 
constructed by their use? How do they influence the company’s decisions? How can the 
company’s use of narratives be said to have influenced its growth? This last question was 
split into three more specific sub-questions: How did Fiberline’s use of narratives 
influence what services were yielded from the company’s resources? How did it influence 
the productive opportunities that were pursued? And how did Fiberline’s use of narratives 
influence the company’s choices concerning diversification and market focus? 
In the first chapter of the analysis, I discussed how a basic narrative of Fiberline was 
constructed. When Henrik Thorning founded Fiberline in 1979, he had a clear idea about 
226
the company he wanted to create and by what means it would become a success. He 
formulated these ideas in a basic narrative of the company from its very start-up. Henrik 
Thorning used this basic narrative to formulate the self-conception of Fiberline as well as 
an image of its environment. Fiberline’s basic narrative centered on the product, the 
production process, and the potential of the reinforced plastic material. This basic 
narrative also established Henrik Thorning as the founder of the company and promoted 
the notion of his motivations as driven by an explorative spirit rather than profit. In 
formulating the basic narrative, Henrik Thorning drew meaning from larger, shared 
narratives, for example about the character of the entrepreneur. This was a matter of 
establishing the company as proper and moral to the surrounding world but also in the 
company’s conception of itself.      
Penrose notes that in the prospective firm the relevant product-markets and the particular 
productive activities chosen are guided by the “inherited” resources available for service 
in the start-up. Henrik Thorning’s prior knowledge and experience became part of the 
prospective firm’s inherited resources. Whatever available services Fiberline had in its 
start-up had to be drawn from these. Therefore, Henrik Throning’s prior knowledge and 
experience were discussed in the second chapter of the analysis, because they constitute 
an important part of the context in which the basic narrative was constructed. Henrik 
Thorning’s knowledge of the plastic industry, for example, was useful in constructing the 
basic narrative, because it made the idea of Fiberline and the risk of starting up seem 
sensible.  
In the third chapter of the analysis, I discussed how Fiberline’s use of narratives 
influenced the services that were yielded from the company’s resources during its start-up 
phase. Henrik Thorning’s knowledge and experience were important in this development, 
but his entrepreneurial resources built up through his former work were also put to 
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service. The task of developing the production to a level where it could run steadily and 
efficiently was difficult and demanded much in the way of thinking in new combinations 
and ideas. Through a difficult process of trial and error in starting up production, Fiberline 
eventually became skilled at producing profiles; thus, the company gained new available 
resources that could be put to service in developing the production further. In this way 
Fiberline started accumulating new available resources through the process described by 
Penrose. In dealing with the challenges of starting-up production, Fiberline strengthened 
the basic narrative and the conception that they could make pultrusion work and that both 
the product and production process were something special. This was, for example, clear 
from Jens Johansen’s history about the feeling of conquest as production started working, 
or from the celebration of the first company birthday.     
In the fourth chapter of the analysis, I returned to the first of the research questions 
concerning the narratives Fiberline use and the self-conception and image of context that 
was constructed by their use. The object of the chapter was to discuss how Fiberline 
started focusing on sales to counter a difficult situation in which its existence was 
threatened when sales didn’t pick up in the hands of the distributor, Dukadan. In this 
situation a new narrative of how the profiles should be sold was constructed. The function 
of the narrative was to enable Fiberline to account for the company’s reaction and 
changing focus in this difficult situation. The new narrative of sale was centered on three 
elements of selling the profiles: the technological superiority of Fiberline’s products, the 
need for constant attention to and guidance of customers, and a focus on international 
markets. Each element of the new narrative was connected to the basic narrative, which 
meant that the meaning created by the new narrative didn’t disrupt the company’s original 
conception of self—although it allowed for the focus to change from production and 
development to sale when this was needed to survive through the crisis of the first years.  
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In the fifth chapter of the analysis, I discussed Fiberline’s financing behavior through the 
first half of the 1980s, when the company experienced many difficulties securing capital: 
seeking to exploit what resources they already had to the fullest and balancing the risk in 
supplying external capital. This is connected to the broad research question of how the 
company’s use of narratives can be said to have influenced its growth. I have argued that 
the basic narrative of Fiberline was decisive for the firm’s financial behavior. Henrik 
Thorning proved willing to run considerable risk yet at the same time didn’t seem much 
burdened by uncertainty. Both these elements of Fiberline’s financial behavior may be 
explained by the self-conception of the firm established in the basic narrative. An 
important element in this was the conception that Henrik Thorning was the owner and 
leader of the company; the risk taken in borrowing from banks through the first years was 
based on this concept. This behavior, however, was also based on the conception 
expressed in the basic narrative about the product’s potential. Fiberline rejected offers 
from interested investors and as such turned down opportunities of developing production 
and product further, even though the technological superiority of both was an important 
part of the company’s self-conception. In this sense the narratives used by Fiberline may 
be said to have influenced the growth of the company. In a related point, Fiberline’s 
attitude toward investors also reveals that, ultimately, Henrik Thorning’s ownership and 
control of the company were more important than its immediate development.  
In the sixth chapter of the analysis I discussed a number of different productive 
opportunities that Fiberline conceived of and acted upon in the years from the mid-1980s 
to the late-1990s. My point in the discussion was to show how the narratives in use, 
formulating the company’s sense of self and context, had a decisive influence in this 
process. The narratives sometimes worked to constrain and at other times to generate 
action, thereby influencing the company’s diversification and growth. Of the productive 
opportunities discussed, those Fiberline seemed most keen to act upon were those that 
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would enable them to develop their technological base. This was so because Fiberline’s 
technological base, the process of pultrusion, was the essential idea behind the 
company—and key to the company’s self-conception. Therefore, Fiberline specialized in 
a very narrow range of basic areas of production and kept to a narrow range of products.  
In the seventh and final chapter of the analysis, I discussed how Fiberline’s use of 
narratives influenced the company’s choices concerning market focus. While Fiberline 
was reluctant to diversify outside its technological base, the company was willing to 
diversify its market area, maintaining a very broad market focus. In this endeavor, the 
company drew on the image of context expressed in the narrative of sale. Within that 
narrative of sale, an image of a very broad international market had been formulated, 
based on the experiences of failing in the Danish market and of losing the largest 
customer (as discussed in the fourth chapter of the analysis). However, the broad market 
focus was also based on the original idea of the product as a potential re-newer of 
industrial production that could compete with steel and aluminum in every industry. Over 
the years until the middle of the 1990s, this image of context led Fiberline to pursue 
market opportunities at very broad markets; at the same time a large and complex sales 
organization was also established. This, however, was difficult to control for Fiberline. 
However, as the broad market focus was a consequence of the company’s image of 
context, and as the fear of dependency on large customers was deep rooted in the 
company’s experience, it remained a difficult task for Fiberline to focus. Still, the 
company knew that a focused market effort and a simpler sales organization would 
benefit its ability to control business and make it more profitable.        
Penrose describes the growth of the company as a path dependence process unique to 
every firm. Therefore, she suggests that firm growth is best studied at company level and 
through historical analysis. Fiberline’s behavior in keeping to a single technological base 
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and in continuing to focus on broad markets illustrates the path-dependencies of the 
company’s development. These two growth paths of Fiberline, the determined focus on a 
single area of specialization and the broad market focus, were both connected to the 
company’s self-conception and image of context. Stated broadly, it may be concluded that 
over the first 25 years of its existence Fiberline grew to become highly specialized 
generalists.  
In my introduction I discussed the subjective elements of The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm and quoted Penrose for concluding that 
… a theory purporting to explain the process of growth of firms can be 
useful on two levels. It can be useful even if it only presents a logical 
model yielding conclusions which seem to correspond to actual events 
that can be ‘observed’ in the growth of actual firms. But it will be even 
better if it helps us to understand the actions behind these events. For 
this, if we assume that firms act for a purpose, we must find an 
acceptable assumption as to why they act.1
The point of Penrose’s discussion of the concepts of self-conception and image of context 
is that they form a mechanism by which firms act. As such, these concepts are the key to 
explaining what Penrose calls the subjectivity of productive opportunities, which makes 
firms exploit their resources in particular ways and grow by certain paths. Yet, to Penrose 
the concepts of self-conception and image of context are inaccessible because they are, 
she claims, an extremely personal aspect of the growth of the individual firm. I have 
argued, however, that by considering construction of meaning along the lines suggested 
by Geertz, the subjective elements that Penrose points to, self-conception and image of 
context, may be treated and studied not as unknowable, personal fads of the entrepreneur, 
but as shared cultural expressions of the firm. What my study offers is a new and closer 
reading of Penrose’s theory of firm growth confronting the subjective elements she 
pointed to but didn’t pursue further.  
Appendix 1 page 231-236 has been excluded from the published thesis. 
This is per agreement with Fiberline Composites to protect sensitive data.  
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Appendix 2: Composites and profiles  
Here I will shortly describe what composites are and what a profile is. Also I will explain 
for what purposes a profile in reinforced plastic like those Fiberline produce can be used 
and I will tell more about the materials used by Fiberline in production; fibers, matrix and 
fillers. The text in this appendix is drawing solely on information given by Fiberline 
mostly on their webpage.1     
Reinforced plastic is a composite material. Composites consist of two or more different 
materials, neither of which are well suited for construction purposes on their own, but 
which in combination result in a strong and rigid material. Composites have been known 
and used for thousands of years. Straw mixed with clay for building clay huts in the Stone 
Age is one example.2 The concrete of ancient Rome is another.3  Today steel-reinforced 
concrete is one of the most used composites. In combinations of this type, tensile force is 
absorbed by the steel reinforcement, while the concrete absorbs the compressive load.4
Plastics reinforced with various forms of fiber are another type of composites used by 
modern society. Reinforced plastics can be divided roughly into two groups: synthetic 
materials reinforced with short fibers, and synthetic materials reinforced with long 
(continual) fibers. Composites that are reinforced with short fibers are used primarily for 
injection moulding or extruded plastic products. Composites reinforced with long or 
continual fibers are often used in large structures such as ships, pressure tanks, aircrafts, 
and wind turbine wings. In fiber-reinforced plastic materials the properties of the fibers 
are used to resist tensile and compressive loads, while the plastic, called the matrix 
material, transfers shear.5
When using reinforced plastic materials instead of traditional materials such as steel or 
aluminum for example, there are normally significant reductions in weight due, in part, to 
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the specific properties of the individual components and low dead weight, and partly 
because it is possible to produce composites for specific purposes. Because it is a 
combination of materials, a composite product can be combined and designed to fit 
specific load-bearing capacities, while providing a number of advantages in comparison to 
traditional materials, such as resistance to chemicals, as well as electrical and thermal 
insulating properties.6
What is a profile and what can it be used for? 
A profile has a fixed geometry, is produced in some form of continuous process and can 
be cut op in to desired lengths. Profiles can be made in many different materials with 
different properties and can be used for many purposes. As just described reinforced 
plastic can be tailored to exhibit properties which makes it suitable for substituting more 
traditional materials like steel, aluminum, concrete or wood. Today Fiberline produces 
profiles for three focus markets which can demonstrate some of the versatility of profiles 
in reinforced plastic. 
Fiberline produce profiles for windows and facades in which the properties of the 
reinforced plastic material is exploited to make frames and sills meet heightened 
requirements for insulating without compromising design flexibility. Frames made by 
reinforced plastic can for example be made so thin that they are almost invisible in the 
finished build. Also large profiles can be used for cladding facades and Fiberline for 
Profiles in different geometries  
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example produces a translucent profile for this. For cladding facades high stiffness and 
low weight gives design possibilities not offered by conventional materials.7
Profiles in reinforced plastic can also be used for many other purposes in construction to 
provide an alternative to concrete, steel, aluminum and wood which is another focus area 
for Fiberline called structural profiles. They produce beams, brackets, tubes, decking 
systems and grating for this which are mostly standard profiles produced to stock.8    
Another focus is the wind turbine industry for which Fiberline manufactures profiles for 
reinforcing the blade. Here the consistent longitudinal strength of the profiles is exploited 
and complex materials used to maximize strength. Also they produce blade root 
reinforcements. Here the high bushing pull-out strength of the profiles and the fact that 
bushings can be placed closer together makes a reduced blade root diameter possible 
compared to conventional solutions. Apart from this a number of different structures for 
the wind turbine is produced in reinforced plastic profiles for example helicopter hoist 
platforms used for dropping off maintenance personnel. The strength of the profiles is an 
advantage as well as the fact that the materials are corrosion free which is a clear strength 
in the often tough environment of especially off shore wind turbines.9
Fibers  
The choice of reinforcement is important for the properties of the profile, including 
mechanical properties such as strength and stiffness. Carbon fiber is sometimes used but 
glass fiber is the most common. Glass fiber refers to the actual fibers, used in the 
composites whereas fiberglass refers to the finished composite. The orientation of the 
reinforcement is also of great importance to the properties of finished products as regards 
load-carrying capacity. Fiberline use a combination of various types of roving and 
different types of complex weaves and mats of fiber. Structural profiles used for 
construction are for example often subjected to loads that are transversal to the length of 
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the profile and these profiles must often be capable of resisting pull-out loads from bolts 
etc. Therefore not only smooth unidirectional fiber roving is used, but also roving in 
which some of the fibers are oriented transversely. In addition, mats and weaves with 
different fiber orientations are used. Mats and weaves with fiber orientations of between 
45° and 90° contribute primarily to improving bolt pull-out strength and mechanical 
properties in the transverse direction. The combination of fiber roving and mats can be 
tailored to the requirements of the specific profile based on the needs of the customer. The 
pultrusion process necessitates that a certain number of the fibers are oriented in the 
direction of pultrusion, but the reinforcement can otherwise be structured in innumerable 
ways.10
If a profile is to be located in a corrosive environment a “surfacing veil” is used. This can 
be thin fiber glass matting, thin thermoplastic polyester matting or acrylic matting which 
is placed on the entire profile surface to protect the glass fibers against corrosion and 
subsequent deterioration of the mechanical properties of the profile.11
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Different components for wind turbines produced by Fiberline.  
(Fiberline, “Wind Turbine Structures,” Fiberline, 
http://www.fiberline.com/konstruktioner-til-vindmoeller (accessed March 17, 
2014). 
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Fibers (Fiberline, ”Reinforcement,” Fiberline, http://www.fiberline.com/armering, (accessed 
March 17, 2014).       
Types of roving
                                    
Unidirectional                          Spun Mock
Types of mat
Continuous mat  
random fibre orientation
Weave Complex mat
Bidirectional complex mat                   




The role of the matrix in a composite profile is to bind the reinforcement together and 
keep the reinforcement correctly positioned in relation to the cross section which gives the 
optimal utilization of the mechanical properties. The type of matrix also determines 
properties such as corrosion resistance, electrical insulation properties, and fire and 
temperature resistance. 
Three types of plastic are most commonly used as matrix: Polyester, epoxy and phenol. 
Polyester is the most frequently used as it produces a composite with good all-round 
properties. Unsaturated polyester can be divided into three main groups: orthopolyester, 
isopolyester and vinylester. Compared with orthopolyester, isopolyester increases impact 
resistance, provides greater flexibility, and increases resistance to temperatures. It also 
increases corrosion resistance. Vinylester has even better corrosion resistance and thermal 
properties. Also vinylester provides a composite with better impact resistance and 
improved fatigue properties. Epoxy is another plastic material which is used primarily for 
carbon-reinforced profiles, giving composites better fatigue and mechanical properties. 
Epoxy is more resistant to thermal influences and has better electrical properties. Phenol 
is used as a matrix when there are requirements to high fire resistance, temperature 
resistance, low smoke generation, and flame retardation when subjected to fire.12
Additives are agents which are added to the matrix. They can be divided into three 
fundamental groups: price-reducing, process-related and function-related additives. No 
matter their purpose additives will influence the corrosion resistance of profiles, as well as 
their properties. Process-related additives are substances that have an effect on the 
pultrusion process and on the properties and appearance of a cured profile. For example 
additives are used to avoid excessive shrinkage during curing of profiles, to prevent 
formation of cracks in the surface, to increase profile resistance to corrosion and 
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improving fatigue properties. Function-related additives have a beneficial effect for the 
use of a finished profile. One example is pigments added for colour. Fire retardants are 
another example. Price-reducing additives is used to fill out the form of a profile, which 
enables a reduction of more expensive reinforcement and matrix materials in the profile. 
This reduces the price of the finished profiles accordingly. However profiles have poorer 
mechanical properties when the amount of reinforcement is reduced and most types of 
price-reducing additives also result in lower corrosion resistance and diminished 
resistance to most chemicals.13
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Appendix 3: The pultrusion process  
I will give a short description of the pultrusion process as it is done in Fiberline today 
based on information from the web page of Fiberline.1
Pultrusion takes place by continual reinforced material being pulled through a guide (tool) 
where the fibers are placed precisely in relation to the profile cross section. The fibers are 
then led through processing equipment where they are impregnated with the matrix 
material. The combined mixture of fibers and matrix is pulled on through the heating 
equipment where the profile is cured in its final geometry. The fully cured profile is then 
pulled forward to a saw which cuts the profiles into defined lengths. 
The process of pultrusion  
The actual combination of reinforcement in a profile: the type and number of continual 
fibers, as well as the type and dimensions of complex weaves and mats are arranged in a 
way that facilitates visual control when the fibers and mats are positioned in a profile. 
Precise positioning of fibers and mats is very important to the properties and qualities of 
the finished product.2
246
When the reinforcement is pulled into the processing equipment, the matrix is added by 
injection. Pultrusion by injection is advantageous in controlling and checking the 
reinforcement; it speeds changing from one profile to another, and eases matrix changes 
during a process. The degree of impregnation of the fibers is another decisive factor for 
the properties of the finished product.3
After the fibers are impregnated with the injected matrix the final curing takes place in the 
last section of the processing equipment. A profile is thus fully cured and stable in form 
when it leaves the processing equipment. The pulling power overcomes friction in the 
processing equipment and is the driving force in the process. It is provided by pullers 
placed outside the processing equipment. During the last phase of the process, the profiles 
are shortened by a saw mounted to move at the same speed as the profile being pulled out 
of the equipment, which ensures a continual process.4
247 












Spray-up 2 2 1







Autoclaving 1 4 6
Pultrudering 6 6 6
Fiberline, Meet the owners, Power Point Presentation, 2004.  
In his time at Jotun Henrik Thorning had made a comparison of the different methods of 
producing reinforced plastic at the time. Today he has summed up the main points in this 
248
framework that Fiberline uses when introducing new employees to the company and 
explaining the idea of the production to them. As Henrik Thorning tells it basically 
explains why he saw options in the method. In the 1970s when he made the original 
evaluation the assessment of pultrusion was based on a loose estimate as the injection 
method that Henrik Thorning was interested in wasn’t yet developed fully.         
For more details on different methods of production, as they are done today, see 
CompositesWorld, “Fabrication methods,” CompositesWorld, 1 January 2014, 
http://www.compositesworld.com/articles/fabrication-methods (accessed   12 April 2014). 
Most, but not all the methods evaluated by Henrik Thorning are discussed on the site.   
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